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Abstract 
Until the publication of 1992 Nien Kuo-fang Pao-kao Shu (1992 National Defence 
Report, Republic of China) by the Ministry of National Defence, and Kuo-fang Wai- 
chiao Pai-pi Shu ( VVhite Paper on National Defence and Diplomacy) by the Institute 
for National Policy Research in 1992, there was no single text or collection of readings, 
written from a ROC perspective or addressing issues of ROC's concern, which was 
available for people interested in national security. This dissertation is intended to fill 
that gap by broadening the theoretical and empirical evaluation of Taiwan's national 
security to encompass military, political and economic factors. The primary objective 
of this study is to develop an in-depth understanding of the ROC's approach to 
national security through an examination both of the dynamics of the numerous 
security threats confronting Taiwan and of the measures instituted to preserve and 
enhance national security. To accomplish this the study is divided into six chapters. 
Chapter I will provide a conceptual framework for the analysis of national security. 
Discussions focus on: the goal of national security; the sources and nature of threats 
to national security; and the measures to preserve and enhance national security. 
Chapter 2 considers the military dimensions of Taiwan's security. The following 
questions will be asked: Under what conditions might the PRC attack Taiwan? Is the 
PRC capable of gaining control of Taiwan by force? What are the most likely military 
options to be employed by the PRC should it decide to attack Taiwan? How capable 
is the ROC of defending itself? And what defence options are available for Taiwan? 
Chapter 3 examines the impact of the Taiwan independence movement (TIM) on 
Taiwan's political stability and national security. It centres on the following questions: 
What are the motives for the pursuit of Taiwan independence? What are both the 
ROC's and the PRC's attitudes towards the TIM? Will "self-determination" be 
applicable to Taiwan? And what will be the likely impact of TIM on Taiwan's 
security? Chapter 4 considers the economic dimension of security. GATT is used as 
a case study, and the implications of membership for the government and the economy 
of Taiwan are examined. As with any initiative, many questions have been raised. 
Because of Taiwan's excessive dependence on exports, its economic success depends 
in no small way on its ability to keep open its avenues of trade with the outside world. 
Cutting off those avenues could threaten both Taiwan's economic success and national 
security. Since survival is essential to Taiwan, in addition to the pursuit of economic 
growth and development, an independent war capability and sufficient forces are 
required for safeguarding Taiwan's security. In order to reach this goal, military 
modernisation is the only option. Thus, Chapter 5 will try to answer the following 
questions: What are the motives driving Taiwan's accelerated military modernisation? 
Will Taiwan be able to break through Peking's blockade and procure the weaponry 
needed for self-defence? Will the economy of Taiwan be able to continuously sustain 
such huge defence expenditures? Will the armed forces be able to recruit and retain 
an adequate number of skilled military personnel for the advanced and sophisticated 
weapons procured? And what will be the potential impacts of cross-Strait arms race 
on Taiwan Strait stability? In the final Chapter 6 some concluding remarks on the 
preceding Chapters are drawn. Taiwan should: continue its policy of cautious 
rapprochement with the PRC; make every effort to prevent any further deterioration 
in the military balance in the Taiwan Strait; use its economic success as a dipl9matic 
tool to strengthen its relations with countries around the world. 
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Introduction 
The Republic of China has long confronted and endured both external threats and internal 
conflicts. In recent times, the complexity and magnitude of these external threats and internal 
conflicts have greatly increased. The factors contributing to these uncertainties include the 
internal political stability of the island; Taiwan's military capability; the policies pursued by 
Peking's future leaders; the degree of modernisation of the People's Liberation Army; and ROC 
relations with the PRC and the United States. 
However, until the publication of 1992 Nien Kuo-fang Pao-kao Shu (1992 National Defence 
Report, Republic of China) by the Ministry of National Defence, and Kuo-fang Wai-chiao Pai- 
pi Shu ( Mite Paper on National Defence and Diplomacy) by the Institute for National Policy 
Research in 1992, there was no single text or collection of readings, written from a Republic of 
China (ROC) perspective or addressing issues of ROC's concern, which was available for 
people interested in national security. This dissertation is intended to fill that gap by broadening 
the theoretical and empirical evaluation of Taiwan's national security to encompass military, 
political and economic factors. Those who are involved in the development of national security 
policy in the ROC, those concerned with studying it, and those who are party to the more 
general public debate need to be informed about an increasing range of domestic as well as 
global political and economic developments, to be open-minded and far-sighted enough to 
comprehend both the negative and positive implications of those developments, and to 
appreciate where the ROC's unique circumstances fit in. 
Therefore, the primary objective of this study is to develop an in-depth understanding of the 
ROC's approach to national security through an examination both of the dynamics of the 
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numerous security threats confronting Taiwan and of the measures instituted to preserve and 
enhance national security. 
Major Approaches to the Study of Taiwan's Security 
There are at least three major approaches to the study of Taiwan's security: diplomatic 
history, the divided-nation, and rational choice. Each one has its virtues and limitations. 
The study of diplomatic history is an age-old, interpretative approach that seeks to 
document every important event, and identify the thrust of foreign relations. Focusing on 
major decisions and key policyrnakers, this approach is often directed at the systemic level of 
analysis and focuses on great-man diplomacy in power games. History unfolds as leaders of 
major powers shape and reshape their countries' foreign policies in perpetual balance-of- 
power games. Not surprisingly, the issue of Taiwan-mainland security interactions is often 
subsumed under the broad study of the Sino-American relationship. Examples of this 
approach abound, including Thomas Stolper's (1985) well-documented study of the Quemoy 
crisis in 1958, Gilbert and Carpenter's (1989) description of US-China relations, John 
Copper's (1992) work on how American foreign policy initiatives and Chinese responses 
restructured the Washington-Taipei-Peking triangle, and Harry Harding's (1992 ) 
interpretative study of the Sino-American relationship since Richard Nixon's visit to the PRC 
in 1972. 
Works on diplomatic history are not necessary atheoretical, as the balance-of-power game is 
often their implied analytical framework. However, the historical development of foreign 
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relations being their concern, this body of literature is primarily narrative and fact-confirming 
in nature. This genre does not attempt explicitly to spell out the logic of interaction across the 
Taiwan-Strait and its underlying analyses are not geared toward predicting policy behaviour 
on either side. The primary contribution of this body of literature lies in trying to "get the 
facts straight". 
Developed out of the experiences of the two Germanys and two Koreas, the paradigm of the 
divided-nation approach has been frequently applied to Taiwan and mainland China (Wei 
1981; Chu 1989; Klintworth 1991; Tsai 1991; Wang 1990). Major works of this approach 
seek to prescribe formulae by which two ideologically opposed systems--socialism versus 
capitalism--can move from confrontation, through cohabitation, to integration and eventually 
unification. As reunification is an eventual goal that both regimes or central governments 
across the Taiwan Strait have vowed to achieve, the divided-nation model is undoubtedly a 
legitimate and useful approach to examine Taiwan-Mainland relations. This approach helps 
understand the parameters of interaction and shows how self-defined goals ultimately guide 
or constrain the leadership's policy options. 
However, the analytical utility of the divided-nation paradigm has its limitations. Using the 
German model to predict the processes, stages, or even outcomes of security interaction 
across the Taiwan Strait can be very misleading. West Germany's Ostpolitik certainly 
contributed to peaceful German unification, but the result would have been quite different 
without a Mikhail Gorbachev. Moreover, the two regions of Germany did not unify on equal 
terms, but rather the West absorbed the East. Finally, using the divided-nation model to 
analyse Taiwan-Mainland security relations overlooks the size factor as well as the sub-ethnic 
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factor. Size disparity is most acute in the Taiwan-Mainland dyad among the four divided- 
nations in the post-war era. Unification proves to be less difficult if the larger party is 
economically successful and politically open. The sub-ethnic cleavage between the 
mainlanders and Taiwanese in Taiwan, and the complex issue of independence versus unifi- 
cation, are also unique aspects not found in other divided nations. After adding all these 
factors up, we find that the divided-nations model is not suitably applicable to the Taiwan- 
Mainland security interaction. 
The rational actor paradigm offers a third perspective for the study of cross-Strait security 
interactions. This type of analysis can be either formal modelling, or a game-theoretical 
exercise (Bau 1991,72-96; Niou 1992,92-95). Works on the US-PRC interaction in crisis 
situations or in strategic triangles also fall into this category; for example, Lowell Dittmer 
shows that the PRC has been generally playing the game of strategic triangle by "rationally" 
following the logic of its position in the structure (Dittmer 1981,485-515). This approach 
assumes that leaders are rational actors, making full use of the available information and 
examining available policy options, and maximising the gains of policy objectives. The forte 
of this approach lies in crisis situations or strategy for crisis management. Deterrence theory 
is subsumed under this approach. However, this approach comes at a price. Critics have 
always cast doubt on the utility and relevance of this approach to the real world, saying that 
the model is at most heuristic, at worst reductionist, and incapable of adding new information 
to the real issue, which is too complex and too dynamic to be captured by a simplified model. 
The numerous studies on the three analytical approaches shed light on various aspects of the 
cross-Strait relations. These studies, however, generally fail to grasp two salient 
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characteristics of the Taiwan-mainland security interactions: power asymmetry and 
sovereignty claims based on ethnic ties. The presence of these two factors distinguishes the 
Taiwan-mainland from other cases of potential international conflict. Therefore, regime 
asymmetry model and game theory models will be adopted as the main approach to the study 
of Taiwan's security. Pushing the assumption of rational choice literature to its extreme, 
game theory models appear very tempting to the analysts of the Taiwan-mainland relationship 
(Bau 1990; 1991,72-96; Lo and Lin 1993). It is only in recent years that game theory has 
been applied to the analysis of international relations, and even now it is rarely applied to 
interactions between Peking and Taipei. 
Elegant and parsimonious, game theory models seem to be powerful analytical tools. For 
instance, on bargaining, their highly selective variables promise to predict a variety of 
outcomes. This approach informs decision-makers what they ought to do in order to best 
achieve their objectives and it prescribes strategies to accomplish what is maximally possible 
in a given situation (Elster 1989). Applied to the Taiwan-mainland dyad, the objectives of 
decision-makers can vary from conquest, status quo, negotiated settlement, to capitulation. 
Due to their intensive and sensitive interaction, both Taipei and Peking are indeed in a game- 
like situation. Taipei's concern over security and Peking's emphasis on sovereignty together 
shape the dynamics of cross-Strait interaction. This situation resembles the "balance of 
terror" of the Cold War era. 
The Taipei-Peking conflict took the form of a deadlock game during the years 1949-78. 
Confrontation was the dominant strategy of both parties. Since Peking's ultimate goal was to 
take over Taiwan and Taipei's was to recover the mainland, the choice of confrontation was 
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regarded by both parties as inevitable. Mutual compromise, in their eyes, would lead to 
collapse. Interactions in the period 1979-86 could be characterised as a Prisoner's Dilemma 
Game. The observation shows that Peking's estimates of the outcomes and its orders of 
preference changed in 1979. While Taipei maintained the same attitudes and policies toward 
Peking as it did in the previous period, it was not so hostile. However the period 1987-88 
marked a turning point in Taipei's policy toward Peking. Clearly, Taipei understood that the 
disadvantages of mutual confrontation were isolation from the rest of the international 
community, and more importantly, less chance of influencing the mainland. Mutual co- 
operation would reduce tension in the Taiwan Strait and improve the prospects of Taipei 
being able to influence the mainland and expand its diplomatic activities. 
According to two-person game theory, mutual co-operation will result if the following 
conditions are satisfied. First, mutual co-operation must be the choice of both parties. 
Second, both actors must regard co-operation as a dominant strategy. Unfortunately, the lack 
of consensus as to the meaning of mutual co-operation makes it more difficult to find a 
solution to the prisoner's dilemma. Peking's insistence on sovereignty is clearly incompatible 
with Taipei's emphasis on security. The more Peking emphasises sovereignty, the less 
comfortable Taipei feels about dealing with Peking, while Peking inevitably feels that 
Taipei's pursuit of security conflicts with its insistence on sovereignty. This conflict could 
potentially destroy the current co-operation between the two sides. In these circumstances, 
the only way to maintain the existing co-operation is to discover factors which would 
encourage or force the actors to behave as co-operators. 
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The Structure of the Thesis 
In Chapter I we try to establish a conceptual framework for the analysis of national security. 
We open the Chapter with a review of the existing literature. We then seek to explore the 
core values of the state and to survey the types of threats which define national insecurity 
across the military, political and economic sectors. In the final part of the Chapter we 
examine the various approaches and policy instruments employed to enhance and preserve 
national security. Conclusions are drawn about the limitations of the traditional concept of 
and approaches to national security. 
In next Chapter 2 we examine empirically the military dimensions of Taiwan's security. 
Our objective is to explore whether the probability of military confrontation across the 
Taiwan-Strait is increasing or decreasing by analysing different scenarios for the PRC's use 
of force and the most likely military options to be employed by the PRC should it decide to 
attack Taiwan. On the ROC's side we consider how capable Taiwan is of defending itself 
and explore several defence options available for Taiwan. 
In Chapter 3 we extend the dimensions of security from military to political by examining 
the impact of the Taiwan independence movement on Taiwan's security. We start by tracing 
the historical background for the emergence of Taiwan independence movement. We 
examine TIM's theoretical justification for the claims on the uncertainty of Taiwan's legal 
status and the right to self-determination and argue that Taiwan independence is neither 
feasible nor possible based on the domestic, cross-Strait and international factors. We then 
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push the analysis forward by exploring Taiwan's political development and the implications 
of political reform for domestic stability and security and for the cross-Strait relations. 
In Chapter 4 our attention turns to the economic dimensions of security. The novelty of the 
analysis is that, contrary to the traditional approaches to the study of the economic security, it 
uses the WTO (GATT) as a case study to examine the importance for Taiwan's entering the 
major international economic organisations and the implications of membership for the 
government and economy of Taiwan. We begin by examining the need to enhance Taiwan's 
legitimacy and defend its economýic interests through membership of the WTO. We then 
investigate the consequences for and impacts on the economy of Taiwan. The impact of 
Taiwan's WTO bid on cross-Strait relations is also explored in the final part of the Chapter. 
Conclusions are drawn about some policy recommendations and measures for the government 
to adopt in order to win a quick admission to the WTO. 
In Chapter 5, after analysing the various dimensions of security, we further explore the 
variables affecting Taiwan's future security, i. e., cross-Strait arms race and major constraints 
on Taiwan's military modernisation. We first consider the PRC's arms build-up as the 
primary impetus for Taiwan's military modemisation. We review the evolution of Taiwan's 
military modernisation from complete reliance on US as sole arms supplier to a search for 
autonomy in weapons supply through indigenous research, development and production. We 
then seek to test whether the much cited negative defence spending effect on economic 
development and social welfare found in most countries is valid in Taiwan's context. Our 
new results, in contrast to evidence about the impact upon other countries, suggest that 
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Taiwan presents a deviant case to the cross-national generalisations about the relationships 
among defence burden, economic performance, and social welfare. 
Although the research undertaken in this thesis focuses on a number of issues they are inter- 
linked in a number of important ways. Although complex, the core argument of the analysis 
is that Taiwan's security is critically contingent on the interactions between Taipei and 
Peking. Thus in the final Chapter 6 we offer some concluding remarks on the preceding 
Chapters and draw together some of the main contributions of the thesis. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that we have made no attempt to give an exhaustive analysis 
of Taiwan's security issues. However, we have attempted to unify the themes discussed in 
this thesis within a holistic structure. We hope that focusing on particular themes, examined 
through a series of inter-connected essays, helps develop an understanding of those particular 
features of security issues that we have highlighted. 
The Wade-Giles system of Chinese Romanisation has been used in the thesis. 
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Chapter I 
National Security: A Conceptual Framework 
In Chapter I we try to establish a conceptual framework for the analysis of national security. 
This Chapter is divided into five sections. We open the Chapter with a review of the existing 
literature. We then seek to explore the core values of the state in the second section and to 
survey the types of threats which define national insecurity across the military, political and 
economic sectors. In the fourth and fifth sections we examine the various approaches and 
policy instruments employed to enhance and preserve national security. Conclusions are 
drawn about the limitations of the traditional concept of and approaches to national security. 
One primary concern of any type of state is and always will be how to guarantee its own 
security. As a rhetorical phrase for politicians and a conceptual term for security analysts and 
social scientists in describing policy objectives, the term "national security" has been widely 
used. Most studies of national security are state-specific and are usually executed from the 
perspective of the global powers. Many studies assume the meaning of national security to be 
obvious, while others define the concept too narrowly and fail to encapsulate the multifaceted 
nature of national security. The need to define the concept is even more necessary in regard 
to the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan, which is seldom explored comprehensively and 
in its own right. The concept of national security and its applicability to the ROC is of central 
importance to this study. Therefore, this chapter is directed toward an investigation and 
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explanation of the concept. Discussion will focus on these three questions: What is the goal 
of national security? What are the sources and nature of threats to national security? and 
How is national security to be preserved and enhanced? 
1.1 The Concept of National Security 
In his book Discord and Collaboration, Arnold Wolfers (1968,147) characterised national 
security as an "ambiguous symbol that may not have any precise meaning at all". Alastair 
Buchan (1966,24) writes, "Security is a word with many meanings". Helga Haftendorn 
(1991,3-17) argues that the term "security" is as ambiguous in content as in format. Barry 
Buzan (1991,3-15) considers it as an "undeveloped and essentially contested concept". As 
countless discussions of the concept have indicated, the idea of "security" is hardly precise. 
Different countries have very different concepts of security. Each concept of security 
corresponds to specific values, threats, and capabilities to meet the perceived challenges. 
Most developing countries emphasise the economic and social as well as the domestic 
dimensions of security. Some scholars consider that in a modernising society security means 
development. Robert McNamara (1968,149-50) has suggested that the feeling of security 
involves not only confidence on the part of the state in its ability to maintain its prosperity 
and way of life, but also the freedom to develop and improve its position in the future. He 
points out that "Security is development and without development there can be no 
security ... development means economic, social and political progress". As far as the 
individual and the state are concerned, security embodies freedom from fear, freedom of a 
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state to pursue its own interests by its own methods. Security implies a minimal measure of 
order and stability. Without internal development of at least a minimal degree, order and 
stability are impossible. 
Judging by the sacrifices that many national states are willing to make when territorial 
integrity or national interests are threatened, it is evident that national security is highly 
valued by most people. " Few people would deny that security, whether individual, national, 
or international, ranks prominently among the problems facing humanity" (Buzan 1991,1). 
Any country, whether a mighty nation or a small one in the world, is inevitably subject to 
factors, actual or potential, which militate against her own security or even survival. If those 
factors have not been discovered, explored, and solved in an equitable and peaceful manner, 
they will exert a very serious effect on the country, the least of whose troubles would be 
threats to her social order, or serious potential disruption of national stability once she encou- 
nters conflicts within her own boundaries. 
But by what yardstick can we measure national security? That could be gauged by the 
extent to which the people of the country have the ability to determine their own future 
without being influenced by any external power outside their own borders. Security is 
measured, objectively, "by the absence of threats to acquired values", and subjectively, "by 
the absence of fear that such values will be attacked" (Wolfers 1968,150). On the other 
hand, a certain measure of national security is preserved and maintained through economic 
strength and independence. Then how much security should a state seek to achieve? 
Security not only relies on a state's own capabilities, but also others' intentions. A state can 
control its own capabilities. It can decide how powerful it wants to be within limits. But it 
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cannot be certain in advance how others will decide. All will just try to make themselves 
more secure. Most states believe that greater strength will bring greater security. This is not 
necessarily correct. An increase in national strength can cause a provocative effect. "It can 
make an adversary at first warier, then more hostile, and, when it acts on its hostility, 
ultimately more threatening than it would have been had there been no increase in strength" 
(Mandelbaum 1989,257). Even if this is the case, states still pursue the policies to be as 
strong as possible. And even if the policy of increasing strength turns out to be mistaken, it at 
least provides the means to rescue. Though the costs of excessive strength could be high, the 
costs of insufficient strength are all too clear. It therefore seems better "to err on the side of 
being too powerful than not being powerful enough" (Mandelbaurn 1989,260). This is the 
phenomenon which has been called the "security dilemma"--that is, an increase in one state's 
security decreases the security of others. (Jervis 1976,62-76; Buzan 1991,294-324; Job 
1992,17). 
The security dilemma is "based on the fact that threats, and preparations to meet them, are 
interrelated in unpredictable and contradictory ways" (Mandelbaum 1989,255). Those states 
that have some prospect of military rivalry and that wish to preserve the status quo do face the 
choice that it imposes. The main objective of each state's national security is to protect its 
interests from being violated and threatened. In the process of pursuing national security, it is 
impossible for any given state to obtain absolute safety. Wolfers (1968,150) has maintained 
that security is a core value of which a state "can have more or less and which it can aspire to 
have in greater or lesser measure". "States, coexisting as they do with other states, must 
therefore learn to live with some insecurity" (Garnett 1972,32). 
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To illustrate this point, a modest concept of security might Suggest that a state should simply 
have military forces sufficient to offer substantial resistance to the forces of a potential 
attacker, while a more ambitious concept would require forces adequate to overcome and 
conquer a potential attacker. Judging which concept is appropriate depends on an estimate of 
what would be required to deter a potential attacker. This is always an issue of some 
uncertainty, and the amount of force required for deterrence may change over time. Future 
views of security may well differ radically from those generally held today. Moreover, since 
security is to a certain extent a subjective condition, different countries might feel equally 
secure under quite different objective conditions. Thus a more appropriate description on the 
extent of security would probably be that given by Walter Lipmann: "A nation is secure to the 
extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice its core values if it wishes to avoid 
war and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war" (Quoted in Wolfers 
1968,150; Ahmad 1984,329; Buzan 1991,16). 
1.2 The Core Values of the State 
Many definitions of national security have addressed the question, What is the object or goal 
of national security? by identifying certain core values that must be protected. National 
security concerns arise when vital national values are perceived as being threatened by 
adverse foreign actions or events. What is regarded as "vital" is a matter of subjective 
judgement depending on a nation's hierarchy of values. For example, Arnold Wolfers, (1968, 
150) identifies national independence and territorial integrity as the minimum national core 
14 
values. In the same vein, Frank Traeger and Frank Simonie (1973,36) assert that "the 
ultimate purpose of national security is to protect or extend certain national values which are 
considered vital". They identify the physical survival of the population as a distinctive entity 
and the territorial integrity and political independence of the state as the core values to be 
protected. 
Several efforts have been made to broaden the definition of core values. For example, the 
definition of national security advanced by Stephen Krasner includes economic well-being as 
a core value to be protected under the label of national security. Krasner argues that: 
limiting the definition of national security to the core objectives--maintaining the 
political and territorial integrity of the state--ignores many other deeply held 
goals pursued by states. In a broader sense national security can be defined to 
include not only the core objectives but a number of other values as well, as some 
of which are economic. Economic well-being has become a basic goal of all 
political units in the last part of the twentieth century (1983,320-321). 
The economic well-being of its citizens is certainly a fundamental objective of the modem 
state. Although national security policy is often portrayed as being aimed at safeguarding the 
physical security of the populace, this can be misleading if it is interpreted to mean that only 
physical violence or armed force can threaten physical security. "In non-conflict situations, 
welfare values themselves are of increasing importance, to the detriment of ones emphasising 
external military security" (Twitchett 1971,12). Indeed, most citizens of most countries 
probably worry more about physical security in terms of economic affairs--that is, the day-to- 
day problems of economic life--than in terms of military attack. However, Colin Gray (1994, 
25-39) argues that economic well-being "is so dependent upon other values (physical security, 
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political liberty, self-respect) that it requires holistic treatment if it is to make sense in its own 
terms". 
1.3 Nature of Threats to National Security 
The preceding brief survey and discussion of the objectives of national security indicate 
broad acceptance of the core values of physical survival and political independence, which 
implicitly or explicitly assumes that the state is the object of national security and that the 
concern is with the threats that come from the international environment. The external 
orientation may be justified in the case of the advanced industrialised states (though not in all 
cases, as shown by the domestic conflicts in the United Kingdom) where the process of 
modem state formation occurred over a period of centuries. Many of these states have had 
political expression and existence in one form or another since the Treaty of Westphalia in 
1648. In most there is sufficient harmony among the interests of the individual, groups, and 
the state. The components of the state--that is, the idea of the state and its institutional 
expression, the physical base comprising both territory and population, and sovereignty--are 
accepted as legitimate both domestically and internationally (Buzan 1991,57-96). Hcnce 
state authority in these countries has broad-based legitimacy, and this precludes massive 
challenges to the exercise of state authority. Consequently, the degree of internal 
vulnerability in these states is low, and both internal challenges to the state and external 
intervention in their domestic affairs are rare. As such, these states may be free to focus their 
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attention on the external environment to ensure that it is favourable for the survival and 
extension of their core values. 
Such is not the case, however, with most of the developing states. To them, internal security 
problems are in fact the most pressing. Some policy-makers of these states are fortunate in 
having to contend with few if any credible immediate external threats, but they inherited 
fragile state structures which compel them to pay great attention to internal security. Many of 
these states are the products of imperialism and colonialism. Frequently, their physical 
constitution was rather arbitrary, and there is considerable disharmony between the interests 
of some individuals, groups and those of the states as they are constituted. Consequently, the 
components of these states are often subjected to internal and external challenges. For this 
reason the analysis of the nature of threats to national security must also focus on the 
domestic environment--that is, the levels below that of the state. Frequently, threats are stated 
in ambiguous and emotional terms. For the purpose of analysis, however, it is necessary to 
examine the nature of the threats to obtain a more accurate understanding of the magnitude 
and intensity of the threats confronting a state. 
According to Ullman (1983): "A threat to national security is an action or sequence of events 
that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of 
life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy 
choices available to the government of a state or to private, nongovernmental entities 
(persons, groups, corporations) within the state". The sources of threats are divided by 
sectors as follows. 
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1.3.1 Military 
There was a general tendency in the literature to emphasise the military dimension of threats 
to national security during the Cold War era. For example, Michael Louw (1978,15) 
contends that it is really physical violence that is generally perceived as the real and tangible 
danger to survival. The United Nations Charter, whose primary purpose is to maintain 
international peace and security, implicitly identifies the threat or use of force as the primary 
danger and explicitly prohibits the use of force but for certain exceptions. In other words, it 
has been considered that the major source of threats to the security of a nation has come from 
other nations, especially in direct and military forms. 
"Military action can, and usually does, threaten all the components of the state" (Buzan, 
1991,116-7). It can subject the physical base to dismemberment, damage, or subjugation. It 
can repress, subvert the idea of the state and distort or destroy the institutions of the state. 
Military action can bring about those changes rather quickly and therefore has traditionally 
been viewed as the major threat to national security. However, military action covers a wide 
spectrum, ranging from overt attack with special objectives to infiltration and subversion. As 
military action approaches the infiltration or subversion end of the spectrum, the threat itself 
becomes difficult to identify and articulate; it also becomes difficult to mobilise and sustain 
popular support to respond to such action. 
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1.3.2 Political 
Political threats are invariably directed at the idea of the state and its institutional 
expression, though at times they can also endanger the physical base by providing the 
incentive for dismemberment (Ibid, 118-122). As the state is a political construct, it has cause 
to fear political threats. A clear perspective of the domestic dimension of national security 
may be obtained through a discussion of the idea of the state component that ties at the heart 
of the state. If the idea of the state and its institutional expression enjoy broad societal 
consensus, then the legitimacy of state authority is established and the subordination of 
individuals and groups to state authority poses only a few minor problems that do not merit 
consideration under the label of national security. If the idea of the state, however, lacks 
broad societal consensus, then the physical base of the state and its organising ideology and 
the legitimacy of the regime are frequently contested, and internal security becomes a primary 
concern. 
In many states there is no close fit between nation and state. They are multinational or 
multiethnic states. The state is based on a dominant ethnic group at the centre, with ethnic 
minorities at the periphery. Differences in race are further complicated by differences in 
religion, geography, and historical experiences. The dominant ethnic group, which inherited 
or manipulated itself into effective political control of the state, takes the view that the 
constitution of the state at the time of independence is sacrosanct and therefore denies any 
further right to national self-determination. They use the political authority at their command 
and require the subordination of the interests of the other ethnic groups. This creates 
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grievances in the minority groups, and their response has ranged from attempts to change in 
their favour the structure and process of the political authority in the state to demands of 
separatism and irredentism. "Ethnic and other minorities within a state begin to press their 
own selfish demands when it is no longer necessary for such groups to be concerned about 
national security and the interests of the state as a whole" (Jensen 1982,56). In the event that 
the political loyalty of the minority group is not directed toward the state, there is disharmony 
between the interests of the subgroup and that of the state. The subgroup may view the state 
as a threat to its security, whereas the dominant may view the effort of the subgroup to 
preserve its own identity and security as a threat to national security. Because ethnic conflict 
is based on the struggle between different groups for political power and status, it is 
fundamentally linked to the existence of states (Horowitz 1990,453). Thus in these 
circumstances subgroup security and national security are incompatible; in the absence of 
acceptable mechanisms for conflict resolution, the differences may be transformed into a 
violent confrontation. 
If it is impossible--or perceived to be impossible--to redress these grievances through legal 
or political channels, then violent conflict may result (Snyder 1993; Horowitz 1990,455-6). 
Presently, a number of developing states in Asia are confronted with demands from ethnic 
minorities for national self-determination, as witnessed by the demands of the Sikhs in India; 
the Tamils in Sri Lanka; and the Muslims in southern Philippines. 
Unresolved and unresolvable irredentist and separatist issues are threats to the territorial 
interest of many nations. Currently, most of the world's nation-states incorporate substantial 
minority populations. Thus, the potential for ethnic conflict is universal because there are 
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very few states in which only one ethnic group resides. Even after prolonged periods of 
apparent assimilation among other groups, many minorities continue to think of themselves 
as separate and distinct. This feeling of distinctness becomes a separate movement when a 
formal demand is made for territorial secession to form a state. "Nationalist conflicts may be 
latent and seemingly forgotten for prolonged periods, suddenly to emerge with renewed 
vigour as group identity reawakens" (Rosen and Jones 1980,315). In this way, conflicts over 
separate demands become common causes of war. 
At another level, there is a lack of consensus over the organising ideology of the state. The 
ideologies of many developing states have been imported from the West and therefore do not 
have deep historical roots, but because of its undue emphasis on the preservation of the status 
quo, it may be opposed by groups seeking changes in the political and economic order of the 
state. Since the organising ideology of the state is the basis for political order, it is keenly 
contested. However, open political competition on the basis of differing ideologies is 
explicitly or implicitly prohibited in many of the developing states, thus driving the opposing 
political forces underground. The absence of open and free political competition frequently 
results in the employment of violence to achieve political ends, as witnessed by the many 
ongoing domestic conflicts in the developing world. 
The disagreement over the idea of the state and the struggle for political power make the 
state vulnerable not only to instability, internal conflict, and dismemberment but also to 
external intervention and even attack. "Since the state is an essentially political entity, 
political threats may be as much feared as military ones" (Buzan 1991,119). 
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1.3.3 Economic 
Political and territorial integrity has long served as the traditional focus of national security 
concerns. It is presumably still paramount. However, with the end of the Cold War, the 
perception of external military threats has diminished in the industrialised world. Yet, the 
weakening of the perception of military threat has also encouraged a growing sense of 
insecurity on other accounts. It might be more accurate to state that security concerns have 
not waned but have changed to include economic issues. This is especially the case when 
"the coercive employment of economic leverage is an option most likely to appeal to 
conflicting governments in issue areas in which military threats are inapplicable because their 
use would be regarded as illegitimate or otherwise disproportionate" (Knorr 1982,116); and 
especially when "there is no guarantee that military means will be more effective than 
economic ones to achieve a given purpose" (Keohane and Nye 1977,17). Therefore, it has 
been suggested that economic power is becoming, to a degree, a substitute for military power. 
Economic threats are usually employed to modify the international conduct of a state by 
affecting its economic health. Economic threats differ from military and political threats in 
that only rarely are they directed toward altering the idea of the state or the physical base of 
the state. In the post-Cold War era, economic threats are more readily articulated and 
implemented than military threats. The relative ease with which economic threats can be 
initiated, however, does not always carry over into their effectiveness. Although economic 
threats such as a sharp cut-off of a strategic material like oil can have a dramatic impact, this 
is usually not the case with other resources. Normally, the effect of economic threat tends to 
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be neither quick nor radical and seldom has the potential to achieve the desired objective on 
its own. 
Despite these failures, economic threats are widely used, and some developing countries, 
especially those dependent on a few export commodities, may be vulnerable to sudden 
disruptions in their economy with negative consequences for their internal security. Severe 
economic dislocation may give rise to or strengthen the cause of domestic threats to national 
security and also make the state vulnerable to exploitation by external forces. 
The problem we shall now discuss is the relationship between economic issues and security 
issues in a world characterised by growing interdependence and increased politicisation of 
economic issues. As national economic trends and policies become more entwined with 
those of other societies, there is greater national susceptibility to disruptive and injurious 
impacts from abroad. With the increasing interdependence of national economies in trade, 
finance and foreign investment, the political autonomy, traditional values and social 
structures of states are directly and at times significantly influenced. Increased economic 
interdependence has greatly increased the number of ways in which external forces and actors 
may affect national economic conditions. In these circumstances, it becomes an increasingly 
realistic policy perspective to identify international trade matters with security concerns. 
International economic relations are sometimes depicted as a threat to national security. 
International trade and financial ties are often seen as limiting a country's independence and 
making it vulnerable to external pressures. Sometimes in reaction to these fears, a desire to 
protect the economy is maintained on national security grounds. However, free international 
economic relations are viewed by liberals as strengthening national security. In the first 
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place, liberals hold that international trade should be organised in terms of national 
specialisation, the principle of comparative advantage, and a global division of labour. Such 
a system would work to the economic benefit of all. In addition, states should not pursue 
protectionist or interventionist policies such as import restrictions or export subsidies. If 
these liberal precepts were followed, liberals argue, a more efficient utilisation of the world's 
scarce resources and a maximisation of global wealth from which every society would benefit 
would ensue (Gilpin 1992,51-68). The result, from this liberal perspective, would be true 
national security. 
A second way international trade is viewed as making nations more secure is by increasing 
interdependence. For liberals, economic interdependence has a moderating influence on 
international relations. A number of positive outcomes are expected from an increasingly 
interdependent world. It tends to foster co-operation, create bonds of mutual vested interests, 
and promote harmony among nations. Interdependence is viewed as a device for lessening 
conflict between states. As Soloman Polachek (1980,5-22) argues, trading countries with 
significant trade relations engage in less conflict. A state contemplating hostile activities may 
be deterred for fear that its foreign assets may be seized in retaliation and its economic 
interaction disrupted. As states invest more and more in foreign areas or increase their trade 
with another state, they become increasingly dependent on the economic and political stability 
of the foreign state. 
It has been suggested that there are three ways in which interdependence can reduce the fear 
of military threats (Crawford 1994,25-56). First, interdependence directly reduces incentives 
to use force as a means of settling disputes. Second, it increases incentives for states to 
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institutionalise co-operation and engage in rule-based international behaviour. Finally, it 
shifts economic priorities in ways that make territorial conquest less desirable. As countries 
become more dependent on one another, the opportunity costs of severing economic relations 
increase. Countries at war usually suspend economic relations with one another, so increased 
interdependence increases the economic cost of going to war. As Holsti (1992,72) points 
out: "interdependence in a high technology age is tending to render war obsolete". However, 
the question of whether higher levels of economic interdependence make war less likely is 
controversial. It is a line of argument that has figured prominently in national security 
debates for decades (Baldwin 1985,70-95; Gilpin 1982,19-66). 
Economic interdependence may also help reduce conflict in another way. Because there are 
presumed rewards in an interdependent economy, states may be more willing to tolerate 
undesirable policies on the part of other states, recognising that long-term co-operation is 
worth a temporary setback. Participants in an integrated society are likely to accept the notion 
that they cannot win in every instance, and will compromise with the expectation that others 
will reciprocate in the future. As Keohane (1984) points out, " reciprocity seems to be the 
most effective strategy for maintaining co-operation among egoists". 
To mercantilists/nationalists, free trade, however, affects the long-term specialisation of a 
country, enabling an industrialised country to grow faster than an agricultural country. 
Accordingly, the free trade principle is more beneficial for industrialised countries. Edward 
H. Carr (1964,60) argues that laissez-faire is "the paradise of the economically strong". 
There is far from a consensus regarding the benefits of free trade and economic interaction as 
a means of increasing interdependence and well-being among the nations of the world. The 
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idea of interdependence implies equality and symmetry between societies. From the 
perspectives of many developing countries, in contrast, asymmetries and inequalities are the 
most salient characteristics of contemporary international relations. "The picture of relations 
between societies in the dependency model is hierarchical, unequal, and exploitative" (Holsti 
1992,72). The inequalities in the trade structure between the developed and developing 
countries have come under considerable criticism, most notably from the Latin-American 
economist Raul Prebisch (1964). According to Prebisch, free trade favours the North, or the 
developed states, in contrast to the South, or the less developed countries (LDC), because of 
economic structural differences between countries at different stages of development. The 
South must engage in trade largely in terms of primary products. Because of this, LDCs are 
confronted with a situation of continuing weakness in the balance of trade. Developing 
countries hence face the challenge of how to change their comparative advantages and 
improve their terms of trade. As a result, many developing countries adopt neo-mercantile 
trading strategies in which the state plays a critical role in promoting exports as well as 
limiting imports. With greater interdependence, more and more countries are attempting to 
counter the domestic economic and political effects of that interdependence by increased 
interventionism. Most frequently, this state interventionism is carried out in the name of 
national security. 
Thus, mercantilists believe that trade is another sphere of international competition, with 
economic dependence increasing states' insecurity and their vulnerability to external 
economic and political forces. They feel that economic dependence not only causes conflict 
and insecurity, but also creates dependent relations among states. "Any dependence on the 
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outside world for supplies that are vital to national economic life and that can be exploited in 
coercive attempts is a vulnerability raising security concerns" (Knorr 1982,1-18). In 
principle, raw materials can be cut off, markets interdicted, critical goods denied, and 
domestic unemployment hugely increased with relative ease. 
Interdependence has made states increasingly sensitive to occurrences beyond their borders. 
Sometimes this sensitivity is mutual and symmetrical, but more frequently, since states are 
unequal in size and endowments, it is asymmetrical and affects some states considerably more 
than others (Jacobson 1984,203-210). "It is asymmetries in interdependence that are most 
likely to provide sources of influence for actors in their dealings with one another" (Keohane 
and Nye 1977,10-11). Since economic interdependence is never symmetrical, trade thus 
becomes a means for the strong to increase their political power over the weak. In sum, trade 
is a source of political tension and economic leverage, and an instrument that lessens a 
society's ability to govem its own affairs. These sources of political and economic leverage 
can be and frequently are manipulated for economic and political advantage. 
Waltz (1979,138) believes that "close interdependence means closeness of contact and 
raises the prospect of occasional conflict". Albert Hirschman (1980,16) further explains 
economic interdependence as "the power to interrupt commercial or financial relations with 
any country" and "the root cause of the influence or power position which a country acquires 
in other countries". Similarly, Gilpin (1987,23) contends that markets are not politically 
neutral, but that they create power which one nation can use to exploit and manipulate 
another. Martin Staniland (1985,95-96) also maintains that foreign trade inevitably makes a 
country more vulnerable to external political and economic pressures. Likewise, Richard 
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Cooper (1972,160-64) believes that increased economic dependence erodes the effectiveness 
of national economic policies, hence threatening national autonomy in the determination and 
pursuit of economic objectives. Overall, the perception is that economic dependence allows 
dominant actors to affect the weaker's economic policy. Thus, the small power's high degree 
of reliance on foreign markets and on foreign sources of supply, coupled with the difficulties 
stemming from specialisation in exports and from having to retain a comparatively higher 
degree of diversification in imports, makes it particularly vulnerable to economic pressures 
and to economic sanctions and economic warfare. 
More recently, several analysts (Buzan 1991; Buzan 1994; Bitzinger 1994; Baldwin 1985; 
Crawford 1994; Friedberg 1991; Goldgeier & McFaul 1992; Gilpin 1992; Knorr 1982; 
Kransner 1978; Luciani 1989; Moran 1991; Ullman 1983; and Vernon & Kapstein 1991) 
have explored the connections between trade and military security, and put emphasis on 
issues such as the restraints on trade arising from strategic considerations. Military power has 
always been an important means of achieving national security. In this context, national 
security requires autonomy in the use and supply of forces, superior technology and 
equipment supply. Thus the control of military and potentially military technologies and 
strategic supplies is a paramount objective of national security. However, viewed from 
another perspective of economic content of security, interdependence also increases military 
vulnerability because military resources are increasingly found in global commercial markets 
over which states have little control. As Barry Buzan (1991,124-3 1) points out, markets are 
a constant source of insecurity; they threaten inefficient actors with extinction. The 
availability of resources for given purposes have an important impact on military policies. 
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Thus, for those states that will continue to seek their security predominantly through military 
means, increasing globalisation of production and exchange presents them with a new 
"economic security dilemma" (Crawford 1994,1). 
The globalisation of the arms industry entails a significant shift away from traditional, 
single-country patterns of weapons production toward internationalisation of the 
development, production, and marketing of arms. Globalisation raises a number of concerns 
about national security requirements, the military and commercial effects of global 
technology diffusion, and conventional arms proliferation. Bitzinger points out that: 
The globalisation of arms production appears to be increasing not only in terms 
of the sheer number of collaborative arms activities but also in terms of depth, 
as armaments co-operation reaches down to the level of technology sharing and 
componentry; of sophistication, as defence firms around the world forge new, 
direct links with each other; and of geographic scope, as more countries in the 
developing world become players in international arms production as a result of 
increased collaborative arms programs (1994,195). 
Therefore, economic globalisation considerably weakens the ability of nations to rely on 
independent, autonomous defence policies as the sole basis of their security (Veron and 
Kapstein 1991,4). The choice of which weapons system to emphasise and what level of 
armaments to strive for is influenced by available economic resources, which are not 
unlimited even in the wealthiest state, and hard choices often have to be made. Economic 
resources also play a particularly important role in whether a state is able to produce nuclear 
weapons. To the extent that a state has its own supply of fissionable materials, its prospects 
of producing nuclear weapons are greatly enhanced, especially in view of the fact that 
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imported fissionable products are likely to be subjected to strict controls to make certain they 
not diverted to military use. 
Attempting to retain access to strategic raw materials that are in short supply also tends to be 
a major objective of states and can lead to conflict between them. Krasner (1978,148) 
concluded that American policy-makers generally place broader foreign-policy aims above 
the security of the supply of raw materials, and an assured supply is viewed as more important 
than the ideological goal of guaranteeing competitive markets. "Market control has therefore 
become a new "threat" to replace the threat of territorial control" (Crawford 1994,35). 
Although the above discussion compartmentalises the possible types of threats to national 
security, in reality they interact and reinforce each other. For example, the threats which 
Taiwan confronts comprise political, military and economic dimensions. Of these, the 
military dimension is the most visible and tends to attract greater attention from policyrnakers 
and observers. However, in the long run, the political dimension is the most important one 
that has to be addressed if the conflicts--both internal and across the Taiwan Straits--are to be 
resolved satisfactorily. 
1.4 Approaches to National Security 
How is national security to be preserved and enhanced? Some states seek security by 
maintaining strict neutrality; others seek it by joining alliances. Some seek security by 
confronting potential adversaries with military force; others seek it by trying to be 
accommodating "good neighbours". As Wolfers (1968,491) noted in the early 1950s, "In the 
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matter of means, the roads which are open may lead in diametrically opposed directions". 
Recalling that the security of a state is a function both of its own vulnerability and the threats 
posed by external sources, the approach to national security may take any one or more of the 
following forms: 
1.4.1 Security Through Strengthening the State 
Security through strengthening the state aims at minimising the state's own vulnerability. 
This would reduce the number and intensity of internal threats and also minimise the 
opportunities for external intervention in domestic affairs. There are, however, inherent 
limitations in the extent to which genuine strengthening of the state can be undertaken. It 
requires the institution of policies to promote the popular acceptance of the idea of the state 
and the establishment of mechanisms for popular representation and transfer of political 
power. This approach would also necessitate positive consideration of options, such as the 
right to national self-determination or political autonomy for ethnic minorities, and the 
acceptance of open political competition based on differing organising ideologies. Similarly, 
the enhancement of the legitimacy of state authority may require open and free competition 
for political power. 
These policies could undermine the political dominance of the group or regime in power. 
Therefore, strengthening the state is undertaken in a limited context. Policies such as nation 
building, development of a national or state ideology, controlled elections, economic 
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development, and diplomatic offensive to neutralise external support for domestic dissidents 
are all aimed at selective strengthening--that is, preservation and promotion of the status quo. 
1.4.2 Security Through Power and Alliance 
Security through power has the functions of deterrence and containment. "Having to rely on 
their own strength for almost all the things they cherish, including their very survival, nations 
set limits below which they dare not drop in their quest for power and influence and their 
resort to power" (Wolfers 1962,106). It is hoped that the development of state power will 
prevent the emergence of external threats, facilitate the containment of perceived threats, and 
enable the defeat of threats that have been actualised. States may seek to enhance their 
standing in the balance-of-power equation by developing their own power or by augmenting 
their power through alliance. For developing states, there are several limitations in the extent 
to which they can develop their own state power. Their resources are limited, and undue 
emphasis on the development of state power to counter potential external threats, which 
means a disproportionate expenditure on defence, would limit the resources available for 
socio-economic development (Deger & West 1987,67-83; Ball 1998,161-386; Chan & Mintz 
1992,163-178). Such a scenario could further increase their domestic vulnerability. 
The development of nuclear weapons may to an extent ease the limitation imposed on the 
development of state power for some of the developing states. Although the cost and utility 
of a small nuclear force are controversial issues, development of nuclear capability will 
almost certainly bring about changes in the behaviour of global and medium powers toward 
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the states in possession of nuclear weapons (Handel 1981,202-208). North Korea is a good 
example of this. However, only a small number of developing states have the potential to 
develop nuclear weapons. For the vast majority, the price tag for the development and 
maintenance of a modem and effective conventional armed forces is prohibitive, plus the 
difficulties of gaining access to nuclear technology and equipment for manufacturing 
weapons. 
Therefore, many states seek to augment their power principally through alliance. Military 
alliances can be classified according to four criteria: "(1) the nature of the casusfoederis; (2) 
the type of commitments undertaken by the alliance partners; (3) the degree of military 
integration of the military forces of the alliance partners; and (4) the geographic scope of the 
treaty" (Holsti 1992,89). Although this approach has the advantage of limiting the resources 
expended on defence, the coupling of national security to the interests of alliance partners 
could result in the loss of control over the direction of national security policy. The state also 
becomes susceptible to new threats and constraints. Thus the action taken to preserve 
national security may itself necessitate a measure of compromise of state sovereignty because 
of the reciprocal need to provide bases, support facilities, and support for the cause of the 
patron power. 
However, there is also the danger that the interests of the dominant member of the alliance 
could override the national security interests of the weaker members. The weak states 
frequently have no other suitable alternative and thus accept the shortcomings of this 
approach as a cost that has to be bome in the name of national security. 
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1.4.3 Security Through Regional Order and Co-operation 
Security through regional order and co-operation has the objective of development and 
maintenance of a favourable regional environment to reduce or eliminate external threats to 
national security from states in the region. It is assumed that regional organisations have the 
potential to (1) prevent intervention by members in each other's internal affairs, (2) create 
regulatory mechanisms to facilitate the resolution and adjustment of intraregional problems 
through peaceful means, (3) generally enhance the stability and solidarity of the region and 
thus minimise interference and intervention by extraregional powers. Although the merits of 
this approach as outlined above are important, the limits must also be recognised. 
National security and regional security do not necessarily complement each other. In fact, 
they can be and frequently are perceived as incompatible. Differences in threat perception, 
competing economic interests, differing foreign policy role conceptions, and unresolved 
intraregional problems imply that the basis for regional co-operation is not deep-rooted and 
its development is likely to be placed in a difficult position, especially when subjected to 
stresses and strains from both within and external to the region. The dynamics of the national 
security of a member state may necessitate emphasis on an approach that may run counter to 
that articulated by the regional organisation, thus creating tension and imposing constraints on 
choice. Another consideration that is likely to limit the value of this approach is the power 
available to the regional organisation. If the organisation has only meagre resources at its 
command, then the attraction and value of the approach may be significantly reduced. 
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The approaches to national security analysed above are not mutuAy exclusive. When taken 
collectively, they address both the internal and external dimensions of national security. 
However, the approaches are not necessarily complementary either. The potential for 
contradictions is inherent, especially when choices are constrained by the linkage of national 
security to an external actor--be it a state or an organisation. In reality, many of the states 
employ a combination of these approaches with the total approach dependent on the 
circumstances of the individual state. 
1.5 Policy Instruments 
A variety of policy instruments may be employed to preserve national security. Given the 
nature of the threats, the policy response and the instruments of policy employed to counter 
them will be multifaceted and encompass political, socio-economic, military and foreign- 
policy dimensions. The combination of policy instruments chosen will, of course, depend on 
the nature and intensity of the threat. 
1.5.1 Economic Development 
Two common instruments of policy employed in countering internal threats are economic 
development and political democratisation. Economic development is perceived to serve 
several functions, among them to (1) eliminate conditions that are considered conducive to 
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the growth of insurgency, (2) facilitate integration by uplifting the economic well-being of the 
affected people, and (3) enhance the legitimacy of the regime in power. 
Although economic development may well facilitate these functions, it is also necessary to 
recognise its limits and possible shortcomings. Unevenness in economic development may 
create differences between urban and rural areas or between regions usually favouring the 
centre at the expense or perceived expense of the periphery and thus further alienate the 
periphery. Distribution of the benefits among individuals and groups may be unequal, such 
an imbalance may provide fertile ground for exploitation by "subversive" groups or may itself 
provide the basis for organised resistance to the incumbent regime. 
Economic development can create new political and socio-economic forces that demand 
participation and changes in the political framework--an outcome that may not be acceptable 
to the incumbent regime. There are many examples where rapid economic development, 
unaccompanied by corresponding political and social development, have worked to the 
disadvantage of the regimes in power. Finally, economic development requires the 
importation of capital and technical expertise--neither of which is often available locally. This 
creates a dependency relationship, with the external actors capable of providing such 
assistance, and may make the regime vulnerable to external pressures. The dependency 
relationship also contributes to the vulnerability of the local economy to international 
economic developments, and downturns in the international economy can make the regime 
vulnerable to challenges from within the state. 
1.5.2 Political Democratisation 
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During Taiwan's past and recent major elections, issues such as ethnic consciousness, ethnic 
conflict, and the dispute over national identity have arisen and have drawn attention from 
both scholars and the public. A close observation of the elections indicates that the problem 
of provincial origin seems to have manifested itself through the phenomenon of ethnic voting. 
In addition, both of the two major opposition parties, the Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP) and the New Party (NP), have displayed inclinations toward becoming ethnically- 
based political parties. In the process of Taiwan's democratisation, long-suppressed 
identification with provincial origins and ethnicities have gradually revived since 1987, when 
martial law was lifted. They have become the base of political mobilisation by the DPP and 
various other social movements. Ethnicity has undeniably played an important role in 
Taiwan's political development, and we have to realise that Taiwan's democratisation is to be 
achieved in a multi-ethnic context. Yet, in the various elections, ethnicity and the 
mainlanders' sense of crisis were seemingly employed to promote ethnic politics. This 
implicit convergence of ethnicity and party politics may become a troubling obstacle in 
Taiwan's democratisation. Therefore, we have to seriously consider the ethnic issue in the 
process of political development and democratisation. 
In principle, democratisation presents a potential opportunity for resolving ethnic conflict. 
As long as different groups continue to cohabit states, the potential for ethnic conflict 
remains. This raises two questions. How is it possible to prevent latent ethnic tensions from 
being inflamed? When ethnic tension is acute, how can these conflicts be mitigated? The 
key to answering both questions lies in creating an environment in which political moderation 
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prevails. Moderation has two definitions. In the context of democratisation, modemisation 
means support for negotiated settlements, rather than revolutions (Huntington 1991,121). In 
ethnic disputes, moderation means avoidance of extremism and hostility in developing 
positions vis a vis other ethnic groups (Nevers 1993,31-48). 
Then how can moderation be promoted? If possible, it is best to prevent serious tension 
from developing, thus avoiding the situation in which a potential conflict becomes a real 
conflict. One way to do this is to structure the electoral system of the state so that most 
political parties and mainstream politicians cannot perceive a political advantage in adopting 
extremist positions on ethnic issues. For an electoral system to avoid or mitigate ethnic 
tension, it must be designed to ensure power-sharing among different ethnic groups. Arend 
Lijphart (1990,491-509) suggests that for power-sharing to be effective, it must provide for 
the following: a joint exercise of power by the relevant groups in a given state, group 
autonomy, proportionality in representation and a minority veto. There is general agreement 
that the parliamentary model is more useful than the presidential model in ethnically diverse 
states; a system of power-sharing through proportional representation can best meet the needs 
of multi-ethnic societies (Quoted in Nevers, 1993,31-48). However, there is the danger that 
smaller groups may never have a share in power if political parties are formed exclusively on 
the basis of separate ethnic communities. 
The process for democratisation tends to follow a general pattern (Third World Quarterly 
1985, vii-xvi). First, in many cases, an external catalyst changes popular perceptions about 
the options available to non-democratic regimes and, thus, increases popular support for 
opposition movements. Second, authoritarian governments reject change, which then leads to 
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an expansion of popular opposition to the regimes. Third, the regimes recognise that they 
cannot continue to rule without including opposition forces in some way, which leads, fourth, 
to negotiations on new political structures between regimes and opposition groups. The fifth 
and final step is elections. In this respect, the means to achieve it are the expansion of 
political participation and the creation of stable democratic governments, established by 
competitive elections in which the majority of the population has the right to vote. 
To prevent or dampen ethnic conflicts successfully, the forces pushing for democratisation 
must, "first, recognise and acknowledge the ethnic differences within the state and, second, 
accommodate the interests of different groups in a way that is perceived to be fair and even- 
handed" (Nevers 1993,31-48). Because in most cases democratisation includes a negotiating 
phase, there is an inherent opportunity in the process to address issues raised by ethnic 
tensions--especially when constitution-building is part of the democratisation process. For 
democratisation to reduce ethnic tension, the inclusion of all relevant groups in the 
negotiating process is required; in addition, there must be a willingness by all parties to work 
for, and then accept, a mutually beneficial arrangement 
1.5.3 Diplomacy 
In countering external threats to national security, greater stress may be laid on diplomacy 
and military power; the emphasis is likely to change with the power of the adversary. 
Diplomatic instruments are skills and resources used by a government to represent itself and 
its citizens to foreign governments and international actors. "Its function [diplomacy], so far 
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as the sovereign states are concerned, is to provide them with a non-violent means to pursue 
their individual objectives, to accomodate or resolve their differences and to advance their 
common aims" (Armstrong, 1993,248). Diplomacy may be directed toward the prevention 
of threats through anticipation of possible developments and the reaction of other states to 
such developments and designing policies to defuse the political situation or problem. 
Alternatively it may be directed at the resolution of security problems that have materialised 
by persuading the adversary state to drop its aggressive designs through the offer of suitable 
incentives and/or application of political, military and economic pressure (Craig & George 
1983). Simultaneously, diplomacy may be directed toward the forging of alliances and 
treaties to improve the position of the state in the relative balance-of-power equation. Thus, 
diplomacy is an important instrument, and while it is not unrelated to military power, the 
relationship is not proportional either. States weak in military power could, depending on the 
circumstances, exert a disproportionate weight in diplomatic influence. However, diplomacy 
not backed by adequate military power has its limits. In such situations, the weak powers 
may have to couple their diplomatic effort with the military muscle of their alliance partner. 
Such a coupling may restrict their flexibility and power of initiative. In other words, the 
developing state has to operate within the given dynamics of the situation and has little or no 
influence to alter the dynamics itself. As such, flexibility, compromise, and accommodation 
must characterise the foreign relations of developing states so that they can come to terms 
with changes in the international alignment over which they have little or no control. 
1.5.4 Military Power 
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Despite all the qualifications which have been made, the survival of the state has been and 
continues to be the most important single value perceived by statesmen and other policy- 
makers. The primary safeguard of that value, moreover, is usually the possession of and if 
necessary the exercise of military power by a state. As Adam Smith wrote in 1776: "The first 
duty of the sovereign, that of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of the 
other independent societies, can be performed only by means of a military force" (Quoted in 
Kennedy 1983,5; and World Economic Survey 1991,17 1). 
Alternatively, security might depend on economic factors or diplomatic skill rather than 
military strength. But these will not be sufficient to ensure survival if there are no restraints 
on hostile neighbours. In wartime when the very existence of a nation is at stake, however, 
its physical survival is of paramount importance. No nation can fail to prepare for this 
contingency. In this sense, defence capability does remain the pivotal element for national 
survival in time of crisis and war. "It is important not to exaggerate the importance of 
military power but it is even more important not to undervalue it" (Gray 1994,37). Military 
power may serve a deterrent function in the threat-prevention stage, but it may assume a more 
dominant role in the containment and defeat of threats that have materialised. In short, 
deterrence and defence are the key elements to securing national security. To cope with 
imminent threats, either internal or external, a nation needs its own forces and enough of its 
resources converted into and maintained as immediately deployable military strength. 
Otherwise, national existence cannot be properly guaranteed. The once vanished Kuwaiti and 
the former Afghan governments unmistakably testify the validity of this proposition. 
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However, national security cannot depend upon military power alone. The specific military 
problem is only a narrow facet of the broader security problem. The overemphasis on military 
aspects of national security is especially prevalent in discussions of external threats and the 
means by which they can be countered. Nonetheless, military means are not the only way and 
are not always the best way to pursue national security goals. The geography, natural 
resources, population, public support and cohesion, the stability of the political system, 
economic strength and technological capability are also as important for national security as 
military power. As Buzan argues, "The different components of the state appear vulnerable to 
different kinds of threat, which makes national security a problem in many dimensions rather 
than just a matter of military defence" (Buzan 1991,97). Richard Ullman (1983,129-53) 
holds the same view that, "defining national security merely (or even primarily) in military 
terms conveys a profound false image of reality". "Military power is not the only source of 
national security, and military threats are not the only dangers that states face" (Walt 1991, 
211-240). However, there are conditions of physical, political and economic insecurity, 
where military protection is indispensable. 
It can be argued that powerful military forces are necessary to deter potential attackers and 
are therefore essential to a state's security. But it can also be maintained that powerful 
military forces in one state are likely to be viewed as threatening by other states and will tend 
to induce the latter to increase their own forces, thereby setting in motion a spiralling arms 
race that could make all states less secure (Jacobson 1984,135-142). 
According to Balding and Milner (1992,29-50), two types of potential costs of excessive 
reliance on military statecraft in pursuit of national security deserve attention, especially in 
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view of the common belief that military build-up always increases security. The first is the 
risk of provoking an adversary to take some rash action, such as a massive arms build-up or 
even a preventative war. Second, massive military spending may have costs that are difficult 
to foresee or measure. In addition, the use of force has become more costly for major states 
as a result of at least four conditions. "One is the risk of nuclear escalation. Second, there is 
greater nationalism and greater resistance by people in poor or weak countries. Third, states 
find that the use of force may have uncertain and negative effects on achieving their economic 
goals. Fourth, domestic opinion opposed to the human costs of the use of force seems to have 
increased" (Nye 1989,332). Therefore, "military power does not have to be used to be 
useful; it is sometimes most useful when it is not used" (Garnett 1972,29). Strengthening 
military muscle too far beyond what a nation can afford may jeopardise its vitality and 
constitute a cause for its collapse. The preceding discussion is just an indication of the nature 
and the role of the variety of policy instruments that may be employed in the pursuit of 
national security. The specific combination and relative emphasis of the measures adopted 
will vary and be related to the source and nature of threat and the approach adopted to 
preserve the national security of the state. 
The analysis advanced above argues compellingly that the traditional approach to national 
security is inappropriate to Taiwan as well as to developing countries. The body of literature 
on developing states' national security appears to suffer from relying on the Western 
experience to understand and apply national policy and security. Four major weaknesses can 
be singled out. 
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First, this literature has focused chiefly on the military dimension, especially threat 
perceptions of contending elites, doctrinal responses, security resources and capabilities to 
meet external threats to the state. However, defining the concept of national security in terms 
of physical protection of the nation-state from external military threats is not only narrow, but 
also misleading. The threats facing the developing states are diverse and complex, and so are 
the dimensions and content of national security. 
Second, the accumulation, maintenance and development of military force is no panacea for 
security problems. Military strength is a necessary but insufficient guardian. The complex 
and multiple vulnerabilities of the developing states compel us not only to look at a deeper 
structure and a broader spectrum of security issues, but also to search for different resources 
and capabilities corresponding to each pertinent threat. Furthermore, excessive preoccupation 
with military power can entail extensive trade-offs with domestic social, political and 
economic issues, which could eventually undermine overall security posture. 
Third, the security environment is important, but it does not necessarily determine or dictate 
the nature of security issues. Domestic factors such as legitimacy, integration, ideology, and 
policy capacity play equally important roles in shaping the national security posture. Security 
challenges in many parts of the developing countries are of endogenous rather than exogenous 
origin. Moreover, it is fallacious to understand the developing states' national security from 
the perspective of superpower rivalry. The superpowers may affect the parameters of 
national security in some countries, but they do not determine its nature. As current 
developments in many parts of the world illustrate, the superpowers are seldom able to 
contain, manipulate, or dictate regional and country-specific security problems, whether 
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military or economic. Finally, direct emulation and adoption of national security management 
tools and techniques from the West also appears unwise. The search for effective 
management techniques should be context-bound, taking account of problems, and 
requirements specific to each national security environment. 
The foregoing does not suggest that the traditional approach to national security must be 
dropped. The traditional concept of national security is still valid in many parts of the 
developing world where significant, immediate external military threats characterise the 
security situation. Against this backdrop, this chapter has tried to refine and expand the 
concept of national security, suggest and expand the concept of security concerns, and 
elucidate the complex structures associated with them. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we tried to establish a conceptual framework for the analysis of national 
security. We found the need to define the concept is even more necessary in regard to the 
ROC on Taiwan, which is seldom explored comprehensively and in its own right. The 
concept of national security and its applicability to the ROC is of central importance to this 
study. Therefore, Chapter I was directed toward an investigation and explanation of the 
concept. 
Judging by the sacrifices that many national states are willing to make when territorial 
integrity or national interests are threatened, it is evident that national security is highly 
valued by most people. However, as countless discussions of the concept have indicated, the 
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idea of "security" is hardly precise. Different countries have very different concepts of secur- 
ity. Each concept of security corresponds to specific values, threats, and capabilities to meet 
the perceived challenges. Most developing countries emphasise the economic and social as 
well as the domestic dimensions of security. The feeling of security involves not only 
confidence on the part of the state in its ability to maintain its prosperity and way of life, but 
also the freedom to develop and improve its position in the future. 
For the purpose of analysis, it is necessary to examine the nature of the threats to obtain a 
more accurate understating of the magnitude and intensity of the threats confronting a state. 
The sources of threats were divided and examined by military, political and economic sectors. 
Of these, the military dimension is the most visible and tends to attract greater attention from 
policyrnakers and observers. However, in the long run, the political dimension is the most 
important one that has to be addressed if the conflicts--both internal and across the Taiwan 
Straits--are to be resolved satisfactorily. 
Since the security of a state is a function both of its own vulnerability and the threats posed 
by external sources, approaches to national security may take one or more of the following 
forms: security through strengthening the state; security through power and alliance; and 
security through regional order and co-operation. These approaches are not mutually 
exclusive. When taken collectively, they address both the internal and external dimensions of 
national security. However, the approaches are not necessarily complementary either. The 
potential for contradictions is inherent, especially when choices are constrained by the linkage 
of national security to an external actor--be it a state or an organisation. In reality, many of 
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the states employ a combination of these approaches with the total approach dependent on the 
circumstances of the individual state. 
A variety of policy instruments may be employed to preserve national security. Given the 
nature of the threats, the policy response and the instruments of policy employed to counter 
them will be multifaceted and encompass political, socio-economic, military and foreign- 
policy dimensions. The discussion in this chapter is just an indication of the nature and the 
role of the variety of policy instruments that may be employed in the pursuit of national 
security. The specific combination and relative emphasis of the measures adopted will vary 
and be related to the source and nature of threat and the approach adopted to preserve the 
national security of the state. 
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Chapter 2 
Military Dimensions of Taiwan's Security 
From the analysis presented in Chapter 1, it is clear that the range of national security 
issues is wide, stretching across the military, political and economic sectors. 
However, the full richness and meaning of security is to be found in the interplay 
among them rather than the primacy of one. It is thus worth examining the character 
ot threats within each of these sectors in order to try to get a general sense of the 
legitimate national security agenda. Therefore this chapter will start by exploring the 
military dimensions of Taiwan's security. 
This chapter is divided into two main sections. Our objective is to explore whether 
the probability of military confrontation across the Taiwan-Strait is increasing or 
decreasing by analysing different scenarios for the PRC's use of force and the most 
likely military options to be employed by the PRC should it decide to attack Taiwan. 
On the ROC's side we consider how capable Taiwan is of defending itself and explore 
several defence options available for Taiwan. 
During his recent visit to Taiwan, former President Gerald R. Ford was asked how 
the United States might respond if the PRC attacked Taiwan. Ford replied, "The day 
[for an attack] is gone" (China Post, June 10,1991). Howard Baker, former White 
House Chief of Staff, believes that "the likelihood of an invasion of Taiwan is very, 
very small, virtually impossible" (Free China Journal, November 12,1990). 
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On the other hand, Martin Lasater, President of the Pacific Council and Research 
Associate at Pennsylvania State University's Centre for East Asian Studies, has 
warned that "Peking's threat to Taiwan in the 1990s will be somewhat higher than in 
the 1980s, despite greater interaction across the Taiwan Strait" (Lasater 1993,39-58). 
Some ROC officials share Lasater's concern. Defence Minister Chiang Chung-lin 
believes that Peking's desire to take Taiwan "is as strong as ever" (Chung-yang Jih- 
pao, October 5,1995). 
Interestingly, Taiwan's population is equally divided in its assessment. In January 
1993, public opinion polls revealed that 33.4 percent of the island's residents believe 
that Peking has stepped up its threat to invade Taiwan, but 20 percent believe that the 
danger of an invasion has declined. Moreover, when asked whether the threat from 
across the Taiwan Strait would escalate over the next decade, 29.7 percent replied that 
it would while 28.8 percent said it would not (Lian-ho-pao, January 22,1993). The 
Peking leadership's recent behaviour has not helped to mitigate the fear. Military 
activities in and around the Taiwan Strait after President Lee Teng-hui's visit to the 
United States and the continuous waves of military exercises prior to Taiwan's 
presidential election have aggravated the already tense situation. The Taiwan and 
international press talks of a possible mainland military offensive, citing cases of PLA 
airforces jets flying over Matsu to intimidate the people of Taiwan, and military 
manoeuvres in the Taiwan Strait. 
Is the probability of military confrontation across the Taiwan Strait increasing or 
decreasing? There is little doubt on Taiwan that the PRC will eventually invade the 
island if it is able to do so at an acceptable cost and if Peking is unable to gain control 
of Taiwan in any other way. The short-term variables inherent in those conditions are 
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infinite, but the long-term threat is itself a constant. In Chapter 2, therefore, we will 
consider five questions that lie at the heart of the issue: Under what conditions might 
the PRC attack Taiwan? Is the PRC capable of gaining control of Taiwan by force? 
What are the most likely military options to be employed by the PRC should it decide 
to attack Taiwan? How capable is the ROC of defending itself? And what defence 
options are available for Taiwan? 
2.1 The Threat of the Use of Force by the PRC 
2.1.1 Military Confrontation Between the ROC and the PRC 
The conflict between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) has lasted for more than half a century, and confrontation between the ROC 
and the PRC dates back to 1949, when the KMT retreated to Taiwan and a few small 
islands off the south-eastern coast of mainland China after its defeat by the 
Communists in the civil war. Since then, both regimes have attempted several times 
to defeat the other and to reunify China. 
Ever since 1949, the PRC's threat of invading the ROC has always been present. The 
CCP leadership has made it clear that the "liberation of Taiwan" remains at the top of 
the regime's agenda. Several military conflicts were initiated, including the Battle of 
Kunitou Beach, Kinmen (Quemoy) Island, in October 1949, the August 23rd 
Bombardment of Kinmen in 1958, and several sporadic guerrilla operations. In all 
cases, the violence was instigated by the PRC but successfully repelled by ROC 
forces. Despite being at a disadvantage militarily, the ROC continued its rivalry with 
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the PRC. During the 1950s, the ROC was actually much more active than the PRC, 
conducting a series of low-intensity military actions against mainland China. Many 
suspect that these hostile actions, besides being a response to Peking's threats, were 
also motivated by political considerations. It might have been the ROC's strategy to 
attract US attention and also to strengthen domestic control by exaggerating the extent 
of the external threat (Rosen & Jones 1980,320; Hoole & Huang 1989,142-63). 
After the second armed conflict, relations between the two gradually relaxed. 
Although the PRC continued to shell the ROC off-shore islands of Kinmen and 
Matsu, the bombardment became ritualistic, taking place on a regular odd-numbcr-day 
basis. However, the possibility of conflict over the reunification issue cannot be 
underestimated. The PRC is always ready to admit that it has a contingency plan to 
reunify China by force. At the same time, the ROC still has about one-fifth of its 
armed forces stationed on the offshore islands adjacent to the mainland (Huang, Kim, 
& Wu 1992,35-58). 
After US President Richard Nixon visited the Chinese mainland in February 1972 
and signed the Shanghai Communiqu6 with Peking's premier Chou En-lai, 
propaganda leaflets replaced high explosives as the contents of shells flying across the 
Kinmen Strait. In December 1978, Peking decided, in view of its forthcoming 
establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States and the latter's 
termination of its defence treaty with the ROC, to adopt a "peaceful offensive" 
strategy as its fundamental policy toward Taiwan and dropped the three-decade-old 
slogan "liberating Taiwan by force" (Ma 1992,1-10). In effect, this period of ROC- 
PRC relations was characterised by an approximate balance of power between the two 
rivals. Neither side seemed to have an advantage over the other. Each had the 
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backing of a powerful patron and ally: Peking had the Soviet Union, Taipei was 
shielded by the United States. The roughly equivalent power of Taiwan and the main- 
land probably accounted for the military stalemates of 1950s. 
2.1.2 Scenarios for the Use of Force 
Despite continued military threats from Peking against Taiwan, a number of analysts 
believe they are no longer credible (Klintworth 1991,115; Lasater 1993,39-58). The 
determining factors usually cited are: (1) the PRC lacks the amphibious capability to 
invade Taiwan; (2) Peking is deterred by the prospects of US military intervention 
(Lin 1993,164); and (3) CCP leaders lack the incentive to attack because they believe 
peaceful unification is possible and that such an attack would harm mainland China's 
modemisation. Such analysis suggests that the probable costs to the PRC in attacking 
Taiwan far outweigh the probabilities of success. It seems irrational for Peking to use 
force against Taiwan. It has broadly been acknowledged that the chances of military 
conflict between the two have become increasingly slim. Even if the threat were real, 
others argue, no government on Taiwan-be it KMT or DPP-would be so foolish as to 
provoke Peking by an explicit declaration of Taiwan independence. Since a move to 
separate Taiwan from Chinese territory is thought to be the only trigger which would 
lead the PRC to use force against Taiwan, scholars from this school of thought 
therefore concluded that the probability of war in the Taiwan Strait is remote. It is 
even believed that "the danger of PRC military attack against the ROC on Taiwan is 
considerably less than the chances of naval battles in the South China Sea" (Jencks 
1993,114). 
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In its survey of 73 flash points around the world, Jane's Defence Weekly (January 11, 
1992; January 22,1994), did not list the Taiwan Strait as an area of potential conflict 
or even as an area of tension. By way of comparison, the Kurile Islands, the Korean 
Peninsula, the South China Sea and Tibet were included. However, in matters of 
national security, it is better to be safe than sorry. Rather than finding reasons why 
Peking would not attack Taiwan, therefore, it may be more worthwhile to explore 
reasons why the PRC might resort to force in the Taiwan Strait. "Because the use of 
force can wreak major undesired changes very swiftly, military threats are 
traditionally accorded the highest priority in national security concerns" (Buzan 1991, 
117). 
From the speeches delivered by the PRC's leadership in recent years, there are as 
many as five different situations that the PRC would take as pretexts and/or opportune 
moments for the invasion of Taiwan. They included, 
a. If and when Taiwan declares independence; 
b. If and when Taiwan develops nuclear weapons; 
c. If and when chaos breaks out on the island; 
d. If and when Taiwan protractedly refuses to negotiate; and 
e. If and when Taiwan forged an alliance with the former Soviet Union; (Nathan 
1989,14-30; Klintworth 1991,115; ROC National Defence Report 1992). 
Among these circumstances, the most likely one to lead the PRC to invade is if and 
when Taiwan declares independence; and that is also the most dangerous one to 
Taiwan. Taipei has perceived a growing security threat in the PLA's unusual 
movements after President Lee Teng-hui's visit to the United States in June 1995 and 
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prior to Taiwan's presidential election. Peking has never made explicit that its 
military exercises are threatening Taiwan, but they have often coincided in timing 
with its official denunciations of the Taiwanese independence movement and of 
Taipei's effort to expand its international presence. Typically, these operations 
conducted in areas not distant from Taiwan, and simulated air, sea or amphibious 
battles--conditions similar to Peking's possible military actions against the island and 
its offshore territories. Peking's recent waves of military exercises have caused grave 
concern across the Strait and was seen by the ROC Defence Ministry as a rehearsal for 
an assault against Taiwan. 
Despite the continuous appeals from Taiwan, Peking has turned a deaf ear to the call 
that both sides should jointly or unilaterally renounce the use of force. The CCP 
leaders have been challenged over and over again, by the United States, by overseas 
Chinese journalists, and by the leaders of Taiwan to abandon this threat, and they have 
always refused (Nathan 1989,14-30), although they nowadays urge peaceful 
unification. Peking stated that the CCP's refusal to rule out the use of military force in 
Taiwan was not directed against the Taiwan residents but only against potential 
foreign interference, and that the CCP would be willing to negotiate an agreement 
with the KMT that both sides would not use force against the other (Chien-chin 
Weekly, August 27,1988). Peking's official journal Liao-Wang elaborated that "the 
CCP will never use force against patriots and those in favour of reunification of the 
motherland. If China must resort to force it will only be against aggressors and 
traitors" (Liao Wang Weekly, September 12,1988). 
The question of a mutual renunciation of force came up recently when President 
Yang Sbang-kun of the PRC rejected outright the suggestion of a PRC-ROC non- 
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aggression agreement, patterned after the renunciation of force agreements between 
the two Germanys in 1972. This proposal was put forward by Cheyne Chiu, presiden- 
tial spokesman and convenor of the Research Committee of the ROC's National 
Unification Council, in May 1992 (China Post, May 11,1992). On May 30, Yang 
Shang-kun personally rejected the proposal, arguing that the signing of such a treaty 
would imply recognition of the existence of two Chinese governments, hence, talks 
between two governments are absolutely out of the question. 
2.1.3 Causes of Concern 
Several trends have given cause for concern that the PRC may be re-examining the 
utility of using force in the Taiwan Strait to achieve unification. 
First, despite increased contacts across the Taiwan Strait, there is no indication that 
Taipei is willing to accept Teng Hsiao-ping's "one country, two systems" proposal. 
The advanced age of Teng and other senior CCP leaders necessitates that, if 
unification is to be achieved in their life times, some dramatic movement on the issue 
must be taken (Nathan 1989,14-30). 
Second, the PRC has lost considerable influence in world affairs because of the 
massacres around Tiananmen Square and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Peking no 
longer enjoys such a favourable international image or the ability to play the strategic 
triangle to its advantage. At the same time, Taiwan's prestige in the international 
community is growing steadily because of its economic strength, rapid 
democratisation, and flexible diplomacy (Chien 1991,92). 
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Third, the United States is reducing its military presence in the Western Pacific. The 
possibility of US intervention in the Taiwan Strait has been an important deterrent to 
war in the region since the late 1950s. There are several current trends in US policy 
which suggest that Washington's intervention is becoming less likely (Lasater 1993, 
39-58). 
Fourth, the improvement of relations between the PRC and the Soviet, Vietnam, and 
India has resulted in increased security for China's border areas, contributed to the 
relaxation of tension in the region, and freed the PLA to concentrate on unresolved 
territorial issues such as Taiwan (Chang 1992,56-73). 
Especially as the Hong Kong and Macao issues have been settled in principle, the 
Taiwan issue will become more prominent. Although some believe that mainland 
China's efforts to acquire a blue-water navy are aimed at establishing a naval presence 
in the contested South China Sea, many of the operational requirements are similar to 
those required around Taiwan. Overall, these trends suggest that "the threat envi- 
ronment in the Taiwan Strait during the 1990s will be characterised by a degree of 
uncertainty and differences of perception in Washington, Taipei, and Peking" (Lasater 
1993,39-58). Certainly, the PRC threat will remain and it will be perceived by some 
as growing. All the factors mentioned above also suggest that the PRC must keep its 
military option open as a possible way to solve the Taiwan issue. 
Then, what are the most likely military options to be selected by the PRC should it 
decide to attack Taiwan? 
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2.1.4 The Most Likely Military Options Employed by the PRC 
Since the Korean War, preparations for invading Taiwan have been under way in the 
PRC. It has a variety of military options available (Lin 1993,169-71; ROC Ministry 
of National Defence 1992,56-57), and three are thought to be most likely: harass- 
ment; military blockade; and invasion. Although there is a tendency to view these 
separately, in reality they would be most effective in combination. These range from 
low-level harassment at one extreme, through blockade, to an all-out attack, invasion, 
and siege at the other extreme. 
(1) Harassment could begin on a small scale with the PRC's aircraft and ships 
operating farther out into the Taiwan Strait and in larger numbers than in the past, 
challenging the ROC navy and air force to interfere with them. The PRC might then 
mount small raids against Taiwan. It could airdrop a few saboteurs or intelligence 
agents in Taiwan's mountainous regions. The purpose of such activities would be 
more political than military, producing fear and uncertainty. At a latter stage, 
harassment might be expanded to include artillery bombardment of the offshore 
islands, a determined effort to gain air and naval dominance over the Taiwan Strait, 
submarine attacks on the ROC navy, and even selective bombing of strategic targets 
on Taiwan. 
Harassment would not be without cost to the PRC, which would lose ships and 
planes to ROC attack. The number would depend on how determined the PRC was to 
gain dominance over the Taiwan Strait and how determined the ROC was to prevent 
it. If the ROC was determined, the PRC would have to decide whether to persist with 
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an air war of attrition against the ROC. Much would depend on whether the ROC was 
able to obtain replacements for lost aircraft. 
Militarily, the ROC could withstand low-level harassment indefinitely, but not 
without damaging effects on both the economy and, at least initially, morale. 
Although the cost to the PRC in lost aircraft would be high, the loss of air and sea 
dominance over the Taiwan Strait would severely shake morale in Taiwan, imperil the 
offshore islands, and decrease the ROC's ability to resist invasion. 
(2) Most experts believe that the greatest threat to Taiwan is a blockade, but 
assessments vary as to whether a blockade would be successful in forcing Taipei to 
the negotiating table. Without question, such a blockade would severely damage the 
economy of the island, given its heavy dependence on trade. If that trade could be cut 
for a number of months, or even substantially reduced, the island might be brought to 
its knees, and would become an island under siege. 
Yet one primary factor to be considered as the cost of a PRC blockade would be the 
adverse reaction of the United States, Japan, Western Europe, and perhaps even 
Russia if their trade and ships were interfered with in a blockade of the Taiwan Strait 
and Bashi Channel. These are international waterways of great importance in ship- 
borne traffic between Northeast and Southeast Asia, as well as between the Indian and 
Pacific oceans. Moreover, given the close interdependence of world trading partners, 
which increasingly includes the PRC, a blockade of Taiwan would hurt the interests of 
far more countries than Taiwan. As a matter of fact, a PRC blockade of Taiwan 
would be a blockade of the PRC itself. 
Thus, the international complications arising from a blockade would be much greater 
than those resulting from the policy of military harassment. Not only would foreign 
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economic interests be directly affected, but foreign governments would be compelled 
to decide how to react to PRC's attempt to throttle Taiwan's international trade in 
terms of international law. A blockade would probably increase international 
sympathy for Taiwan. 
Some analysts feel that Peking could effectively impose a blockade on Taiwan 
merely by verbal announcement of a forthcoming blockade. Shipping companies 
serving Taiwan would immediately face a prohibitively high increase in insurance 
rates. The possibility of loss of ship, cargo, and crew would be sufficient to deter 
many international carriers from regularly visiting Taiwan. "Even before the actual 
execution of the blockade, the heavily trade-dependent Taiwanese economy will begin 
to suffer from the pains of economic strangulation" (Lin 1993,170). 
How long Taiwan could hold out would depend on a variety of factors, including 
international reaction to the blockade, the morale of the people, the conditions laid 
down by the PRC for ending the blockade, and the stockpiles of essential materials. A 
successful, sustained blockade might be very difficult to execute, however, without 
enormous expenditure of resources. In all likelihood, a blockade's outcome, as in 
other forms of attrition warfare, would hinge on the political wills of Peking and 
Taipei. 
(3) Of the scenarios for a PRC attack against Taiwan, the one most likely to force 
Taipei to the negotiating table would be a successful amphibious invasion of Taiwan. 
But in many ways, this scenario is the least likely to occur because it is the most 
difficult, and also the most risky and costly for the PRC to implement. The first 
requirement would be a willingness to pay the price of gaining control of the sea and 
air over the Taiwan Strait. James Gregor believes one of the principal deterrents to 
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the PRC is the high cost of such a venture in terms of equipment loss. Gregor states, 
"How much they might be prepared to commit, and lose, in an invasion of Taiwan is 
difficult to determine. But it is clear that the higher the cost in such terms, the less 
likely the prospect" (Snyder, Gregor, and Chang 1980,62). 
The second requirement would be the determination to train large numbers of troops 
in amphibious and airborne operations and to build the specialised landing craft that 
would be needed to land men, tanks, and artillery on contested beaches. It is 
estimated that "the number of divisions required to invade Taiwan successfully range 
upward of 40 or more" (Lasater 1986,145). Currently, Peking has deployed three 
army groups, consisting of 320,000 troops, 1,600 tanks and six reserve divisions, in 
the Nanking [Nanjing] military region--the military zone directly across the Strait 
from Taiwan and reportedly designated as the staging area for any PRC invasion of 
the island (Free China Journal, November 1,1990). However, according to official 
ROC government estimates, the island's defence forces are "capable of repelling a 
Chinese Communist attack of 2,000 jet fighters, 200 warships and 20 divisions 
simultaneously" (China Post, April 11,1989). Cognisant of Peking's calculations, 
ROC officials have revealed that a key element in Taiwan's defence strategy is 
"keeping a mainland invasion prohibitively costly in terms of casualties and materials" 
(China Post, March 29,1993). 
Therefore, the area of least concern to Taiwan seems to be Peking's amphibious 
invasion, although improvements in this category are being made through the training 
of additional Marine-type units, the acquisition of surface-skim craft, and the 
introduction of helicopters in amphibious operations (Chai 1990,23). On the other 
hand, the submarine threat to the ROC is serious. Because of geographical factors 
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which expose Taiwan's flank to almost any sort of offensive from the mainland, 
Taiwan is extremely vulnerable and hard to defend. 
Peking would, certainly, prefer not to invade Taiwan. Much of the island's 
impressive infrastructure and industrial facilities would be destroyed. The human 
cost, although replaceable, would be exorbitant. Besides, Taipei has created a web of 
relationships and situations which make PRC military attack increasingly 
counterproductive (Jencks 1993,113). Not only would such attack be economically 
harmful to the PRC, it would also damage PRC relationships with Taiwan's global 
network of political and economic partners. Thus, invasion "is Beijing's least-desir- 
able strategic option and is the least likely to occur" (Lin 1993,17 1). Nonetheless, if 
Peking decided to proceed with a rnilitary solution to the "Taiwan Issue", its leaders 
could reasonably expect success, albeit at tremendous cost. Under such circum- 
stances, how capable is the ROC of defending itself? Could Taiwan repel a Peking 
attack? 
The armed forces of the ROC are credible, certainly. However, examined in the light 
of the potential threat from the PRC, ROC defence capabilities are in need of 
considerable upgrading. In view of the long-term threat facing the ROC--both in 
terms of PRC capabilities and intentions, the ongoing modernisation of the PLA, and 
the approaching obsolescence of Taiwan's current inventory of fighters and destroyers, 
it is questionable whether Taiwan, without significant upgrading of its military 
equipment, will be able to maintain an effective deterrent against the PRC much 
beyond the latter half of this decade (Lasater 1988,50). It is almost impossible to 
conclude with any certainty. History is replete with examples of countries that pro- 
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voked confrontations on the assumption that they were going to win, but failed to do 
so. A great deal is going to depend on circumstances. 
In addition to these military measures against Taiwan, the PRC could use, or threaten 
to use, nuclear weapons. Peking might calculate that the mere threat to use nuclear 
weapons would so intimidate people on Taiwan that the authorities would have no 
choice but to open negotiations. Taipei cannot guard against Peking's nuclear 
weapons, but it may not need to. The 1969 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signed 
by the United States and the Soviet Union guarantees non-nuclear nations protection 
from those with nuclear weapons. While none of the nuclear signatories recognises 
Taipei diplomatically, Taiwan still may be protected from nuclear attack under the 
broad terms of the agreement (Cooper 1990,100). Peking is also constrained by 
world opinion from using nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear country. Ever since 
the PRC exploded its first nuclear device in 1964, it has stressed that it will never be 
the first to use nuclear weapons, and it has publicly stated that it will not use nuclear 
weapons against its own people. For these reasons, it appears there is little likelihood 
that PRC leaders would resort to such action. 
2.2 ROC's Defence Policy Options 
2.2.1 Insecurity Dilemma 
The perception of the tangible and direct threats and the potential vulnerabilities 
ensued from the PRC in the past decades has brought Taiwan the sense of insecurity 
and also ft impetus to remain strong rpilitarily. Taiwan's insecurity stems from being 
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a weak state and the sharp asymmetry of power compared with the PRC (see Table 2- 
1). 
Table 2-1 
A Comparison of ROC-PRC Military Forces 
Population 














8: 2CSS-4 (DF-5) 
6CSS-3 (DF-3) 
60 CSS-2 (DF-3) 
50 CSS-1 (DF-2) 
2,300,000 
20 6 bde 
84 22 
260,000 
Total Men 360,000 30,000 
Submarines 100 4 
Destroyers 17 24 
Frigates 37 10 
Large Patrol Ships 100 3 
Missile Craft 207 52 
Coastal Craft 100 3 
Minesweepers 130 13 
Amphibious Type 461 426 
Air Force 
Total Men 470,000 70,000 
Total Aircraft 6280 486 
Bombers 520 
Fighter/Bombers 2450 
Fighter/Interceptors 1830 298 
Reconnaissance 130 35 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sources: The Military Balance 1994-1995,144-162. 
National Defence Report, ROC, 1992,25-42. 
"Weak state" is cornmonlY agreed upon as the central feature of a state's insecurity 
dilemma. And "the condition most feared among governments as a cause of war is the 
power asymmetry-that is, an unfavourable tilt in the distribution of power" (Rosen & 
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Jones 1980,308). Strength and weakness are always relative. Where a state stands on 
the spectrum of power depends on the rivals it has to confront. Power is "the ability of 
an actor ... to use tangible and intangible resources and assets ... to influence the 
outcomes of international events to its own satisfaction" (Ibid, 203). It is a means to 
an end, an instrument to achieve objectives. The possession of power is meaningless 
if its application is unable to enhance a state's security. A state is powerful not in the 
abstract but in comparison with its adversaries. Many small or thinly populated states 
are not weak because they do not confront obviously superior enemies. This is unlike 
the current situation of Taiwan. What makes Taiwan weak is not simply inequality of 
power. What makes Taiwan distinctive is the margin of superiority that the PRC 
enjoys. 
There has been a considerable amount of literature on the relationship between the 
relative capabilities of nations and the incidence of war. Some argue that the equal 
distribution of power among nations leads to peace (Claude 1962; Kaplan 1964; 
Morgenthau 1973), whereas others suggest that power parity increases the likelihood 
of war (Garnharn 1976,379-94; Kim 1989,255-73). Although the so-called power 
parity and power preponderance schools present competing arguments and 
contradictory empirical findings, they both indicate that the initiation of conflict is in 
some way connected with the balance of national capabilities between a pair of rivals. 
In a situation where the power distribution between the two sides is roughly equal and 
animosity between them is deep, an increase in national capabilities by one side might 
discourage the other side's potential aggression (Huth & Russet 1984,496-526). On 
the other hand "an explicit and visible parity based on offensive means would amplify 
insecurity" (Buzan 1991,318). The ROC-PRC confrontation is a special case on 
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account of its apparently asymmetrical attributes. The PRC rates as a great Asian, if 
not global, power because of its sheer physical size and its large population. 
Moreover, it meets several of the traditional criteria for great power status. It also has 
a substantial economic base and significant reserves of most minerals and other 
natural resources, while the ROC on Taiwan, controlling only 0.38 percent of Chinese 
territory as a whole and less than 2 percent of the Chinese population, is clearly at a 
disadvantage despite its dynamic economy since the 1960s. 
As table 2-1 demonstrates, a comparison of the total military capabilities of the ROC 
and the PRC shows an overwhelming superiority on the part of the mainland. When 
total numbers of men and weapons possessed by the PRC and the ROC are compared, 
the PRC appears to have the overwhelming military advantage. In several categories-- 
all strategic nuclear forces, submarine chasers, naval bombers and fighters, and air 
force bombers--the PRC commands a complete ascendancy. In other key areas--such 
as their total armed forces, infantry divisions, submarine and fast attack craft, and 
fighters/interceptors--the PRC has enjoyed an almost 10: 1 advantage over the ROC. 
These figures, although only approximate, give an idea of disparity in numbers and 
equipment between the two sides. Clearly, in any all-out conflict, the ROC would be 
defeated militarily. The military capabilities on both sides of the Taiwan Strait will be 
further discussed in chapters 5. 
Studies of power in international relations recognise that power comes from three 
sources: "natural, socio-psychological, and synthetic" (Rosen & Jones 1980,205). Of 
the natural resources of power, geography is among the more important. Sheer size 
can multiply the defensive capabilities of a state and reduce its vulnerability to 
enemies. Taiwan is separated from the Chinese mainland by the Taiwan Straits, which 
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are about 140 nautical miles at their widest point and only 72 at their narrowest. "It 
takes only 5 to 10 minutes for the enemy's [the PRC] combat aircraft from the other 
side of the Straits to enter our [the ROC] air, and about 2 to 4 hours for their combat 
ships to reach us" (ROC National Defence Report 1992,174). Within 750 nautical 
miles of Taiwan, the PRC has deployed 495 bombers, 3500 fighters, 410 transport 
planes, 209 helicopters, and 134 other military planes (The Military Balance 1992-93, 
144-162). Adding to the threat is the fact that additional air reinforcements can be 
flown in on short notice. Thus, the answer to the question whether Taiwan Strait can 
be used as a natural barrier against the PRC's invasion is quite clear. "Although 
wealth, skill, socio-political cohesion and will power can compensate for smallness to 
some extent ... they cannot compensate in the long run for the lack of a broader 
physical base" (Buzan 1991,113). 
In the discussion of geography, a second critical component of power is natural 
resources. Relative endowments of natural resources and raw materials may affect the 
power of a nation significantly. There is no doubt that plentiful natural resources have 
helped to create the superpower status of the United States and the former Soviet 
Union, and may some day do the same for the PRC. However, this should not obscure 
the fact that there are many poorly endowed nations which have great power and 
richly endowed countries which are weak. Japan, for instance, imports most of its 
critical raw materials and yet has been one of the most important economic and 
growing military powers. Nations poor in raw materials are more dependent on the 
outside world and hence more vulnerable to sanctions such as blockade, boycott, and 
so forth... A nation that can effectively mobilise its economic and industrial capacities 
may adjust well to the scarcity of raw materials by importing primary products. 
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Critical strategic materials can be stockpiled against the possibility of war blockade. 
Then, how long could Taiwan bear and last once the PRC conducted an indefinite or 
long-term blockade? For "weak powers ... will have a particular vulnerability to 
military threats because of their limited resources" (Ibid 1991,114). 
After analysing Taiwan's insecurity dilemma and assessing the threats, it is necessary 
to explore further how Taiwan could cope with them and what national security policy 
Taiwan should establish. All states must choose between an emphasis on offensive 
and defensive military operations. Some states seek security by maintaining strict 
neutrality; others seek it by joining alliances. Some seek security by confronting 
potential adversaries with military force; others seek it by trying to be accommodating 
"good neighbours". In view of the real situation, the most direct and most serious 
threat that would endanger Taiwan's existence at present is still the PRC's use of force. 
Therefore, to resist such a threat and protect national security has become the most 
critical task of Taiwan's national defence. 
2.2.2 The Feasibility of Alliance 
Alliances serve as a substitute for internal sources of national capability. The 
formation of alliances increases the likelihood that allies will help defend one another 
militarily or provide economic or political support. A very important factor for the 
smaller states is the ability to attract and retain allies willing to pool resources for 
mutual security. Most weak states seek to affiliate themselves with third parties that 
are powerful enough to offset those much more powerful opponents. Though diplo- 
matic means can play significant roles in protecting the security of small states, and 
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should be encouraged as worth-while endeavours, in the pursuit of peace, they are not 
at least so practical and applicable to Taiwan, since Taiwan has been isolated 
internationally, banned from various important international organisations, and 
regarded as a pariah. Besides, "diplomatic manoeuvres do not guarantee protection in 
case of actual attack" (Mandelbaum 1989,228). Therefore, an independent war capa- 
bility and sufficient forces are essential for safeguarding Taiwan's security. "The 
requirements of national security dictated that states maintain military forces and a 
large array of weapons systems adequate to the perceived military threat" (Haftendorn 
1991,3-17). For "the existence of stronger states will not by itself guarantee security, 
but their continued absence will certainly sustain insecurity" (Buzan 1991,106). 
At the same time, Taiwan can simply not rely on the PRC's good-will or its 
renouncing the use of force against Taiwan. "States have rarely if ever been naively 
willing to rely for their security only on the disposition of other states to act morally or 
lawfully... " (Jackson 1992,87). "If one rests one's security on restraint by others in 
offering threats, then one's security is at the mercy of changes of mind by others" 
(Buzan 1991,335). 
During the Cold War era, both superpowers, the United States and Soviet Union, 
were willing to risk confronting each other in order to protect their allies from the 
aggression. However, maintaining this kind of asymmetrical alliance relationship is 
costly for the superpower as well as for their prot6g6s. In order to keep their 
respective prot6g6s in line, the superpowers have to provide security protection, while 
for the prot6g6s, security dependence implies some limitations on their freedom of 
action. Taiwan's attempt to counter-attack the mainland by taking advantage of the 
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Korean War, which was checked and repressed by the US under the "Mutual Defence 
Treaty", is a vivid example of this (Kindermann 1989,2). 
Taiwan may benefit from the lowering of tensions among the great powers after the 
end of the Cold War, which hopefully may decrease the PRC's threat to take the island 
by force as well. It may also possibly lead to a US-PRC diplomatic deal to resolve the 
so-called 'Taiwan issue' in favour of the PRC. The fact of the abolition of the 
US-Taiwan defence treaty following Carter's acceptance of PRC's demand that 
Taiwan was 'part of China', has remarkably enhanced Taiwan's sense of insecurity. 
Therefore, Taiwan simply can not count on others coming to its rescue in the event 
of attack by the PRC. Thus considering the central fact of international relations that 
the sovereign state is almost exclusively responsible for its own defence, it is 
understandable that "states are hesitant to rely upon other states for ensuring that their 
defence is effective when the moment for putting it into operation arrives" (Northedge 
1974,19). At the same time, "as long as international politics remains anarchic, the 
ultimate recourse for states will be self-help, and the ultimate self-help is military 
force" (Nye 1989,331). Since survival and independence are essential to Taiwan, in 
addition to the pursuit of economic growth and development, Taiwan has to acquire 
the strength and capability required for self-defence. As a motto says: "If you want 
peace, prepare for war". In order to reach this goal, military modernisation is the only 
option. This will be considered in Chapter 5. As Buzan (1991,294) points out, 
"States that fail to look after themselves risk at best loss of power, and at worst loss of 
independence, or sometimes loss of existence. " 
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2.2.3 Nuclear Weapons Dilemma 
Judging from the analysis made above with respect to Taiwan's security concern and 
the perception of threat, then we come to the core question as to whether Taiwan 
needs nuclear weapons for security. When a country like Taiwan is seriously 
endangered by the PRC, and when conventional defence cannot be relied upon, 
nuclear weapons may enhance its sense of security. Taiwan's strategic interests in 
acquiring nuclear weapons are not dissimilar to North Korea's. Taiwan perceives 
itself to be under threat from both the conventional and nuclear forces of a major 
adversary. Like North Korea, it no longer feels that it can rely on its superpower ally. 
Taiwan's security planners know that they cannot hope in the long run to prevail 
militarily over the PRC, and that they cannot count on receiving military assistance 
from the United States or any other country if the island is attacked. So it would be 
surprising if military planners had not given serious consideration to the nuclear 
option. Nuclear weapons remain the ultimate strategic equaliser for states that 
consider themselves to be out-gunned by more powerful adversaries. In the worst- 
case threat--a PRC invasion of Taiwan--nuclear weapons would surely be a more 
powerful deterrent than the island's defensively oriented conventional forces. 
Although the acquisition of nuclear weapons may create risks, "they [countries] may 
prefer to adopt a posture that involves some risk of nuclear mutual destruction but 
may provide security, rather than one that entails a high risk of conventional defeat 
without any real risk of destruction" (Dror 1981,97). From the perspectives of 
Taiwan, therefore, the acquisition of nuclear weapons seems quite rational. However, 
there are more sound reasons to discourage Taiwan from going nuclear. 
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Reasons for Not Going Nuclear 
Since Taiwan is facing pressure and threats from PRC, whilst possessing only 
medium conventional capabilities, why has it repeatedly declared several times that it 
has no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons? The first such declaration was made 
by the then Premier Chiang Ching-kuo in 1977. He declared that "though Taiwan is 
capable of developing nuclear weapons, it will never do so". The latest one was made 
by the Minister of National Defence Chen Li-an. He said that "The development of 
nuclear weapons requires high technology, it is not such a simple thing, the military 
alone can not make it. Besides, where can Taiwan find a place for a test explosion? " 
(Chung-yang jih-pao, November 7,1992). It seems reasonable and enticing for 
Taiwan to develop and own nuclear weapons, but it should be noted too that the mere 
possession of nuclear weapons cannot protect it from nuclear threat by a superior 
nuclear power like the PRC. " Many philosophers have conceded, on utilitarian 
grounds, that nuclear deterrence has brought some benefits (of peace and security) but 
others have argued that the peace is fragile and the sense of security is based on fear... 
the use of nuclear weapons in retaliation would add to the evil already done" (Rumble 
1985,216). Therefore, "are nuclear threats a reasonable way to pursue military 
security when they might lead to national suicide? " (Buzan 1991,103). 
In addition to the reasons mentioned above, there are at least three more to 
discourage Taiwan from going nuclear. 
(1). Financial and Technological Constraints 
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Any nation that decides to develop a new weapon system must commit huge 
resources to it. The requirements depend upon its sophistication and the technology. 
Certainly, "going nuclear" involves any country in significant costs, such as "direct 
investment in nuclear activities, super-power pressures and sanctions, the increased 
risk that neighbours may also "go nuclear", with possible catastrophic results for all" 
(Dror 1981,96). Thus desires and motives are one thing, the actual ability to carry 
them out is another. It is a long process beginning from the very initial stages of 
research, development, testing to production and deployment. The amount of capital 
available for investment is a key determinant. In the case of Taiwan, "not only is a 
substantial portion of its GNP disbursed to sustain that (military) establishment, but 
about 42 percent of the national budget is employed (annually) in the support of the 
military and foreign affairs" (Gregor 1986,312). The national budget for defence has 
increased sharply from the mid-80s (see Chapter 5). It would mean the budgets used 
for education, people's welfare and national construction would be relatively reduced. 
At the same time, it would impede Taiwan's economic development, though it still 
prospers. As Buzan argues, "defence dilemmas of cost involve straight trade-offs 
between resources devoted to defence, and resources available to meet other security 
objectives" (Buzan 1991,273). In the light of this, how could Taiwan afford such a 
complicated project as nuclear weapons? 
Then come the technological constraints. Taiwan does enjoy high economic growth. 
However, its industrial base seems not strong enough to meet the requirements of 
nuclear weapons. Taiwan is notably weak in technically trained manpower and a 
research base, and institutions for educating technicians as far as nuclear weapons 
technologies are concerned. Though there is one Nuclear Engineering Department at 
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Ching-hua University, one Atomic Energy Council monitoring civil nuclear 
operations and maybe some R&D conducted in the Chung-shan Institute of Science 
and Technology, it is still limited and insufficient. Taiwan does not even have the 
basic capability to manufacture propellants for missiles, engines for cars and for 
airplanes, not to mention nuclear weapons. Taiwan has neither a uranium enrichment 
capability nor the ability to reprocess spent reactor fuel into plutonium. Thus, 
"dependence on imported know-how and materials will normally only increase with 
the degree of sophistication of the weapons" (Brzoska & Ohlson 1986,283). 
(2). Fears of Provoking an Attack from the PRC 
It is argued that even endangered countries may be better off with conventional 
inferiority than with an unstable nuclear balance stimulated by their own active 
nuclear-weapons policy (Dror 1981,97). "The more a state relies upon the threat of 
retaliation the more it gives its opponents an incentive, whether through fear or 
opportunism, to try to eliminate its deterrent in a pre-emptive attack" (Ceadel 1987, 
82). If the PRC's threats are to be taken seriously, a Taiwan bomb could provoke the 
very war it was intended to prevent. Therefore, at the very least, a non-nuclear 
defence policy for Taiwan will lessen the risk of suffering a nuclear attack from PRC. 
"To pose an unacceptable risk to the enemy automatically poses the same risk to 
oneself' (Rumble 1985,265). It is unwise to do so. The greater Taiwan's confidence 
that it can defend its vital national interests with conventional weapons, the fewer its 
incentives to seek nuclear weapons. "Given the uncertainties involved in the 
possession and control of such weapons, many individuals conclude that the weapons 
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themselves, and the system of relations they create, detract more than they contribute 
to the pursuit of security" (Buzan 1991,275). 
(3). US Pressure and Intervention 
For more than two decades, Taipei tried to acquire the facilities to produce 
plutonium. In every case, either direct or indirect pressure from the United States 
prevented it from succeeding. US leverage derived partly from Taiwan's dependence 
on American nuclear technology and fuel services, and partly from the island's 
security dependence on the United States. Taiwan both signed and ratified the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty, and shows no interest in acquiring nuclear weapons at the 
present. Though Taiwan often declared it did not have this intention in the mid- 
1970s, the US government became suspicious of activities at Taiwan's largest nuclear 
research centre and feared that Taiwan was trying to move closer to a nuclear weapons 
capability (Yager 1985,193). In 1988 the deputy director of the Nuclear Energy 
Laboratory at the military's Chungshan Institute vanished, reappearing shortly 
afterward in the United States to reveal that his country was still seeking to build the 
bomb. As the result of US pressure, and also the fear of US economic sanctions and 
endangering its security connection with the US, Taiwan yielded to US wishes and 
voluntarily dismantled a reprocessing laboratory and accepted restrictions on the 
operation of a research reactor. Since then, there have been no further reports of 
Taiwan's nuclear weapons development. 
According to Khan, there are a number of incentives which can be given to those 
countries which are in a position to make, or feel compelled to undertake, the 
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production of nuclear weapons, to refrain from going nuclear. (Khan 1986,420). In 
this context, if the US could continuously provide Asia and Pacific regions (including 
Taiwan) with some sort of security promise, then Taiwan would naturally lack reasons 
for going nuclear, and concentrate its resources on national development projects. So 
long as the ROC continues to be heavily dependent on the United States for the 
security and prosperity of Taiwan, the possibility that its leaders will oppose the US 
by developing nuclear weapons is remote. 
(4). The Impact on the International Community 
Taiwan's possession of nuclear weapons would also have an international political 
impact. If, for example, ROC leaders, confronted by the threat of invasion and feeling 
abandoned by the United States, were to declare Taiwan an independent state and 
announce their determination to defend its independence with nuclear weapons, the 
importance of their declaration of independence would be magnified. If Taiwan, 
became a nuclear power, the nations of the world, particularly those nearby such as 
Japan, would be much more deeply concerned with preventing a nuclear exchange 
between the PRC and Taiwan than they are now in preventing a resumption of 
hostilities with conventional arms. 
It would also undermine Taipei's efforts to win over the international community to 
support Taiwan's sovereignty and its right to refuse Peking's reunification offers. 
Thus Taipei seems genuinely to have abandoned this alternative. 
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2.2.4 The Strategic Shift from the Offensive to Defensive 
Since seeking for alliance and nuclear weapons has proved impractical, what 
alternative measures could Taiwan adopt in order to reduce its vulnerability and pre- 
vent threats? The choice is straightforward for Taiwan. Because Taiwan does not 
have the resources to conquer and hold territory beyond its borders, what it has to do 
is defend what it already has. Especially in a world that appears to be shifting from 
military to economic competition, and with its own growing economic status, Taiwan 
must once again evaluate its strategic alternatives. And that is the main reason why 
for the first time in the past four decades, the ROC's Minister of National Defence 
stated publicly that "from now on, the concept of national defence strategy will shift 
from being offensive-oriented to defensive" (Chung-yang jih-pao, November 3, 
1993). Though "the renunciation of offensive options ... narrows the military choices 
available to the defender ... and imposes some serious limitations and vulnerabilities on 
security policy" (Buzan 1989,284), however, given its limited war capability, a small 
state like Taiwan has mostly been following the policy of defence rather than offence. 
According to Ceadel: 
Defencism seems both realistic and humane. It seems realistic because it 
recognises the importance of the state, and takes account of the anarchic and 
power-political features of the international system, and it seems humane because 
it rejects aggression, and works for order, stability, and co-existence. (Ceadel 
1987,100). 
The goal of such a state is not the pursuit of power but the protection of whatever it 
possesses. And "the first concern of states is not to maximise power but to maintain 
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or improve their relative positions in the system" (Haftendom 1991). Owing to its 
status as a weak state, structural incapacity for offence, and the power asymmetry 
compared to the PRC, a more appropriate policy for Taiwan to adopt in order to 
survive is "non-provocative defence", which means "making the country hard to 
attack, expensive to invade, and difficult to occupy" (Buzan 1989,277). Although 
war-fighting ability is critical important, the ability to prevent war is equally 
important. 
Non-provocative defence has been defined as: "The build-up, training, logistics and 
doctrine of the armed forces... such that they are seen in their totality to be unsuitable 
for offence, but unambiguously sufficient for a credible defence... " (quoted in Mack 
1990,17 1). There has been much controversy over offensive and defensive strategies. 
Proponents of offensive strategy argue that non-provocative defence is at best naive, 
at worst a form of appeasement; it undermines deterrence and so increases the risk of 
aggression, while non-provocative defence proponents counter by arguing that 
offensive strategies undermine "crisis-avoidance" and "crisis stability" (Ibid, 176- 
184). Thus, offensive strategies designed to enhance deterrence may increase the risks 
of inadvertent war. 
A state like Taiwan whose aim is defensive will prefer deteffing an adversary such as 
the PRC to having to fight. Deterrence concerns the credibility of threats, and affects 
the intentions of the adversary. It bears on the other's calculations as well as its 
capabilities. Those calculations concern "not only the likelihood of success, but also 
the price that the attacker will have to pay to succeed" (Mandelbaum 1989,229). In 
order to make deterrence credible, Taiwan has to devote considerable effort to trying 
to persuade the PRC that it would indeed defend itself despite the odds against it. 
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Like most states, Taiwan prefers not to have to fight. Fighting is not always necessary. 
But "its goal in fighting must be to make the cost of victory higher than the gains of 
victory can justify" Jbid, 235). As mentioned earlier, "A nation is secure to the extent 
to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice its core values if it wishes to avoid 
war, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war" (Quoted in Wolfers 
1968,150; Buzan 1991,16). The question for Taiwan thus is how resolve to resist 
aggression and commitment to principles is best communicated when the PRC thinks 
that its threats might result in compromise. Relative military potential is only one 
variable which determines each country's fear of war. The other is courage and will. 
Determination is an especially relevant issue when the weak try to deter the strong. 
"A state with limited resources and support may be able to prevent asymmetry by 
showing a resolute determination to utilise its capacities fully" (Rosen & Jones 1980, 
309). Even though "... non-provocative defence is unfortunately not likely to find more 
than limited application... " (Buzan 1989,288), Taiwan still should signal its resolve 
regardless of its true intentions, "because signs of weakness will be interpreted as 
weakness and the failure to take costly actions invites attack" (Niou 1992,82-95). For 
the peace to be preserved, it is important that signals conveyed to the PRC should be 
clear, steady and unambiguous. 
By employing non-provocative defence strategies, Taiwan could signal to the PRC 
unambiguously defensive intentions. Such strategies act to dispel the suspicion, 
tension and hostility which can not only minimise the probability of crises occurring, 
but remove entirely all incentives for the PRC to resort to pre-emptive or preventative 
war. 
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2.2.5 Strategies and Tactics of a Non-Provocative Security Policy 
Military 
Providing an effective defence against the PRC's attack clearly represents a major 
challenge for the ROC's defence planners. The strategy and operational concepts most 
appropriate for this remain the subject of considerable debate. Do the offshore islands 
still need the deployment of such a big proportion of forces? What kind of force 
structure is considered reasonable? How to extend the strategic depth and preserve 
combat strength? All these issues are worth of consideration. 
A. Defence Dilemma of the Offshore Islands 
Occupation of the offshore island groups of Kinmen (Quemoy) and Matsu by the 
ROC has advantages and disadvantages for both sides across the Strait. For both 
Peking and Taipei, the islands constitute a link between Taiwan and the mainland, 
symbolising the "one China" position maintained by both governments. For Taipei, 
they also serve to bottle up the ports of Amoy and Foochow, preventing their use as 
assembly points for forces preparing to invade Taiwan. For the PRC the islands offer 
a convenient target for controlled military pressure on the ROC at an acceptable cost. 
An invasion of the islands, however, would be extremely costly for the PRC. The 
ROC stations nearly one-fifth of its army on the two principal islands. The defending 
troops are so well protected in deep fortifications that an attacking force would be at a 
great disadvantage. The PRC is deterred from invasion not only by the high military 
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costs but also by the political disadvantage of severing the link between Taiwan and 
the mainland. 
By keeping one-fifth of its army on Kinmen and Matsu, the ROC may reduce the risk 
that the PRC would attempt to invade the islands, but at the same time it may increase 
the risk that the PRC will interdict their resupply and block the islands, which would 
contain the defending troops in extremely passive position, and thus become a hostage 
for the PRC useful in negotiations. No doubt there are enough supplies on the islands 
to enable them to hold out for a long time, but sooner or later the ROC would be com- 
pelled to try to break the blockade. In order to breach the blockade, the ROC navy 
and air force would be forced to join battle with PRC forces at locations relatively 
favourable to the PRC, which would result in a gradual attrition of the ROC's air force 
and navy at minimal cost to the PRC. 
The ROC could strengthen its military position by drastically reducing its garrisons 
on Kinmen and Matsu. Converting these islands into relatively lightly defended 
forward outposts would eliminate the ROC's risk of losing one-fifth of its army as 
well as a large part of its air force and navy in a vain effort to break the blockade (Nai 
1992,225). 
Some agree that too large a portion of ground forces is stationed on the offshore 
islands, and regard it as a waste of strength. Many senior military officers would 
oppose the move because they have a vested interest in preserving a large force 
structure designed to defend the offshore islands. Powerful critics in the KMT party 
and the armed forces would denounce proposals for further reductions. Consequently, 
despite the military disadvantage of leaving too large a part of the army in exposed 
positions, no substantial change in deployments seems likely in the near future, unless 
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a Mutual Non-aggression Pact were signed by both the ROC and the PRC, or the 
offshore islands were converted into an armistice region. 
B. Extending Strategic Depth 
In view of the fact that, as an island long and narrow in shape, Taiwan is confined by 
limited space latitudinally and doesn't have enough strategic depth in wartime, it has 
to strive for more depth of defence, so as to preserve its effective strength and to 
withstand sustained attacks from the PRC. 
To do so, a layered defensive strategy of denial proposed by Paul Dibb could be 
considered (Babbage 1990,214). This would require, in the first layer, a quality 
intelligence system to monitor military developments on the mainland. The second 
defensive layer would be composed of aircraft and ships operating offshore tasked 
with identifying potential air and surface targets in the air-sea gap and possessing a 
capability to arrest or destroy hostile elements moving towards Taiwan. The third 
layer would be composed of air, naval and ground force elements tasked with 
preventing hostile landings, air attacks and mine operations. The fourth defensive 
layer would comprise ground force elements assigned the task of denying the enemy 
access to Taiwan's northern population centres and military and civil infrastructure. 
To effectively implement the layered defensive strategy, the following measures 
should be adopted: 
a). Strengthen the long-range early-warning system and use more advanced high- 
tech electronic equipment, so as to broaden the scope of alert, closely monitor the 
PRCs troop movements, and lengthen the time for early warning and reaction. 
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b). Deploy air-control and sea-control missiles on the offshore islands so as to 
acquire more operational depth forward, and strengthen air and naval defence 
capabilities. Thus the defence operation should firstly lay stress on air domination 
and sea control; but the ground battle remains the decisive theatre. 
C. Preserving Combat Strength 
In the new technology environment, as it becomes more and more easy to hit a target 
once acquired, and a target hit is more likely to be destroyed, it is obvious that the 
capacity to remain untargeted is becoming an increasingly central determinant of 
battlefield outcomes. If Taiwan has not concealed, dispersed and protected key 
elements of its defence structure, then new generations of precision-guided weapons 
will make it increasingly susceptible to rapid and decisive defeat. If ships, aircraft, 
armoured vehicles, artillery pieces, communication, command and control facilities 
are grouped in unconcealed and unprotected concentrations, it is becoming very easy 
for them to be targeted and destroyed by long-range terminal guided weaponry. 
To cope with such weakness, major weapons and equipment as well as logistic 
support facilities have to be moved into underground shelters constructed around 
military bases or in tactical positions. This will not only offset the limitations of 
Taiwan's small physical size, but give Taiwan the leeway of defence in depth, and 
preserve combat strength. 
In order to secure military personnel, equipment, and facilities from surprise attack, 
some defensive measures have been taken recently. In July 1988, General Liu Chih- 
chung revealed that the Defence Ministry "has moved the nation's key military 
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installations underground in an effort to prevent missile attacks from Communist 
China" (China Post, July 27,1988). This multi-billion-dollar project, code-named 
Chia Shan, includes underground shelters for fighter aircraft and submarine facilities 
(it was completed in late 1991). The General also announced that major military 
bases have been relocated to Taiwan's east coast, which is shielded from the PRC by 
the Central Mountain range. 
The implementation of a non-provocative defence policy will doubtless raise new 
issues for policy-making and public debate. Will the ROC defence posture become 
too defensive, or, on the other hand, might not some policies and programs contribute 
to heightened suspicion and increased arms acquisition across the Taiwan Strait - and 
hence diminish Taiwan's security? Are the ROC's security and defence decision- 
making processes properly structured for designing a viable posture for the defence of 
Taiwan? Indeed, given Taiwan's small size, limited economic and population 
resources, a self-reliant non-provocative posture for the defence of Taiwan has to be a 
national effort requiring broad public support and participation. 
Diplomatic 
A. Taiwan's Diplomatic Isolation 
Since the establishment of the PRC in October 1949, confrontation in the diplomatic 
field between Peking and Taipei has never ceased. Peking's chief objective has always 
been to gain the status of sole legal representative of China and then to force the ROC 
government to yield by isolating the latter from the international community. Blocking 
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Taipei's participation in international activities is an important means employed by 
Peking to force Taipei to accept its unification formula. The 1970s were a critical time 
in the diplomatic confrontation between both. During this period, Peking not only took 
over the ROC's UN seat in 1971, but also established formal ties with the United States, 
the ROC's most important ally, in 1979. It was during this period that Peking gained 
much leverage over the Taiwan issue (Ross 1986). 
To international bodies (such as the United Nations) that wanted the PRC as a member 
and to foreign governments (such as the United States) that desired diplomatic 
intercourse, Peking presented them with an either/or option. They must choose between 
Peking and Taipei; they could not pursue official relations with both. Confronted with 
this dilemma, most chose the PRC. By the end of the 1970s, all the world's major 
nations had severed formal relations with Taipei. However, Peking's subsequent 
proposal of the "one country, two systems" formula for China! s unification met with 
resolute opposition from the ROC. Thus, to force Taipei to accept this formula, Peking 
has tried to isolate Taiwan completely, including "blocking its pragmatic foreign policy, 
downgrading its status to the level of local government, and preventing it from 
purchasing arms" (Lee 1992). 
By criticising the ROC's pragmatic diplomacy, Peking charged that Taipei is trading 
money for diplomatic recognition and that its purpose is to create "two Chinas" or "one 
China, one Taiwan"; that is, to transform Taiwan into an independent political entity 
(Liu 1992). Taiwan's continuous efforts to rejoin the United Nations and its peripheral 
organisations has drawn Peking great concern. "Ever since we declared our intention to 
participate in the UN, [Beijing] has become even more adamant in its attempts to 
downgrade our [ROC] status and evade reality" said Fredrick Chien, ROC's Foreign 
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Minister (Jane's Defence Weekly, January 22,1994). Therefore, when the ROC's Legis- 
lative Yuan adopted on June 18,1991, a resolution requesting the government to apply 
at an appropriate time for readmission to the UN under the name of the "Republic of 
China", there was a very strong reaction from Peking, and severe criticism of the 
resolution was published in the mainland Chinese media (Wen-Wei-Po, June 15,1991). 
Peking claimed that the attempt of some people in Taiwan to squeeze into the UN in 
order to realise their objective of splitting China and the Chinese nation will surely fail 
(People's Daily, July 10,1991). Moreover, all of the PRC's embassies and consulates 
were ordered to do their utmost to stop Taiwan from participating in any UN-related 
organisations or conferences (Independent Evening News, January 10,1992). 
Though Winston L. Y. Yang, a professor at Seton Hall University in New Jersey, put 
forth a proposal that both sides should be given equal opportunity to take part in interna- 
tional organisations, it has clearly not been accepted by the PRC ( Yang, 1988). Peking 
has never abandoned the policy of isolating Taipei in the international community. 
Fearing that any parallel recognition of two Chinese governments by a third state might 
psychologically and legally contribute to a deepening of China's division, the PRC has 
warned repeatedly that Peking would regard such any acts of dual recognition as a move 
inimical to the national interest of the Chinese people and that it would react with a 
termination of diplomatic relations with that state or with economic sanctions against it. 
Peking has maintained this policy with comparative rigidity. 
B. Controversy over Sovereignty and Legitimacy 
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Despite the conflict and hostility between Peking and Taipei, both sides still share the 
same view that there is only "one China" of which Taiwan is a part. The issue at stake 
is: which of the two parties is the legitimate government of that "one China". The ROC 
government in Taipei claimed de jure legitimacy and referred to the PRC government as 
a rebel regime. However, Peking also claims that it is China's only legal government 
because the establishment of the PRC in 1949 effectively ended the ROC's existence as 
an entity in international law. Therefore, there are two mutually exclusive claims to be 
the legitimate government of the whole of China in a situation in which one side does 
not have any de facto control over Taiwan and its adjacent islands, and the other side has 
no control over the Chinese mainland. 
Since the governments in Peking and Taipei each claim to be the legitimate ruler of 
China, the recognition question is indeed a zero-sum game. If one of them is admitted 
to an international organisation or establishes diplomatic relations with another country, 
it automatically excludes the other. There are two features to be pointed out here: the 
first is that the sovereignty problem still exists, despite the increase in exchanges across 
the Strait. The second is that although the two sides are still in conflict over the sover- 
eignty issue, Taipei's gradual acceptance of a "one country, two governments" or "one 
country, two regions" solution to the problem shows that it has accepted the reality of 
national division even though it has not given up the principle of "one China" (Baum 
1990). 
This "One China, Two Governments" stance has been condemned by Peking officials 
"as an effort to garner international recognition of Taiwan's separate identity from the 
mainland" (Stutter 1993,24). If the CCP were to accept this initiative, unification 
would never take place, Peking asserts. Taipei, however, sees "two governments" or 
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"two regions" as temporary formulas to be applied only in the transitional period before 
national unification; as the social and economic gap between them narrows, Taiwan and 
mainland will merge together naturally. In other words, Taipei hopes to put the 
sovereignty issue aside for the time being. It believes that both sides should make 
efforts to broaden functional exchanges and avoid thwarting each other's participation in 
international activities. 
Peking's reluctance to make any concessions on the sovereignty issue is also 
understandable. In spite of the easing of tensions across the Strait, unification seems 
even more uncertain due to changes in the political climate in Taiwan. Peking fears that 
the main opposition party, the DPP, supports Taiwan independence, and several 
important DPP leaders did make calls for independence during the various election 
campaigns. Diplomatic frustrations have left the ROC's international status uncertain, 
and this uncertainty has had a direct impact on domestic politics. The PRC's policy to 
isolate Taiwan from the international community would help the elements of the 
"Taiwan Independence Movement" to promote their cause. The DPP members have 
repeatedly expressed that only when Taiwan becomes independent can it break its 
present international isolation. Though they explained that self-deten-nination is differ- 
ent from independence, both the ruling KMT and the CCP, however, assert that 
independence is the DPP's real goal (Hoon 1988). Currently, the independence question 
is an uncertain variable in the issue of reunification. Since it is the only excuse for the 
PRC's use of force, therefore, its impacts on Taiwan's security and stability are deep and 
profound. If Peking continues to block Taiwan's participation in international affairs, 
independence sentiment is likely to grow, and this will erode the improved relations 
between both sides. 
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The sovereignty problem is clearly an important source of distrust and 
misunderstanding that hinders the further improvement of Taiwan-mainland relations. It 
casts a shadow of uncertainty over functional exchanges and interaction, let alone the 
unification of the country. 
C. Flexible and Pragmatic Diplomacy 
The ROC's isolation in international society could be attributed to two principal factors. 
First, the ROC government did not modify its ideological one-China policy before 
Peking's admission to the United Nations. Second, the PRC persists in exerting 
pressure through all channels to isolate the ROC and to force its leaders to negotiate 
with Peking. If the ROC had softened its one-China policy before the coming of the 
d6tente period, it would have forestalled a series of diplomatic setbacks in the 1970s. 
As its diplomatic isolation has increased, the KMT leadership has been eagerly seeking 
an identity in the international community. Since the late 1980s, the ROC has pursued a 
"flexible and pragmatic diplomacy". It has worked for the development of 
intergovernmental relations with other countries no matter whether or not they have 
formal diplomatic relations with Peking. In other words, if a country which has formal 
ties with Peking wants to establish or resume formal relations with the ROC, then Taipei 
will not refuse to do so. Similarly, if the ROC is allowed to use an appropriate name 
and given appropriate status, it is willing to join or rejoin various international 
organisations even if Peking is already a member. "The desire to end a decade of 
diplomatic isolation is understandable, as are the benefits that success here might confer 
on an incumbent government facing a democratic election" (Niou 1992). 
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D. Diplomatic Context of Non-provocative Policy 
Indeed, focusing on diplomatic recognition would assure Peking of victories and work 
to Taipei's disadvantage. There is little prospect that the major states will recognise 
Taipei at the expense of their relations with Peking. The diplomatic recognition game is 
one that Taipei can not win. Peking's goal is to further isolate Taipei and force it into its 
embrace and its strategy is to signal its resolve by withdrawing recognition from anyone 
who establishes formal ties with Taipei. Moreover, by focusing on states that matter 
little in international power politics, Taiwan may be paying too much for recognition. 
However, if the diplomatic initiatives contribute to Taiwan's access to international 
organisations such as GATT which impact on its economic performance, then those 
initiatives are worthwhile. 
Hostility between Taipei and Peking has decreased in recent years, although the danger 
of war still exists. At present, both sides should try to avoid provoking each other on the 
sovereignty issue. Taipei must be careful not to lapse into a "two-Chinas" policy, while 
Peking should cease trying to isolate Taipei internationally as long as it adheres to "one- 
China". Peking's insistence on sovereignty is clearly incompatible with Taipei's 
emphasis on security. The more Peking emphasises sovereignty, the less comfortable 
Taipei feels about dealing with the mainland government, while Peking inevitably feels 
that Taipei's pursuit of security conflicts with its insistence on sovereignty. We are 
strongly convinced that any shift away from the "one-China7 position, especially the 
context of a unilateral Taiwanese declaration to the contrary, would be viewed as highly 
threatening by Peking in a most fundamental way and thus would be immediately 
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destabilising. At best it would cause severe political turmoil with significant economic 
implications. At worst, it could plunge the region into war. Continued adherence to the 
"one-China" policy, therefore, appears to be in everyone's political, economic and 
security interests. 
2.2.6 The Search for Security Through Regional Collective Co- 
operation 
Strategically placed between two of Asia's most important sea lanes, the Taiwan 
Strait and the Bashi Channel, Taiwan's security is closely related to that of the rest of 
Northeast Asia and indeed to the entire Asian-Pacific region. As a glance at the map 
would indicate, many view Taiwan as occupying a crucial nexus between the 
industrialised nations of Northeast Asia and the resource-rich countries of Southeast 
Asia and the Middle East. Today, the PRC and the United States are two key factors 
influencing Taiwan's external security environment. However, to understand the 
ROC's strategic value to the region and its own need for security, it is necessary to 
look at Taiwan from a broader perspective: the major trends and the developing sense 
of community within the Asian-Pacific region and the various factors that influence 
Taiwan's role in the proposed regional groupings. 
It is commonly recognised that "the Asian-Pacific region will be the don-dnant 
growth centre of the world by the end of this century; that is, a global shift in 
importance away from Europe to the Pacific is currently underway" (Ahmad 1980,11). 
A study by the Brookings Institution of Washington, DC, noted that "the Pacific Basin 
is the most dynamic region of the world" (Quoted in Rostow 1980,18). And more 
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than one commentator has pointed to the prophetic wisdom of US Secretary of State 
John Hay when he said, "the Mediterranean is the ocean of the past, the Atlantic is the 
ocean of the present, and the Pacific is the ocean of the future" (Cited in Lien 1994, 
3). 
Asia is unique in many important respects. It is probably the most heavily 
militarised region in the world and, unlike the European case, its security 
arrangements are predominantly bilateral. In this region neither has any multilateral 
security regime received much enthusiastic response, nor do there exist formal arms 
control agreements among the Asian countries comparable to those in Europe (Segal 
1992,83-101). Economically, Northeast Asian nations together with the members 
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have registered the world's 
fastest economic growth. Despite the recent world-wide relaxation of tension, 
however, defence expenditures have tended to grow faster in both Northeast and 
Southeast Asia, as a result of their economic dynamism and vitality. The strategic 
situation in the region is fluid at this time. Contributing to that instability are the lack 
of a clearly articulated and consistently applied Asian policy by the United States, the 
shifting balance of power in the region, uncertainties surrounding Peking's leadership 
and its military expansion, the growing independence of Japan and the intensity of its 
defence debate, potential conflicts in the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, the 
increasing vulnerability of vital sea lines of communication, and the disputes over the 
South China Sea. It is these strategic factors that make an analysis of the Asian- 
Pacific environment all the more important. 
Countries in the region are relieved that the danger of global conventional or nuclear 
war involving the superpowers has been eliminated. Some have argued that Asian 
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countries would be free to concentrate on economic development or internal security 
without the problems of superpower rivalry spilling over into the region. Nonetheless, 
the security challenges that the Asian states face have become more complex and give 
rise to troubling dilemmas. "The cost for East Asia of its freedom from foreign 
rivalries is that it now has to deal with indigenous insecurities that have deep roots of 
their own" (Buzan and Segal 1995,7). Now more than ever, the Asian countries are 
being compelled to direct attention and resources to external defence as the United 
States readjusts its presence in the region. The fear is that the United States may leave 
Asians to their own devices (Segal 1993,47-60; Strategic Survey 1991-92,211-218), 
and could create instability that may encourage external intervention. It seems that it 
is time for Asians to sort out their own security problems. "But so far there has been 
little serious thought in the region about how security might be handled" Jbid, 53) and 
"what the regional pattern of security relations will be" (Buzan and Segal 1995,8). 
Although various measures for security co-operation in the region have been proposed 
in recent years none has made any real progress. Regional economic co-operation is a 
fact of life in the Asia-Pacific, but while multilateral economic regimes like the 
Pacific Economic Co-operation Council (PECC) and Asia-Pacific Economic Co- 
operation (APEC) flourish, on the security front, co-operation has been far more 
difficult to achieve. The following examines some of the proposals for establishing 
security/dialogues and regimes in the region. 
A. Proposals for Regional Security Co-operation 
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In addition to the economic forces of integration, there are also important political 
and strategic forces at work that are stimulating a renewed interest in multilateral 
security arrangements. These forces include: 
--The importance of sea transportation to countries bordering the Pacific Ocean. 
--The relative decline of the US Navy presence in the region and the emergence of 
the PRC. 
--The growing interdependence of the countries in the region, especially in economy 
and trade. 
--A growing sense of threat throughout the region caused by unresolved civil wars in 
the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait, and potential violence in South China 
Sea. 
--A recognition of the need to cooperate in matters of security because of the lack of 
strategic depth in the region and the various geographical relationships that make 
the defence of one nation in the region dependent upon the security of another. 
However, until now there has never been a region-wide multilateral security dialogue 
in Asia-Pacific. Even at a subregional level such dialogue has, until very recently, 
been rare. Regional security issues have been almost exclusively dealt with 
bilaterally. The establishment of a multilateral security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific 
region has therefore been a painstaking process. ASEAN had traditionally refrained 
from dealing with security or military issues. Additionally, most Asian states denied 
that there was a need for regional security dialogue, arguing that they had other 
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priorities, such as economic development and internal stability, and a different notion 
of security. 
It was ultimately ASEAN which seized the initiative and brought the regional 
security dialogue concept to fruition. With greater exposure to the concept of 
common security, regional policy makers seemed to see a genuine need for managing 
their security dilemmas--such as the Spratly Islands dispute--to avoid creating 
misconceptions of intention, instigating a regional arms race, or, in the worst case, 
triggering armed conflict (Henderson 1992,12). Since ASEAN has long been 
reluctant to engage in formal multilateral discussions on security issues, the elevation 
of security onto the ASEAN, PMC and ARF agenda represent a considerable shift in 
regional security thinking. There are a number of reasons for this. Perhaps the most 
important factor driving ASEAN to seize the initiative, however, was its realisation 
that if such a development was as inevitable as it now seemed, then it would be in 
ASEAN's interest to be in the vanguard. Moreover, the ASEAN states had come to 
realise that their organisation was beginning to enhance their influence both 
individually and collectively. 
There is no doubt that support for the idea of multilateral security dialogues is much 
greater in Southeast Asia than Northeast Asia. Most of the regional proposals for 
security co-operation have come from Southeast Asia. While the ARF offers great 
promise, its contribution to forming a multilateral security institution for Northeast 
Asia is as yet unclear and remains in its nascent stages. Why have the Northeast Asia 
states been so much less forthcoming? 
Perhaps the single most important reason is that relations between the key Northeast 
Asia states--Japan, the Koreas, the PRC and the ROC--are very different from those 
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between the ASEAN states. First, "at a first glance, relations among Northeast Asian 
governments lack certain critical prerequisites for the establishment of such 
institutions: a modicum of trust and mutual confidence and consensus on what the 
means of co-operation should be" (Gill 1994,149). 
Second, the key security issues in Northeast Asia are nearly all bilateral. Most 
regional states see the solutions to these problems lying primarily, if not exclusively, 
in the relevant bilateral relationships. 
Third, the absence of such institutions is rooted in complex factors of culture, 
politics, idntity and history (Higgott & Stubbs 1995,516-35; Higgott 1996,1-38), 
upon which must be overlaid the more contemporary complexities of post-World War 
11 animosities, territorial disputes, and cold war legacies (Buzan and Segal 1995,4-7). 
In addition, the ARF does not include two key players from Northeast Asia--Taiwan 
and North Korea--a situation which will take some time to resolve. The fact that 
Taiwan is not a member makes discussion of Taiwan Strait security difficult. 
Economic issues tend to be less sensitive than security issues, which may explain why 
Taiwan has a place at the APEC table but not at the ASEAN PMC nor the ARF. Until 
these membership gaps are resolved, crucial security-related problems cannot be fully 
addressed. It is in Northeast Asia that the implantation of habits of dialogue on 
security issues--and broader regional co-operation--will be most difficult to achieve. 
B. The Regional Role of Taiwan 
Irrespective of the erosion of its international diplomatic status, Taiwan has 
maintained fairly extensive security relations with the nations of ASEAN. In fact, the 
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ROC shares critical security interests with the nations of Southeast Asia. The major 
sea-lanes of communication that pass through the Malacca Straits and along the 
Philippine Palawan, also traverse the Bashi Channel and the Taiwan Strait adjacent 
itself. In addition, the PRC has been unyielding in its insistence that it has sovereign 
control over almost all of the South China Sea, where these waterways are found--a 
claim that conflicts with those of the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and 
Brunei, as well as those of the ROC. Any effort to defend this area from a major navy 
would require naval capabilities that, at present, are notable in their absence. In such 
circumstances, small, high-speed missile boats would be ideal force supplements in 
the cluttered waters and narrow straits of the region, and Taiwan has the production 
facilities, the servicing capacity, and the disposition to supply them at affordable cost. 
Thus, in some areas, the ROC has the potential to become a major arms supplier. 
ASEAN may soon feel the necessity to provide for the defence of the narrow but 
strategically critical waterways. 
Taiwan has so far been excluded from regional security dialogue, because none of 
the countries in the region recognise it as an independent political entity. Taipei is a 
member of APEC, but security matters are always kept off the agenda of APEC 
summits. The major obstacle to ROC participation in regional groupings is the 
sensitivity on the part of some Asia-Pacific nations to the views of Peking. It appears 
to many that under present conditions of improved relations among the United States, 
Japan, and the PRC, Taiwan's participation as an official member of any political 
based regional grouping would require careful consideration of the views of the PRC 
leaders. 
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ROC officials, however, refuse to accept the view that Peking's opinion should in 
any way influence Taiwan's participation in the various groupings suggested for the 
Asia-Pacific region. They insist that Taiwan's future role should be based upon the 
reality of its regional contributions and not be subject to pressures from Peking. 
Economically, the ROC is a newly industrialised country and stands midway between 
ASEAN and the more fully developed nations of the region. In addition to having 
excellent economic relations with the developed states, Taiwan's experience in 
economic development and intermediate technology is of great value to ASEAN and 
other developing nations. No matter from which perspective one views the situation, 
progress and prosperity in Taiwan are intimately bound up with the Asia-Pacific 
region. As an Asia-Pacific country, Taiwan cannot and should not place itself outside 
the integral development of the region. Thus Taiwan is seeking the establishment of 
an Asia-Pacific regional security organisation as a guarantee of its own security. 
C. Taiwan's Security Strategy 
Apart from the Sino-American Mutual Defence Treaty, which was in force between 
1954 and 1978, Taiwan has not managed to form any military alliances. Past attempts 
to join the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and ASEAN ended in 
failure. Although Taiwan assists Singapore in training its troops and its fleet does 
visit Indonesian ports from time to time, Taiwan is far from achieving the idea of a 
multilateral military consultation mechanism with the Southeast Asian countries. The 
Institute for National Policy Research has proposed a strategy of "connecting with 
South, approaching the North, and maintaining peace with the West", which involves 
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allying with the countries of Southeast Asia, but the emphasis here is on economic co- 
operation rather than a military alliance (Hsu, Li & Shiau 1991,152-60). ASEAN 
wants to preserve Southeast Asia as a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality, and 
despite the fact that these countries have recently been paying more attention to 
military and security issues, it would be difficult for them to form an alliance with 
Taiwan for fear of upsetting the PRC. 
Even though, President Lee Teng-hui has put forward the proposal of building an 
Asia-Pacific regional security organisation on many occasions, even going so far as to 
suggest certain concrete measures, such as a collective security guarantee fund, 
military cutbacks in Asia, and economic co-operation and the joint development of 
resources. These shared economic interests, Lee believes, would ensure peace and 
security in the region. Lee holds that this security system should not be directed at 
any one enemy and that all nations in the region, regardless of their ideological 
differences and political systems, should have the opportunity to join (Chung-yang 
fih-pao, September 18,1992; Chen 1993). 
Regarding the question of funding, Taiwan would certainly have to share the 
financial burden of collective security, as Washington's allies did during the Gulf War 
and as Japan and South Korea are doing today by helping foot the bill for American 
troops stationed in their countries. Disarmament is also important as collective 
security will not function well without it; yet countries will be unwilling to disarm if 
collective security does not work. As for the role of the United States and Japan, 
under the Bush administration, the Asia-Pacific security structure was like a fan, with 
the US at the base and its bilateral alliances forming the slats. These were connected 
by the fabric of shared economic interests provided by the APEC process (Baker 
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1991/92, pp. 4-5). Bill Clinton favours the institution of multilateralism for security 
consultation in the Asia-Pacific. Turning to the question of joint development of 
resources, Taiwan has persistently encouraged countries with territorial claims in the 
South China Sea to set aside their disputes and discuss joint development. 
Unfortunately, yielding to the PRC's pressure, ASEAN has excluded Taiwan from 
ARF. However, Taiwan's absence will damage the functional integrity of the Forum, 
because such issues as the security of the Taiwan Strait and sovereignty over the 
South China Sea directly involve Taiwan (Lien-ho-pao, April 17,1993). 
Undeniably, without the PRC's support and participation, it will be hard to achieve a 
formal, structured regional security organisation. Fortunately, there is a growing 
consensus among the Asia-Pacific countries in favour of a loose dialogue mechanism 
similar to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). This 
might be achieved in two ways. One is to include security issues in the APEC agenda; 
the other is to establish a regular security dialogue based on ASEAN and including its 
dialogue partners and observers. Therefore, Taiwan must continue to support the 
APEC process and make active efforts to become an ASEAN dialogue partner. 
It is in Taiwan's interest to be included in the Pacific Basin Community. Taiwan's 
trade position would be enhanced, especially with the ASEAN nations, and it would 
no doubt benefit from any defence arrangements that might evolve. Also of great 
importance to Taipei is the fact that participation would give the ROC government 
renewed legitimacy in the eyes of the world community. Whatever limitations, if any, 
may be placed on the ROC's political participation in regional organisations, Taiwan 
will in all probability continue to play an important and influential role in economic 
affairs. "The primacy of economics over military power must be established as a 
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means for exercising regional influence" (Higgott 1996,1-38). In a region 
characterised by economic growth and interdependence, Taiwan's economic strength 
can be translated into a degree of political influence. In addition, Taiwan has 
important historical, cultural, and strategic links with many of the region's most 
dynamic members. However, its positive contribution to regional affairs depends 
heavily upon continued prosperity and security. 
Conclusion 
In Chapter 2, we considered the military dimensions of Taiwan's security. The 
Chapter started by asking: Is the probability of military confrontation across the 
Taiwan Strait increasing or decreasing? There is little doubt on Taiwan that the PRC 
will eventually invade the island if it is able to do so at an acceptable cost and if 
Peking is unable to gain control of Taiwan in any other way. The short-term variables 
inherent in those conditions are infinite, but the long-term threat is itself a constant. 
The Peking leadership's recent behaviour has not helped to mitigate the fear. Military 
activities in and around the Taiwan Strait after President Lee Teng-hui's visit to the 
United States and the continuous waves of military exercises prior to Taiwan's 
presidential election have aggravated the already tense situation. 
Despite continued military threats from Peking against Taiwan, a number of analysts 
believe they are no longer credible. It has broadly been acknowledged that the 
chances of military conflict between the two have become increasingly slim. Even if 
the threat were real, others argue, no government on Taiwan-be it KMT or DPP-would 
be so foolish as to provoke Peking by an explicit declaration of Taiwan independence. 
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Since a move to separate Taiwan from Chinese territory is thought to be the only trig- 
ger which would lead the PRC to use force against Taiwan, scholars from this school 
of thought therefore concluded that the probability of war in the Taiwan Strait is 
remote. Nevertheless, several trends discussed in Chapter 2 have given cause for 
concern that the PRC may be re-examining the utility of using force in the Taiwan 
Strait to achieve unification. These trends suggest that the threat environment in the 
Taiwan Strait during the 1990s will be characterised by a degree of uncertainty and 
differences of perception in Washington, Taipei, and Peking. Certainly, the PRC 
threat will remain and it will be perceived by some as growing. All the factors 
mentioned also suggest that the PRC must keep its military option as a possible way 
to solve the Taiwan issue. However, a major use of force against Taiwan seems 
unlikely without severe provocation on the part of Taiwan, although limited PRC 
military pressure to speed up the unification negotiating process may be possible. 
A comparison between the military capabilities of Taiwan and the PRC is 
illuminating because it establishes one fact. The PRC is so overwhelmingly superior 
to Taiwan in virtually all categories of military force that the outcome of a struggle 
between the two Chinese governments is more likely to be decided by Peking's 
determination to pursue the fight than by an actual contest of military superiority. In 
other words, the cost of taking Taiwan would be enormous, but Peking has, or will 
have by the next decade, enough resources to accomplish the task if it elects to do so. 
Then, what are the most likely military options to be selected by the PRC should it 
decide to attack Taiwan? It has a variety of military options available. These range 
from low-level harassment at one extreme, through blockade, to an all-out attack, 
invasion, and siege at the other extreme. 
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After analysing Taiwan's insecurity dilemma and assessing the threats, it is necessary 
to explore further how Taiwan could cope with them and what national security policy 
Taiwan should establish. Some states seek security by maintaining strict neutrality; 
others seek it by joining alliances. Some seek security by confronting potential 
adversaries with military force; others seek it by trying to be accommodating "good 
neighbours". 
Since seeking for alliance and nuclear weapons has proved impractical, what 
alternative measures could Taiwan adopt in order to reduce its vulnerability and pre- 
vent threats? The choice is straightforward for Taiwan. Owing to its status as a weak 
state, structural incapacity for offence, and the power asymmetry compared to the 
PRC, a more appropriate policy for Taiwan to adopt in order to survive is "non- 
provocative defence", which means "making the country hard to attack, expensive to 
invade, and difficult to occupy". 
A state like Taiwan whose aim is defensive will prefer deterring an adversary such as 
the PRC to having to fight. In order to make deterrence credible, Taiwan has to devote 
considerable effort to trying to persuade the PRC that it would indeed defend itself 
despite the odds against it. Like most states, Taiwan prefers not to have to fight. 
Fighting is not always necessary. But its goal in fighting must be to make the cost of 
victory higher than the gains of victory can justify. As mentioned earlier on page 5, "A 
nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice its core 
values if it wishes to avoid war, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a 
war". 
By employing non-provocative defence strategies, Taiwan could signal to the PRC 
unambiguously defensive intentions. Such strategies act to dispel the suspicion, 
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tension and hostility which can not only minimise the probability of crises occurring, 




Political Dimensions of Taiwan's Security: 
The Impact of the Taiwan Independence Movement 
on Taiwan's Political Stability and National Security 
Although Taiwan's security suggests a focus on the military sector, the idea cannot 
be properly comprehended without bringing in the actors and dynamics from the 
political and economic sectors. Taiwan's security problem turns out to be a systemic 
security one in which political and economic sectors are as important as military ones. 
The concept of security binds together these sectors so closely that it demands to be 
treated in an integrative perspective. Therefore, in evaluating the security problem of 
Taiwan, one should also take into account the peculiar features of politics in Taiwan. 
In Chapter 3 we extend the dimensions of security from the military to the political 
by examining the impact of the Taiwan independence movement on Taiwan's 
security. We start by tracing back to the historical background for the emergence of 
Taiwan independence movement. We examine the TIM's theoretical justification for 
the claims on the uncertainty of Taiwan's legal status and the right to self- 
determination and argue that Taiwan independence is neither feasible nor possible 
because of the combination of domestic, cross-Strait and international factors. We 
then push the analysis forward by exploring Taiwan's political development and the 
implications of political reform for domestic stability and security and for cross-Strait 
relations. 
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In just a few years, self-determination has accelerated the collapse of the former 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, replaced totalitarian and authoritarian regimes with 
democratising or democratic regimes, and ignited and sustained civil wars all around 
the globe. It threatens to tear apart such newly formed or reborn states as Russia, 
Georgia and Moldova, and even to trigger regional wars in the Balkans, the Middle 
East and the Caucasus. As Hedley Bull observed a decade ago: "The territorial 
integrity of many states old and new is now more threatened by separatist violence 
within their frontiers than by violence from outside" (Quoted in Chubin 1989,246). 
According to Rosen and Jones, nationalism (separatism) and nationalist movements 
are the second among the twelve causes of war, and the main link between national- 
ism and war has been the survival of separate identities among populations whose 
geographical distribution differs from the international boundary lines (Rosen & Jones 
1980,309-310). Thus the link between nationalism and war today operates most 
importantly through militant territorial and political demands organised around certain 
principles of ethnic, linguistic, religious, and racial we-group identities. Hence, "it is 
clear that national identity is a central component of the security problematique 
whether or not it lines up with the state" (Buzan 1991,72). 
To the PRC, Taiwan is an integral part of the territory controlled by the sole legal 
and legitimate govemment of China. Any advocacy or movement of Taiwan 
independence which violates the "One China" principle would be rejected by the 
PRC. Based on the scenarios for the use of force by the PRC illustrated in Chapter 1, 
the most likely one under which the PRC would invade is if and when Taiwan 
declares itself independent; and that is the most dangerous one for Taiwan, because an 
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independent Taiwan would have implications for China's hold on Tibet, Sinkiang, and 
Inner Mongolia and there would be strong reaction inside the PRC to any Chinese 
leader who acquiesced in an independent "Republic of Taiwan" (Klintworth 1994). 
At the same time, Taiwan independence might cause internal upheavals on the island 
and thereby limit the ROC's capacity to mobilise resistance against external threats, 
and consequently might invite PRC aggression. In history, it has been extremely 
seldom that a government with internal chaos can successfully repulse a formidable 
enemy's invasion. 
Therefore, how did the Taiwan Independence Movement (TIM) emerge and evolve? 
What is its theoretical framework? What may be the impact of the TIM on Taiwan's 
social and political stability, national security, and on the cross-Strait relations? What 
are the attitudes from both the ROC and the PRC toward the TIM? Will it be possible 
and feasible for Taiwan to declare independence? What measures should the ROC 
government adopt in order to pacify the increasing TIM ? And what are the critical 
issues confronted by the KMT regime as it proceeds with democratic evolution and 
political liberalisation? All these will be discussed in detail in this chapter. 
3.1 Historical Background for the Emergence of Taiwan 
Independence Movement 
3.1.1 Domestic Political Factors 
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When Taiwan was returned to the ROC in 1945, the Taiwanese welcomed the 
Chinese Nationalists with open arms. However, facing the large-scale civil war 
activities in many provinces of China, and having been surprised by the sudden end of 
the war against Japan, the then Nationalist Government (ROC) was ill-prepared for 
the tasks of take-over and psychological reintegration of Taiwan, which since the 
Sino-Japanese War of 1895 had been for half a century under Japanese rule. On 
October 25,1945, General Chen Yi, a former governor of Fukien, was installed as 
governor in Taipei. Chen Yi was regarded as a liberal member of the political science 
clique of the KMT. He was welcomed by the local Taiwanese, but within months the 
native population complained that "the dogs go and the pigs come" (Lin 1993,19). 
Chen Yi's administration treated Formosa as a conquered province and its inhabitants 
as a subjugated people. 
Wartime poverty caused many of the administrators and soldiers arriving from the 
mainland to engage in acts of corruption or extortion. There was a severe language 
barrier, because few of the arriving mainlanders were able to speak or to understand 
the local Taiwan dialects, while the Taiwanese had mostly not been taught to speak 
Mandarin. The breakdown of the Japanese administration was followed by inflation 
and economic chaos. In addition, the political and economic systems had not yet been 
put back on the rails. The mainlanders, who were seeking to assert their leadership 
role in all spheres of public life, lacked the knowledge and competence necessary for 
dealing with this particularly difficult situation. The millions of Taiwanese very soon 
felt disappointed and antagonised. Inefficiency and corruption ruined the prosperity 
of the island and drove the people to revolt. To suppress the rebellious and bitter 
Taiwanese, the mainlanders used blackmail, bribery, secret police, and ultimately 
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cold-blooded murder. On February 28,1947, the mishandling of investigations by the 
Taiwan Tobacco and Wine Monopoly Bureau into the private selling of contraband 
tobacco led to protests and rioting. It snowballed into a major uprising, and precipi- 
tated the so-called "Tobacco Massacre" in which hundreds of intellectuals and 
innocent Taiwanese were killed. The number of victims is still not clear today. In the 
early stages, the government sent in the army to restore the order. But it was only 
when the incident was over and things were gradually calming down that reasons were 
found for arresting and executing many of the Taiwanese elite. Though General Chen 
Yi was recalled an& executed for his brutality, the incident had happened, an 
irremediable tragedy of history had been made. 
During the Japanese rule most uprisings and home rule movements reflected the 
participants' anti-Japanese attitude instead of any intention on their part to create an 
entity permanently divorced from China (Shaw 1979,24-30; Wang 1993,1). The 
post-1949 independence movement, however, no longer has loyalty to the "great 
China unity" concept, but has been instead a secession movement not unlike those 
found elsewhere in the world. The incident cast the shadow of separatism over the 
Taiwanese people. The incident was blown up and magnified by Taiwan 
Independence advocates. Although that rebellion was ruthlessly put down, leaving 
bitter memories behind, which accentuated the cleavage between mainlanders and 
Taiwanese, herein lies the root cause of conflicts that have plagued Taiwan society 
ever since. It was thus that, with living together having already given rise to much 
friction, added to the occurrence of the bloody incident, the scars between the two 
newly integrated groups grew ever larger and the suspicions deeper. 
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The tragic February 28 Incident was clearly an act of civil disobedience against 
repression and in no way represented an effort on the part of the Taiwanese to seek 
independence from China. It has, however, been regarded by TIM groups as their first 
revolutionary action against "foreign" Nationalist Chinese rule. On the other hand, the 
Nationalists considered the Incident communist-inspired because the Taiwanese 
Communist Party was instrumental in leading the uprising in Central Taiwan (Kerr 
1965,278-280). Interestingly, the Chinese Communist Party regarded the incident as 
one of its achievements during the civil war of 1946-1949 with the Nationalists. 
During the 1970s, Peking-supported leftists in the US competed with TIM groups to 
commemorate each year February 28 by organising various activities. Meanwhile, it 
is noticeable that Taiwan Independence advocates have commemorated and played up 
the incident every year and take it as a means to oppose the ROC government. 
The "February 28 Incident" (Erh-Erh-Pa Shih-Chien) took place more than 40 years 
ago. The taboos surrounding it have been gradually lifted but the passions are still not 
completely exhausted. Abundant source materials are streaming out and victims are 
still around, but the truth about the incident often gets distorted for the sake of 
politics. "This dead-lock must be resolved, otherwise, it will become the everlasting 
invisible wound in the deepest parts of hearts of Taiwanese people, and the 
inflammatory excuse of conspirators" (Lin 1993,19). 
Since July 1992, the ROC government has set up a task force to register the number 
of victims of the February 28 Incident and make preparations for public apologies, 
paying compensation, and building a memorial. Official historical material and 
research reports on the incident are also coming to light in a steady stream. All these 
activities show that the ROC government is sincere in coming to terms with the 
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feelings of this painful period. By doing so, not only will this not lose government 
prestige, on the contrary, many of the irrational barriers will disappear without a trace. 
3.1.2 The Interplay of International Factors 
Where the international background is concerned, Japan and the United States played 
a major part. Before World War H, Japan regarded Taiwan as an unsinkable aircraft 
carrier, and as a launching pad for the invasion of China. After her surrender, Japan 
was unwilling to abandon Taiwan. The Japanese thought that if the colony of Taiwan 
became independent, then reversion of Taiwan to Japan might take place. So Japan 
instigated, cultivated, and stirred up undercover activities of the Taiwan Independence 
Movement from every angle. 
All the parties in Japan asserted and maintained the policy of "One China, One 
Taiwan", and explained that "the ROC Peace Treaty with Japan in 1952 only served to 
detach Taiwan from Japan but fell short of attaching Taiwan to Nationalist China" 
(Ma 1988,17). As a matter of fact Japan was obliged to give up Taiwan under duress, 
but could not really acknowledge the retrocession of Taiwan to China. On February 
28,1956, the Japanese Premier made a public statement in order to prove the theory 
that Taiwan did not belong to the Chinese, and he opposed the Cairo Declaration. He 
said it had no legal status since Japan renounced her sovereignty over Taiwan and the 
Pescadores (Wang 1993,5). In other words, Taiwan's status was ambiguous and 
undefined. From the Japanese point of view, even if Taiwan could not be returned to 
Japan, it should become a Japanese satellite state. 
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Therefore, the initiators of the TIM were, ironically, the Japanese. When the 
Japanese Emperor broadcast, on August 15,1945, to his subjects to surrender to the 
Allied Forces, certain Imperial Army officers in Taiwan denied the authenticity of the 
announcement and planned to fight to the last man. General Rikichi Ando, then 
governor general of Taiwan and commander-in-chief of the armed forces on the 
island, insisted upon a peaceful capitulation (Kerr 1965,62). Those intransigent 
officers, along with their Taiwanese collaborators--most of them were great landlords, 
financial tycoons, highly placed functionaries-and criminal elements of the Japanese 
army, who were loyal to Japan at that time, then proposed an "independence 
movement" to head off potential retaliation by the newly liberated Taiwanese. 
Rebuffed by General Ando as "a mischievous and dangerous suggestion" (Ibid, 65), 
they secretly formed the first TIM organisation. 
During the February 29 Incident in 1947, some TIM advocates were involved in the 
uprising. When these TIM elements got wind of troop reinforcements coming from 
the Chinese mainland, they fled the island to Japan, and established there a "Taiwan 
Democratic Independent Party" in 1950, a "Provisional Government of the Republic 
of Taiwan" in 1956, and set up an intermediate regime whose national flag was the 
picture of a sun and a half moon which implied Japan and Taiwan. They placed 
emphasis on the self-determination of the Taiwan people. They called for 
overthrowing the Nationalist government and setting up an independent state of 
Taiwan to be governed by Taiwanese. Their publications elaborated the historical and 
legal arguments for regarding Taiwan as a political entity separate from China. 
Under the impact of the incident and the approaching defeat and fall of the 
Nationalist Government on the mainland, a small group of Taiwanese separatists and 
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some American authorities began to draft reports and develop scenarios for a 
separation of Taiwan from the rest of China to be legitimised by a UN- or US-super- 
vised plebiscite of the Taiwanese people. Ambitious American elements utilised the 
disappointment and discontent of the Taiwanese toward the mother country as well as 
the cleft brought about by the February 28 incident to launch a movement to separate 
Taiwan from China. Moreover they also encouraged public opinion to favour the 
placing of Taiwan under trusteeship, saying that since the ROC Government was 
incompetent even to rule China proper, naturally it could not rule Taiwan successfully. 
From the above fact we can plainly see the attempts of ambitious American elements. 
"They are availing themselves of the critical war situation in China to carry out their 
design of positively winning over the gentry in Taiwan to promote the movement for 
placing Taiwan under trusteeship" (Pilcher 1972,474). 
Led by Dr. Liao Wen-i (Thomas Liao), the separatists formed in 1948 a "League for 
the Re-Emancipation of Formosa". This organisation sent out appeals to the UN and 
to many other authorities in the US and abroad suggesting an American military 
occupation of Taiwan for the dual purpose of preventing its conquest by the Chinese 
Communists and of becoming a trusteeship (Lin 1993,39). Liao voiced an appeal that 
the US would assist a Taiwanese revolt and stressed his hope that, following the 
revolt, American army units in Formosa would assist in disarming Government forces 
(Cabot 1974,276). In a memorandum from the Formosan Democratic Independent 
Party to the US Consulate General at Taipei entitled "Appealing for a Prompt Action", 
Chen Fong-chu claimed that "the duty and responsibility of protection of Formosa 
must fall upon USA to drive out the unwanted KMT elements from our island" (Edgar 
1974,334). 
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Surprisingly, similar proposals were developed and discussed internally by American 
authorities. From the strategic viewpoint, the control of Taiwan would enhance the 
potential value to the United States as a war time base for staging troops, strategic air 
operations and control of adjacent shipping routes. Thus the policy set forth in "Draft 
Report by the National Security Council on the Position of the United States With 
Respect to Formosa", NSC 37/1,37/2 and 37/5 all concluded that "It would be in the 
interest of US national security if Communist domination of Formosa could be denied 
by the application of appropriate diplomatic and economic steps" (Foreign Relations 
of the United States 1949,1974,271-75), meanwhile, the US should "put itself in a 
position to intervene with force if necessary" and added that the US Department of 
State had supported this position. The report also recommended that the US should 
"seek discretely to maintain contact with potential native Formosan leaders with a 
view at some future date to being able to make use of a Formosan autonomous 
movement should it appear to be in the US national interest to do so" (Ibid, 274-295). 
George F. Kennan, the influential director of the State Department's Policy Planning 
Staff, argued in a secret memorandum of July 6,1949 that "the only reasonably sure 
chance of denying Formosa and Pescadores to the Communists and insulating the 
islands from mainland authority would lie in the removal of the present Nationalist 
administrators [by force] from the islands and in the establishment of a provisional 
international or US regime... " And he also pointed out that "Formosan separatism is 
the only concept which has sufficient grass-roots appeal to resist communism" 
(Kennan 1974,356-362). Although scenarios of this nature did not become the official 
policy of the US government due to the basic reforms carried out by the Nationalist 
Government on Taiwan and the outbreak of the Korean War, they were quite indica- 
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tive of certain American trends of thought considering ways and means by which 
effective control of Taiwan could be denied to either Communist or Nationalist China. 
The earnest US support for the TIM not only appeared in words, but in action as 
well. The US even attempted to persuade General Sun Li-jen, a Virginian Military 
Academy graduate, to betray Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and declare Formosan 
autonomy (Flexer 1974,263), which resulted in General Sun being put under life-long 
house arrest (Wang 1993,4). The US became the base for the TIM in the late 1960s. 
Besides the US government, the TIM has been strongly backed by American scholars 
such as John King Fairbank, George Kerr, Kent Christiansen, Robert Wesson, 
Michael Reisman, and politicians such as Claiborne Pell, Ted Kennedy, Stephen 
Solarz and Jim Lzach. They were all sympathetic to the goals of TIM. Fairbank, a 
professor at Harvard University, often advocated a policy of "One China, One Tai- 
wan". In support of Taiwan Independence, some organisations were established in 
America. However, the American government looked upon those organisations as 
illegal, and inciting riot and unrest (Kupperrman & Trent 1979,186). 
3.2 Theoretical Justification 
3.2.1 Taiwan Nationalism 
The TIM advocates claim that the Taiwanese are indigenous to the soil and have 
farmed the land for four hundred years with a population of about fourteen million 
people, who diverged in the history of self-development from the Chinese 
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mainlanders in that they were possessed of special attributes acquired through half a 
century of Japanese occupation (Li 1980,79). In other words, Taiwanese culture is 
closer to the Japanese one. Furthermore, Taiwan had experienced such a considerable 
period of colonial rule that the result was a hybrid culture composed of Japanese and 
Taiwanese elements. Robert Wesson contends that the people on Taiwan and those 
on mainland China have a different culture, different languages, literature, music, and 
arts (Quoted in Tzou 1992,70-84). 
The TIM advocates insist that the Taiwanese are distinct from the Chinese. Because 
of this insistence, the inference was drawn that Taiwan should become an independent 
country outside of China, according to George Kerr, a friend of Taiwan Independence 
advocates. He argued that, as a result of their special history, the Taiwanese were 
only as "Chinese" as the Americans were "British" (Kerr 1966,453). He pointed out 
that the Taiwanese were a mixed by-product of Indonesian, Malaysian, Spanish, 
Dutch, English, and French rule. Some independence advocates declared that the 
Americans of 1776, though descended from English stock, were distinctly American 
by then. Thus the Taiwanese for a long time were not Chinese (Li 1980,79). 
The Taiwan Independence advocates considered that Taiwanese and mainlanders are 
heterogeneous elements which cannot be easily combined, so the Taiwanese had the 
right of self-determination and independence. However, the advocates gave a variety 
of justifications for Taiwanese separateness (Ma 1988,30). They divided Taiwanese 
residents into two kinds. One was the ruling class, who were immigrants from the 
Chinese mainland, and they comprised a population of about 600,000 at most. The 
other was the ruled class which counted 400,000 aborigines organised into ten clans or 
tribes, and native Taiwanese numbering fifteen million which consists of Chinese 
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immigrants long since domiciled in Taiwan and their descendants. The second theory 
defined the true Taiwanese as immigrants from the mainland who have pioneered 
agricultural settlements for several generations. These Taiwanese shared the same 
language, living environment, culture, and experienced a common struggle for 
survival for a long time, thus differentiating Taiwanese society from Chinese society 
more and more. 
3.2.2 Uncertainty of Taiwan's Legal Status 
The uncertainty of Taiwan's legal status has long been the focus of argument and 
controversy. The advocates of it are not only the people who support the TIM, but 
also Americans and Japanese (Foreign Relations of the United States 1949,1974, 
273; Lin 1993,58). Kent Christiansen claims that Taiwan residents have the right to 
self-determination and proposes that Taiwan should be placed under UN trusteeship 
so that its future status can be determined (Quoted in Tzou 1992,70-84). Michael 
Reisman interprets international pacts to conclude that Taiwan does not belong to 
China (Reisman & Weston 1976,224-5). The purpose of their platform is to find 
common ground for Taiwan Independence. 
They have conceived the idea that the status of Taiwan is still an unresolved problem 
arising out of World War 111. Their view is that Taiwan was not a part of the territory 
of the ROC at the conclusion of World War H and that it has not been Chinese 
territory in this century, since Japan took over the island in 1895 as the result of the 
Sino-Japanese war. The Cairo Declaration of 1943 announced as a war aim the return 
of the island to Chinese sovereignty, and the Japanese renounced its sovereign claim 
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upon it in the San Francisco Treaty in 1951 and the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty in 
1953 but the ownership of Taiwan and Pescadores was not specified. 
Another point raised by some Taiwan Independence advocates is that China ceded 
the territory of Taiwan to Japan under the Shimonoseki Treaty. However, Japan has 
not returned Taiwan to the ROC according to any official treaty. 
3.2.3 The Right to Self-Determination 
Self-determination has always been strongly advocated by opponents of the ruling 
party. The slogans of such advocates have been that Taiwan's future should be deter- 
mined by all of the Taiwan people and that they should enjoy the freedom to advocate 
Taiwan Independence (Li 1980,85). They consider "the right of peoples and nations 
to self-determination is a fundamental human right" and "all peoples have the right of 
self-determination" (General Assembly Resolution 2200,1966,49-58). No govern- 
ment is possessed of the right to decide on its own the political future of Taiwan. 
According to its declaration in April, 1988, the DPP will stick to the advocacy of 
Taiwan Independence under four conditions: (1) if the KMT should seek a 
compromise with the CCP; (2) if the ruling party should "sell out" the interests of the 
people of Taiwan; (3) if the PRC should endeavour to take Taiwan by force; or (4) if 
the KMT should fail to implement genuine political reforms (Hoon 1988,52). 
3.3 Criticism of the Theories 
3.3.1 Taiwan's Historical Origins 
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From any point of view, especially those of history and demography, Taiwan is part 
of China. Archaeological studies show that mainland Chinese culture was the main 
basis for Taiwan's culture (Chang 1977,11). Chinese historical records reveal that Ho 
Man, a Chinese navigator, arrived in Taiwan during the Sui Dynasty in the year 605 
AD (Quoted in Tzou 1992). Chinese settlement in Taiwan dates back as far as the 
twelfth century AD, but not until the seventeenth century did large groups of Chinese 
begin to enter Taiwan. When the Dutch were colonising Taiwan, China was going 
through a period of strife. In 1644 China was invaded by the Manchus, who 
overthrew the Ming Dynasty in the north; the struggle continued for many years in the 
south, and the people suffered. In addition, Japanese pirates constantly ravaged 
Chinese coastal provinces. Consequently, thousands of people began to pour across 
the Taiwan Strait to the island. During the years from 1624 to 1644, over 25,000 
Chinese families emigrated to Taiwan (Hsieh 1967,90). 
From the 1500s, Taiwan was successively invaded by the Portuguese, the Spanish, 
and the Dutch. The Portuguese were the first to sail into the Taiwan Strait in 1517. 
Moved by the beautiful Taiwan coastline, they excitedly called the island "Eha 
Formosa" (the Beautiful Island). In 1626, the Spanish occupied the northern part of 
Taiwan and they were driven away by the Dutch in 1642 who then occupied the entire 
island. In 1661, Cheng Chen-kung, a Ming general, recovered Taiwan from the 
Dutch. After the Ch'ing Dynasty took over Taiwan in 1683, efforts were made to 
develop the island. However, defeated in the 1895 Sino-Japanese War, the Ch'ing 
Dynasty ceded Taiwan to Japan by the Treaty of Shimonoseki. 
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Whether the island was under the rule of Dutch or of the Japanese, the majority of 
the population of the island were, as now, Chinese. During the 50 years of Japanese 
rule, the Japanese represented only about 5 percent of the population; the rest were 
Chinese. The view raised by the TIM advocates that Taiwanese are not Chinese 
ignores Taiwan's situation; for the true Taiwanese or the Formosans are the 
aborigines, who now live in the central mountains and represent only about 2 percent 
of the total population. The so-called Taiwanese are the Chinese who were born on 
the island and who are descendants of the mainland Chinese. The early migrants 
came from China's overpopulated coastal provinces of Fukien and Kuangtung in the 
seventeenth century; the latter ones (so-called mainlanders) came during the years 
between 1945 and 1949. After World War H, when Taiwan was returned to China, 
many of the inhabitants of the island--after 50 years of Japanese rule--had forgotten 
their Chinese language and customs. They spoke Japanese and clung to Japanese 
customs. Naturally there developed misunderstandings and suspicions, inspired by 
the Japanese remaining on the island. At present, the younger generation all speak 
Chinese, and much intermarriage has occurred between the "mainlanders" and 
"Taiwanese". 
In addition, China is a vast country with more than 100 dialects. Varied 
geographical and climatic conditions have ensured that the Chinese people do not 
have identical habits and customs. Chinese opera and other arts, for instance, have 
distinct local characteristics. Nevertheless, a unique Chinese culture has developed. 
By suggesting that Taiwan is not Chinese because the mainland and Taiwan have 
different literatures, music, arts, and languages, the TIM elements and Robert Wesson 
merely show their ignorance of China. 
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Moreover, Chinese culture served as the melting pot for different cultures, which 
combined harmoniously into a homogeneous whole. Even if Taiwanese were not 
Chinese, it does not mean that Taiwanese cannot become Chinese through natural 
assimilation. Even if it is a fact that a Taiwanese clan system exists, it cannot justify 
the claim that Taiwan does not belong to China. The reason is that people of mixed 
stock can combine to form one country. And the insistence that the Taiwanese are 
distinct from the Chinese goes clear against historical evidence, for Taiwan belonged 
to China during the Ming and Ching Dynasties and the Cairo Declaration made this a 
fact. It is also a fact substantiated by all evidence that the ROC has been developing 
Taiwan for more than forty years. From what has been mentioned above, it is clear 
that those theories are fallible and legally untenable. The Taiwan nationalism 
employed by the TIM elements is merely one among many tools designed to acquire 
political power, it represents a search for political identity rather then a reaffirmation 
of cultural identity (Breuilly 1982,44-45). 
3.3.2 Taiwan's Legal Status 
As noted above, Taiwan was originally Chinese territory and was ceded to Japan by 
the Treaty of Shimonoseki. The 1943 Cairo Declaration jointly issued by the heads of 
government of the United States, Britain, and the ROC clearly stated that: "all the 
territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the 
Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China" (Foreign Relations of the 
United States 1943,1972,448). This principle was reiterated in 1945 in Postdarn by 
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the heads of the three governments (Foreign Relations of the United States 1945, 
1974,1474). 
Article 4 of the 1952 Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty reads: "It is recognised that all 
treaties, conventions and agreements concluded before December 9,1941, between 
China and Japan have become null and void as a consequence of the war (Chiu 1979, 
245-48). The Treaty of Shimonoseki was thus legally annulled by this later treaty 
signed between China and Japan. Article 2(b) of the Multilateral Peace Treaty of 
Allied Forces with Japan also states: "Japan renounces all rights, title, and claim to 
Formosa and the Pescadores" (Nicholls 1972,724-41; Aandahl 1977,1025). When 
Japan gave it up, it should thus logically be returned to its original owner, China. At 
the time of Cairo Declaration, however, the Chinese government was that of the 
Nationalists. The Japanese renunciation obviously could not specify any particular 
government or regime. In October 1945, the ROC officials formally accepted the 
surrender of the Japanese forces in Taiwan and took the island over from Japan, 
declaring it to be once more incorporated into the territory of China. 
Yet why did the 1951 Peace Treaty with Japan not specify Taiwan's restoration to 
China? It was mainly because of the complicated international situation at the time of 
the treaty's conclusion. With the June 1950 outbreak of the Korean War, the US 
dispatched the Seventh Fleet to defend the Taiwan Strait to prevent the Chinese 
Communists from "liberating" Taiwan. The US policy at that time was: if Taiwan is 
openly recognised as part of China, then the US Navy's defence of Taiwan would be 
interference in China's civil war, so all the better to leave Taiwan's status 
undetermined. Besides, "there appeared to be a real possibility that the General 
Assembly of the United Nations would recommend turning the island over to the 
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Chinese Communists ... and it had been thought advisable to leave the status of 
Formosa undecided" (Foreign Relations of the United States 1951,1977,932). When 
drafting the Peace Treaty with Japan, the US thus deliberately avoided specifying the 
return of Taiwan to China and just stated Japan's renouncement of all rights, title, and 
claim to Taiwan and the Pescadores. It was "with a view to avoiding dispute as 
between "China" and "the Republic of China" and also to avoid a result which would 
end any basis for international concern regarding the future of Formosa such as was 
the basis for the President's order to the Seventh Fleet" (Ibid, 1052). The US and 
Britain agreed that neither the Nationalist government nor the Chinese Communists 
would be invited to the San Francisco Conference, and neither of them should be 
included as a signatory of the treaty (Ibid, 1105-1348). 
However, the 1954 Sino-American Mutual Defence Treaty specified that the US 
recognised Taiwan as China's territory (Chiu 1979,227-29). The notion that Taiwan's 
status was an unsettled question was also denied in three communiqu6s jointly issued 
by the US and the PRC. The 1972 Shanghai Communiqu6 stated that "the US 
acknowledges Taiwan as a part of China". This principle was reiterated in both the 
1978 Joint Communiqu6 on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations and the Joint 
Communiqud issued on August 17,1982. Thus, the legal status of Taiwan is clear 
and certain. Taiwan is part of China; no other country can claim sovereignty over it. 
3.3.3 The Applicability of Self-Determination to Taiwan 
The end of the Cold War was accompanied by a resurgence of nationalism. In most 
parts of the world, there exist states that have either already split or are on the verge of 
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doing so. Because in many of these cases (in Quebec, as much as Lithuania and 
Ukraine) nationalists claim to be democrats, the conventional interpretation of the 
principle of national self-determination is now under more intense pressure than at 
any time since World War 11. 
The evolution of the concept of self-determination is often traced back to the 
American and the French revolutions in the eighteenth century. Then it quickly spread 
to Latin America and the rest of Europe, sparking wars of national liberation which 
ultimately led to the emergence of new states. It was, however, only after the First 
World War that self-determination started taking a definite shape. US President 
Woodrow Wilson was a pioneer in contributing to the theory of self-determination 
during this period, by incorporating it in his famous fourteen points (Lansing 192 1, 
314-5). Self-determination was offered as a formula for a peaceful and harmonious 
world. It would give each 'people' living in the former territories of the defeated 
empires (German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman) their own state with their own 
government. 
Two Articles of the United Nations Charter specifically mention the principle of self- 
determination. Article 1(2) states that one of the purposes of the organisation is "to 
develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples... " (Hajnal 1978,331; Evans 1991,8). 
Article 55 states that the United Nations will promote certain objectives: 
"with a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which 
are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect 
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples" (Ibid, 341). 
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According to Cobban, "... the principle of self-determination is, in general terms, the 
belief that each nation has a right to constitute an independent State and determine its 
own government" (Cobban 1969,4). Starke argues that "it connotes freedom of 
choice to be exercised by a dependent people through a plebiscite or some other 
method of ascertainment of the peoples' wishes" (Starke 1972,136). These 
definitions leave one in the dark with respect to the exact concept of self- 
determination and raise questions. Who are these 'selves' who are entitled to self- 
determination and what is the precise nature of 'nation', 'groups' and 'people'? "The 
expression itself gives no clue to the nature of the self that is to be determined; nor 
does it provide any enlightenment concerning the process of determination or the 
source and the extent of the self s putative right to this process" (Buchheit 1978,9-10). 
No attempt has been made to define self-determination, specially because the UN 
General Assembly never got around to defining precisely what a 'people' is and what 
are the criteria for identifying a'people'as such. Thus, the answers to these questions 
have changed radically over time and there is still no consensus. TIM elements have 
repeatedly claimed that Taiwan's future should be determined by all of the Taiwan 
people. However, according to Sir Ivor Jennings : "On the surface it seemed rea- 
sonable: let the people decide. It was in fact ridiculous because the people cannot 
decide until somebody decides who are the people" (Jennings 1956,56). 
TIM elements also claim that all peoples have the 'right' to self-detem-lination. 
Nonetheless, there has been and still is much debate and controversy over whether 
self-determination is a right or a principle. Rosalyn Higgins concludes from her 
twenty years of study of United Nations practice that "it seems inescapable that self- 
determination has developed into an international legal right" (Higgins 1969,103). 
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Brownlie holds the same view that self-determination is a "legal principle" (Brownlie 
1979,577). Sureda also points out that within certain limits "there has been a 
consolidation of the right of peoples to self-determination as a legal right" (Sureda 
1973,17). 
On the other hand L. G. Green has maintained that it is a political right and not a 
right under international law (Quoted in Buchheit 1978,129). Leo Gross finds that 
nowhere in the UN Charter has the right to self-determination in the legal sense been 
established (Gross 1971,19). So far as self-determination within the traditional 
colonial situations, existing at the end of Second World War is concerned, the 
development of the decolonisation process leaves no doubt that it has achieved the 
form of a principle. 
Nevertheless, "the recognition of this principle in a certain number of international 
treaties cannot be considered as sufficient to put it upon the same footing as a positive 
rule of Law of Nations" (Quoted in Alston 1992,126). Gros Espiell believes that the 
right to self-determination is jus cogens, but only in a very limited form: 
The United Nations has established the right of self-determination as a right 
of peoples under colonial and alien domination. The right does not apply 
to peoples already organised in the form of a State which are not under 
colonial and alien domination, since resolution 1514 (XV) and other United 
Nations instruments condemn any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption 
of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country (quoted by Hannum 
1990,46). 
Thus, existing states which have been invaded or controlled by foreign powers have 
a right to self-determination, i. e., the right to overthrow the invaders and re-establish 
independence. However, this does not imply that any non-colonial 'people' within an 
existing state such as Taiwan could acquire the right to independence or self- 
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determination under international law. "The principle of self-determination would be 
invoked only for the liberation of colonial peoples and territories. It was not to be 
construed as implying the right of individuals within nations to express their special 
ethnic, cultural or religious characteristics or the exercise of the democratic method in 
internal affairs" (Moskowitz 1968,160-1). Emerson also concludes that "what 
emerges beyond dispute is that all people do not have the right of self-determination. 
They have never had it, and they will never have it" (Emerson 1971,464). 
Since Taiwan is an existing independent sovereign state and not under colonial or 
alien rule, the claim of Taiwan Independence and the right to self-determination is 
unjustifiable and should not exist. Moreover, the lack of popular support for a 
separatist movement from the results of various central and local elections has clearly 
revealed that the TIM lacks both the power, and the right, to succeed. 
3.4 The Feasibility and Possibility of Taiwan Independence 
On the crudest level, the TIM elements' demand for self-determination may be seen 
as a simple rhetorical flourish with at best some moral appeal but wholly lacking in 
legal significance. The concept of the right of self-determination of peoples, "on the 
face of it, appears to be quite obvious and self-evident, but in reality, it is one likely to 
cause greatest upheavals in the modem world" (Saxena 1978,21). Robert Lansing 
concluded that self-determination: 
is one of those declarations of principle which sounds true... but which, when 
the attempt is made to apply it in every case, becomes a source of political 
instability and domestic disorder and not infrequently a cause of rebellion 
(Lansing 1921,101) 
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Eleanor Roosevelt also raised questions by asking: 
Does self-determination constitute a right of fragmentation or a justification 
for the fragmentation of nations? ... regardless of the effect upon their 
internal 
stability and their external security, regardless of the effect upon their neighbours 
or the international community? Obviously not (Lent 1971,293). 
Nevertheless, is it possible for TIM and DPP elements to declare Taiwan 
independence? It is fair to say that historically the TIM did have its political and 
social roots. However, as Taiwan progresses toward economic prosperity, political 
democratisation, and social equality rarely found in other parts of the developing 
world, people on the island have become increasingly content with the status quo and 
accordingly abhor violent change as advocated by TIM leaders. In other words, the 
TIM's very appeal is disappearing, if still existing. Although pro-independence 
sentiment has grown on the island, public opinion polls (see Table 3-1) consistently 
reveal that a vast majority of the island's populace still do not support such a move - 
Nevertheless, some have argued that "given a free choice ... a sizeable majority of 
Taiwan's 19.5 million people would support the idea" (Far Eastern Economic Review, 
May 14,1987). The KMT's disappointing showing in the 1992 Legislative Yuan 
election should not be interpreted as a vote for separatism. Furthermore, Taiwan's 
military might not tolerate independence. Former Premier Hau Pei-tsun, formerly 
ROC's Defence Minister, has cautioned that "the ROC armed forces will not defend 
Taiwan in the cause of independence" (Free China Journal, December 25,1989). He 
has also warned that "if our country's name and national flag are changed by advocates 
of independence, they are not worthy of our loyalty" (Ibid). 
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Table 3-1 
Percentage of Taiwan's Population Pro-and Against-Independence 
(September 1989-january 1995) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Pro Pro Total Con Con Total No Comment 
(very) (very) 
Sep/89 5.4 10.4 15.8 28.4 28.9 57.3 25.2 
Dec/89 1.3 6.9 8.2 25 37 62 24.4 
Mar/90 4.5 11.3 15.8 28.9 33.4 62.3 13.7 
Jun/90 4.3 8.2 12.5 37.4 29.6 67 14 
Dec/90 3.8 8.2 12 31.1 30.6 61.7 21.7 
Jun/91 1.9 10.8 12.7 28.6 36.7 65.3 20.9 
May/92 5.3 4.7 10 50.4 28.7 79.1 8.8 
Oct/92 4.7 10.4 15.1 29.5 33.8 54.3 20.5 
Nov/93 3.8 16.2 20.14.39.9 40.3 39.7 
Apr/94 9.8 17.2 27 16.3 29.3 45.6 25.4 
Jan/95 5.4 5.4 20.4 23.4 38.8 62.2 15.8 
Source: Conducted by Gallup Poll and Public Opinion Poll Foundation. 
Quoted in Chung-yangjih-pao, January 5,1995. 
Besides the pressure from the domestic and the ban from the ROC government, the 
primary difficulty confronted will be : will the PRC tolerate Taiwan independence? In 
reality, the DPP's stance has been a major irritant to Peking. Peking's Taiwan policy 
priority in recent years has in fact shifted from early unification to preventing Taiwan 
independence. When support for independence was on the rise in the beginning of 
the 1990s, PRC officials issued a series of warnings, the most serious of which were 
nothing short of naked threats. For instance, PRC President Yang Shang-kun said that 
"if Taiwan tries to gain independence, we will not rule out the possibility of using 
force" (China Post, June 9,1990). Shortly thereafter CCP general secretary Chiang 
Tse-min argued that maintaining the PRC's threat of a military invasion against 
Taiwan could help to promote China's unification by exercising pressure on the forces 
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of separatism and preventing foreign intervention to the disadvantage of China (China 
Post, July 2,1990). It is evident in the repeated confirmations that Peking will not use 
military force to attack Taiwan unless Taiwan declares formal independence. In other 
words, military threats are no longer aimed at the liberation of Taiwan or the unifica- 
tion of China, but preventing Taiwan's independence (Tsai 199 1). 
When the DPP publicly advocated Taiwan independence during the election 
campaign at the end of 1989, the PRC severely criticised this view. An article 
published in the Liaowang (Outlook) weekly stated that: 
"Taiwan independence" or the "Republic of Taiwan" will not be permitted by the 
PRC authorities and will not be accepted by the absolute majority of compatriots in 
the mainland. If it really happens, the PRC authorities must respect the will of 
the people and react forcefully ... To conclude, "Taiwan independence" can only bring disaster to the Taiwan people, not well-being (Liao-wang 1989). 
At the third session of the Seventh National People's Congress held in March 1990, 
PRC Premier Li Peng made harsher threats, saying that the people of China would 
resolutely oppose the "adverse current" of independence and that the PRC government 
would not sit idle and watch it grow (People's Daily, June 14,1990). On October 13, 
1991, at its fifth national convention, the DPP adopted an amendment of its party 
platform calling for the creation, through a national plebiscite, of a "Republic of 
Taiwan" separate from China (Chung-yangjih-pao, October 14,1991). The response 
from Peking was swift and unambiguous. On October 14, a spokesman for the 
Taiwan Affairs Office under the State Council announced that "the Chinese 
government will not sit idly by and remain indifferent to the activities to separate the 
nation and sell out the territories" (People's Daily, October 15,1991). On October 17, 
the People's Daily published an article condemning the DPP amendment, accusing 
the DPP of "a conspiracy to splinter the nation and betray the Chinese people". The 
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article warned that unless the DPP refrained from its advocacy of independence, its 
fate would be that of "total destruction" (People's Daily, October 17,1991; China 
Post, October 18,1991). In November, it was reported that PRC military regions 
contiguous to Taiwan had been ordered to stand at "battle readiness" (Chung-kuo 
shih-pao, November 1,199 1), and the commander of the PRC navy had indicated that 
Peking would conduct a naval blockade of Taiwan if the latter sought independence 
(Lian-ho-pao, November 14,1991). 
The DPP members have claimed that the argument that the PRC would use force 
against Taiwan if it declared independence is sheer fabrication on the part of the KMT 
for the sake of staying in power. Once it has declared independence, they seem to 
believe, the international community will extend recognition to Taiwan, forcing 
Peking to accept reality. At present, some people in Taiwan still think that by relying 
on factors such as support from the United States, even if Taiwan announces 
independence, the PRC will not dare to use force. Yet the international community 
does not support or only weakly supports Taiwan's separation. Most nations favour 
the status quo and have not considered policy choices (Cooper 1990,117). 
Another important reason for DPP claims for Taiwan independence is that it brings 
with it international recognition and status. It is their wish that by becoming an 
independent state, Taiwan can be recognised as a legitimate participant in 
international relations, and self-proclaimed territorial entities can seek recognition of 
their statehood. Such recognition opens up membership in international organisations, 
and gives direct access to foreign governments through diplomatic recognition. 
However, is it feasible for Taiwan to declare independence and gain diplomatic 
recognition? Will the major powers support Taiwan independence? Will the 
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advocates of TIM continue to claim that their cause can definitely gain the support of 
the majority of countries? 
On the basis of the August 12 communiqu6, it is clear that the US will not support 
Taiwan independence or support self-determination. The US only hopes that the two 
sides across the Taiwan Strait can peacefully resolve their problems. TIM elements 
think that because the TRA is an American law, the US has an obligation to support 
Taiwan. They do not understand that the TRA was devised as compensation for the 
ROC after the US and the PRC established diplomatic relations. Furthermore, 
according to precedent, whenever there is a conflict between domestic laws and 
international treaties, the US usually decides in favour of the international treaties. 
Every country knows that it is necessary to acknowledge first that "Taiwan is a part 
of China" before establishing relations with the PRC. What country would be willing 
to intervene in the "domestic politics of China? " Therefore, under the present 
circumstances, there is nothing to gain and much to lose by declaring Taiwan's 
independence. Neither the United States nor Japan would be likely to recognise the 
new state formally because of the damage it would do to their relations with the PRC- 
If the United States and Japan declined to recognise the new state of Taiwan, few 
other countries would be likely to do so. Thus, by declaring independence, Taiwan 
would have hurt rather than improved its international position (Clough 1978,170-1). 
Besides, the UN Charter guarantees the territorial integrity and 'political independe- 
nce' of its member states, though Taiwan currently is not a member of it. As such, it 
is common sense that any step towards self-determination that leads to revolution and 
ultimate secession will never get support from that organisation. In a report to the 
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Council of the League of Nations, a Commission of Rapporteurs was even more 
explicit in its rejection of a legal right to separatist self-determination: 
To concede to minorities either of language or religion, or to any fractions 
of a population, the right of withdrawing from the community to which 
they belong, because it is their wish or their good pleasure, would be to 
destroy order and stability within States and to inaugurate anarchy in 
international life; it would be to uphold a theory incompatible with the very 
idea of the State as a territorial and political entity (Quoted in Saxena 1978, 
10; Buchheit 1979,7 1; Hannum 1990,30). 
Whether the recognition of the Baltic Republics, Croatia, Slovenia and Ukraine will 
trigger a world-wide epidemic of successful secessions and a wave of new states is 
more doubtful. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the resurgence of militant 
nationalism poses a major challenge to the political and economic arrangements of 
international society and to the security of its members (Mayall 1995,21). TM does 
have as its express goal the dismemberment of a previously unified, independent state. 
As such, it clearly constitutes a matter of concern for the world community on a 
number of levels. First is the impact of independence on the present structure of inter- 
state relations (Time, October 30,1995). A political entity lacking the accepted 
requirements of statehood is a foreseeable result of an unqualified acceptance of a 
right of independence. This would involve at a minimum some serious rethinking of 
current practices in the areas of recognition, jurisdiction, diplomatic customs, 
membership in international organisations, and so on. Secondly, the world community 
must recognise that a favourable international reaction, even to a single independence 
attempt, may constitute a dangerous precedent potentially applicable to any state 
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containing racial, religious, linguistics, or political minorities. As Lee Buchheit points 
out: 
"the present reluctance to accommodate the claims of secessionist groups 
within the principle of self determination seems to be motivated primarily by 
a fear on the part of most independent States that such a principle would 
constitute an unmanageable threat to inter-State harmony and consequently 
have an adverse effect upon the stability of the international system" 
(Buchheit 1978,19). 
Unlike theYugoslav case, it is the horror of a sustained civil war, not a commitment 
to the principle of self-determination, that pushed Western governments into 
recognising Slovenia and Croatia (Mayall 1995,24). No country, however well 
intentioned, can recognise an unlimited right to self-determination and expect to 
survive as a unified nation. Based on the above study, the future of Taiwan 
independence seems neither optimistic, nor feasible. 
3.5 The Implications of Political Reform 
Currently, there are several domestic factors causing instability in the ROC. Among 
all of them, it goes without saying that the TIM is the most important factor resulting 
in social conflicts. Naturally, it is easier to criticise the approach taken by the DPP to 
the right to self-deten-nination and independence than to suggest an answer to the 
problems thus identified. Taiwan's stability and security are not simply dependent on 
its economy and military, they are also contingent on the domestic political situation. 
Thus the best hope probably lies in seeking to make independence seem less attractive 
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by stressing the right of all the people on Taiwan to participate in the governance of 
that state and the right of minorities to respect for their separate identities. It is for 
the ROC's good to have a legal opposition party within the political system rather than 
an outlawed and terrorist group with the aim of overthrowing the KMT regime. If 
Taiwan's political dissidents believe that they can achieve their political interests 
through party politics, the chances of their resorting to violence are slim. This would 
also soften their tone in advocating the Taiwan independence and make the TIM less 
prone to challenge the ROC. Political reform has therefore become especially 
important and significant. The success or failure of reform measures may have 
profound implications not only for the island's internal political stability, but also for 
the future evolution of its relations with mainland China. 
3.5.1 Political Democratisation 
Since the Nationalist government moved to Taiwan in 1949, the KMT has been the 
sole ruling party. Before 1986, the KMT was a mass political party that had deeply 
penetrated Taiwan society, including government bureaucracies, the military, the 
judiciary, schools, and non-governmental organisations. Key political decisions were 
made by the party, and most high-level official appointments were handed out by 
party leaders. Based on Sartori's classification of party systems, Taiwan's system 
before the 1986 democratisation drive can best be characterised as one-party and as 
having a party-state structure, rather than reflecting political pluralism (Sartori 1976, 
36-5 1). With the declaration of the Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period 
of Communist Rebellion and the implementation of martial law, civil and political 
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rights in Taiwan were highly restricted, and there was a ban on new parties or 
associations. Freedom of the press was curtailed, and the public was excluded from 
the policy-making process. The constitution, enacted in 1947 on the mainland, was 
superseded by the "Temporary Provisions" which vested enormous power in the hands 
of the president and the executive branch. Elections to the parliament, which consists 
of three bodies--the Legislative Yuan (administration), the Control Yuan (censorate), 
and the National Assembly (electoral college)--were suspended. Accordingly, all the 
parliamentarians elected on the mainland had life tenure. 
Although conditions in Taiwan were relatively advantageous for the Nationalist 
government, its political system has been beset by severe strains, "arising particularly 
from Taiwanese resentment at mainlander domination and from the restiveness of 
intellectuals under the tight security controls imposed to prevent Communist 
subversion and Taiwanese opposition activities" (Clough 1978,34). The peak 
reached in 1986 presented the KMT authorities with both a potential domestic crisis 
and an opportunity for major political reforms. Street protests organised by the 
Tangwai (literally, "outside the party") were rapidly escalating the level of political 
conflict. The DPP was formed despite repeated warnings from the authorities. In the 
face of these critical challenges, plus "his [Chiang's] desire for a reconciliation 
between the regime and the majority Taiwanese population" (Ferdinand 1994a , 138), 
the KMT reformists under President Chiang Ching-kuo apparently saw much to be 
gained by stepping up political liberalisation and democratisation. 
Liberalisation could provide an environment conducive to democratic development. 
Democratisation "is an evolutionary political process that gradually puts into practice 
the ideals of popular sovereignty and political equality" (Tien 1989,105-133). 
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Reforms can offer the advantage of improving the ROC's ability to legitimate 
itself, reducing social conflict, eliciting the confidence of foreign investors and trade 
partners, and projecting a much-needed favourable image in the international 
community (Chou & Nathan 1987,283-5). Hence, a number of bold steps have been 
taken by the KMT to revamp the nation's ailing polity. 
Martial law was lifted in July 1987 and the first democratic multi-party elections 
since 1949 were held in December 1989. Other important measures introduced by the 
KMT included the lifting of press restrictions; reform of the judicial system; 
legalisation of opposition political parties; the retirement of the tenured 
parliamentarians at the end of 1991; and further Taiwanization of the KMT. As a 
matter of fact, Taiwan had made steady progress in liberalisation and democratisation 
even before the major breakthrough in 1996. This can be illustrated by the emergence 
of progressively stronger opposition political forces, the spreading of journals critical 
of the authorities, more open and fairer coverage in daily newspapers, greater 
tolerance of protest movements, and the enlarged scope of electoral activities. To be 
sure, progress has come at a cost, and development is not always smooth. In fact, 
severe setbacks have occurred periodically. But taking the changing events as a 
whole, one sees a positive trend over time. Although the democratisation process has 
yet to be completed, it has considerably expanded the scope of public contestation and 
political participation. These reform measures as a whole indicate remarkable break- 
throughs in Taiwan's political development. All these have provided a fresh outlook 
for a democratic future for Taiwan. 
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3.5.2 Taiwanisation 
Taiwan's political reform is also reflected in the "Taiwanization" of KMT 
organisations and the government at all levels. Taiwanization, means the creation of a 
more pluralistic KMT power structure and parliamentary reforms to enhance native 
Taiwanese participation in the elite and legislative process. During the first two 
decades of Nationalist rule in Taiwan, the KMT was an exclusively authoritarian party 
under the mainlanders' domination. Almost all of the key posts in both the party and 
the government were held by mainlanders who had followed President Chiang Kai- 
shek to the island in 1949. The Taiwanisation of the political systern--initiated in the 
mid-1970s with the recruitment of increased numbers of Taiwanese into the upper 
ranks of the ruling party--has reached the highest level of party and government (see 
Table 3-2). 
Table 3-2 
Ethnic Composition of the Executive Yuan, 1963-93 
................................................................................................. 
Year Taiwanese Mainlander 
1963 4 32 
1972 8 18 
1978 8 21 
1984 12 23 
1988 9 11 
1990 10 11 
1993 11 14 
................................................................................................. 
Source: Huang, Teh-fu, 1995. "Electoral Competition and the Evolution of the 
Kuomintang" Issues and Studies, 31-5: 104. Taipei: 11R. 
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For the first time in Taiwan's history the President is a Taiwanese, and the party 
Central Standing Committee (CSC) and the new cabinet, both formed in July 1988, 
were each more than one-half Taiwanese in composition. As Table 3-3 shows, the 
number and percentage of Taiwanese in the CSC has steadily increased since 1973. 
Table 3-3 
Composition of the KNIT Central Standing Committee, 1952-94. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Year Total Taiwanese (%) Milita! j (%) Representative %) 
1952 10 003 30 4 40 
1957 10 001 10 5 50 
1960 16 2 12 6 37 6 37 
1964 18 2 11 6 33 6 33 
1969 21 2 10 5 23 9 47 
1973 21 3 14 4 19 5 23 
1976 22 5 22 4 18 6 27 
1979 27 9 33 6 22 5 18 
1981 27 9 33 5 18 4 14 
1984 27 12 39 4 13 6 20 
1986 31 14 45 4 13 6 20 
1988 31 16 52 3 10 9 29 
1993 35 20 57 389 25 
1994 35 21 60 388 23 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Nan Min, 1986. "Tui Kuomintang San-Chung-Chuan-Hui Te Kuan-cha" 
(An Observation of the KMT Third Plenum), Chiu-shih lien-ai (The 
Nineties), 196: 43; Huang 1995,105; and Chung-kuo shih-pao (China 
Times), July 15,1988. 
Currently, over 70 percent of the 2.7 million KMT members and almost all cadres of 
local Party branches are Taiwanese (see Table 3-4) (Lu 1989,29-41). A similar 
pattern of change in elite composition has taken place in major government 
appointments. Until the 1970s, only the Interior Minister was Taiwanese. Even the 
provincial governor was a mainlander. Since then, there has been a steady increase in 
the number of Taiwanese-held cabinet posts and other key administrative offices. As 
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far as the government itself is concerned, four of the five Yuan heads-the Executive, 
the Legislative, the Judicial and the Examination-are Taiwanese. Taiwanese now hold 
nearly half of the cabinet posts, including that of Premier. 
Table 3-4 
Ethnic Composition of KMT Membership 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Year Taiwanese Mainlander 
1969 374,666 576,327 
1972 553,215 645,203 
1975 764,961 683,145 
1977 954,145 732,579 
1980 1,180,352 753,659 
1983 1,346,014 774,965 
1986 1,552,025 804,017 
1989 1,713,377 822,153 
1992 1,810,392 807,259 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Source: Quoted in Huang 1995,105. 
Taiwanization is a clear and irreversible trend in the ROC's political development. 
It is a function of generational change as well as of the KMT leaders' desire to foster 
ethnic harmony through political democratisation. The political unity between 
Taiwanese and mainlanders can be further promoted by expanding the scope and level 
of elections. "This provides legitimate channels for politically ambitious Taiwanese 
to pursue upward mobility in ways that lead to identification with the country" (Tien 
1989,105-33). Through the recruitment of more Taiwanese into the upper echelons 
of government, the party, and national legislature, the roles of Taiwanese in decision- 
making will be steadily enhanced, which will result in raising their common stake in 
Taiwan's future. 
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3.5.3 Emergence and Evolution of the Opposition Party 
After the "February 28th Incident" in 1947, most prominent local politicians in 
Taiwan were either killed or frightened. Political opponents generally were then too 
weak to pose any significant threat to the KMT. Since the formation of new political 
parties was also forbidden, the KMT was easily able to collect, regulate, and distribute 
political and economic interests according to its own concerns. Furthermore, the legal 
ban on forming new parties guaranteed the KMT's dominant position in Taiwan. For 
instance, in 1960, the government cracked down on the Chinese Democratic Party on 
the eve of its formation. Lei Chen, the principal organiser, and some of its followers 
were arrested on a dubious charge of patronising Communist agents (Pan 1989 52-55; 
Peng 1986,46-56). Two parties, the Young China Party and the Chinese Democratic 
Socialist Party, were allowed to continue operating because they posed no threat to the 
KMT. 
Even so, the KMT is not immune to challenges from political opposition. According 
to Dahl, political democratisation or the democratic transition of authoritarian regimes 
mainly refers to institutionalising the political opposition's participation and 
competition in both national and local political arenas (Dahl 1971,4-14). In order to 
maintain the short-term political stability and the appearance of effective governance, 
the KMT has usually tried to repress or restrict the opposition's scope of political 
participation and competition. Under such circumstances, further organising of politi- 
cal opposition indeed becomes a serious threat to the KMT's rule. Then how has the 
DPP been able to emerge to challenge the legitimacy of the KMT's authoritarian 
regime? 
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Since the early 1980s, tangwai politicians were able to attract the support of 
approximately 25-30 percent of the electorate. However, these opposition politicians 
appeared not to be able to exert enough political pressure on the government to 
change its policy. In fact, in addition to prohibiting the tangwai from becoming an 
island-wide organisation, the KMT's policy of cracking down on prominent 
opposition figures left the tangwai with little chance of becoming a real political party. 
In 1979, the KMT banned Mei-D-Tao (Formosa Monthly), which was used as a front 
for organising opposition activities. The key leaders of the group were charged with 
sedition and were sentenced to long years in prison (Peng 1987,8t-82). By early 
1986, it had become public knowledge that President Chiang Ching-kuo was deter- 
mined to lift martial law, and open up the political system by permitting opposition, 
among other things. Opposition politicians seized the initiative and suddenly 
announced the birth of the first opposition party, the DPP, that September 28. The 
establishment of the DPP came in a climate of a possible government crack-down. 
However, the government took no repressive measures against the DPP organisers. 
The rise and development of the DPP had a considerable impact on Taiwan's political 
democratisation movement and set the stage for party competition in Taiwan's 
politics. Table 3-5 illustrates the evolution and formation of the DPP. 
The Legislative Yuan elections at the end of 1986 provided the opportunity for the 
newly-formed DPP to test public acceptance of a competitive political party system. 
Election results showed that the DPP could indeed survive under harsh conditions. 
The DPP gained 33 percent of the popular vote, while the KMT won 66 percent. The 
1989 election was the first in which the DPP competed as a legal party. The DPP won 
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31 percent of the total popular vote and many seats at all levels of government. The 
KMT 'only' won 60 percent. 
Table 3-5 
The Foundation and the Evolution of the DPP 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
1949 Tsu-you Chung-kuo (Free China Monthly) 
1957 Tangwai hou-hsuen-jen lien-yi-hui 
(Non-Party Candidates Association) 
1960 Chung-kuo min-chu-tang (Chinese Democratic Party) 
1970 Ta-hsueh (The Great Learning Monthly) 
1975 Taiwan Cheng-lun (Taiwan Political Forum) 
1978 Tangwai Chu-hsuen-tuan 
(Non-Party Electoral Assistance Corps) 
1979 Mei-li-tao tsa-chih (Formosa Monthly) 
1983 Tangwai Chung-yang hou-yuan-hui 
(Non-Party Central Back-up Society) 
1984 Tangwai Kung-chih jen-yuan Kung-kong cheng-cheh 
yan-chiu-hui (Non-Party Public Officeholders 
Society for Research into Public Policy) 
1986 Min-chu chin-pu-tang (Democratic Progressive Party) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Klintworth, G. 199 1. "Taiwan--Evolution and Response" in Harries& 
Cotton ed. The End of the Cold War in Northeast Asia. 138-140. 
Huang, T. F. 1991. "Electoral Competition and Democratic Transition 
in the Republic of China" 110. 
In the December 1992 Legislative Yuan elections, the KMT suffered a serious 
setback, its nominated candidates winning only 53 percent of the total vote. The DPP 
won a record high 31 percent of the vote for its nominees. The ruling party retained 
almost a two-thirds majority in the legislature, but the representation of the DPP more 
than doubled from the previous legislative session. Such a division of power between 
ruling and opposition parties means little in a Western multi-party democracy, but it 
assumes great importance in Taiwan's context because the official policies of the 
parties are diametrically opposed in key areas. The main implication of this political 
development for Taiwan's future is that the issue of Taiwan independence, a major 
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part of the DPP platform, would become a disruptive force in both Taiwan's domestic 
politics and in relations with mainland China. 
In addition to the factors mentioned earlier, the independence issue also arises out of 
the ROC's long-standing claim that it is the sole rightful government of all China. 
Given the political reality across the Taiwan Strait and the ROC's increasing 
diplomatic isolation, this claim hardly sounds persuasive. Hence the DPP, in defiance 
of ROC law, offers the alternative of complete independence from mainland China, 
which many advocates contend is the only way Taiwan can survive in the international 
community. Especially followed by the increasing numbers of dissidents speaking in 
favour of an independent Taiwan and increasing numbers of native Taiwanese 
winning legislative seats in recent years, the independence movement is becoming 
more active and gaining momentum. They proclaim that Taiwan and the mainland are 
two different countries, that both sides should develop bilateral diplomatic relations, 
and that Taiwan should 
--Give up the "one China" principle and adopt a "one China, one Taiwan" policy; 
--Get rid of the PRC's influence internationally, ignore the PRC factor, adopt an 
independent foreign policy; 
--Return to the United Nations and other international organisations under the name 
of "the Republic of Taiwan"; 
--Follow a "two Germanys' model" and pursue "dual recognition" 
It is natural that these separatist demands usually are resisted by the authorities 
because of the threat perceived to the state's political and territorial integrity. In the 
first two years after its establishment, the DPP preferred to use the ambiguous term 
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"self-determination" rather than independence, and this tactic helped avoid an 
immediate showdown with the KMT. However, the rise of a strong pro-independence 
faction within the DPP in 1991 upset this delicate balance. By October that year, the 
DPP formally incorporated Taiwan independence into its party platform, thus pitting 
the two parties against each other. Despite the violation of the National Security Law, 
the KMT did not take any action against the DPP, hoping that voters would reject the 
DPP's independence appeal in the upcoming National Assembly election as indeed 
they did. 
The 1994 mayoral and gubernatorial elections and 1996 presidential elections were 
widely seen as a milestone in Taiwan's political democratisation and as the KMT's 
biggest legitimacy test in its decades rule of Taiwan. The main appeal of the KMT to 
voters during the campaign was its support for "stability, prosperity, and the 
unification of China", while that of the DPP was the "independence of Taiwan and the 
establishment of a new Republic of Taiwan". Of the 8.5 million ballots cast, 56.22 
percent were for the KMT, 38.72 for the DPP (Chung-kuo shih-pao, December 4, 
1994). The 15 percent drop in the DPP's share of the ballot in comparison with the 
1992 election was a clear message from the electorate. The presidential election result 
was even worse for the DPP, which only gained 21 percent of votes. This has caused 
the party chairman to resign over the defeat. 
After the election, the DPP realised that its advocacy of Taiwan independence is 
probably the major stumbling block on its road to power at national level. The party 
has called a national congress so that the clause in its platform that provoked such 
public suspicion can be modified. However, this will be a painful process for a party 
which has adhered to the independence ideal for so many years. "The DPP cannot 
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afford to renounce this ambition [independence] since it remains the single most 
potent identifying feature of their appeal" (Ferdinand 1994b, 18). The difficulty was 
highlighted when Chiu 1-jen, the DPP's long-serving deputy secretary-general and the 
top leader of the New Tide faction, suggested that in future elections the DPP should 
be even more aggressive on the Taiwan independence issue rather than avoiding it 
altogether (Lian-ho-pao, December 18,1994). 
The KMT's overwhelming victory shows that the majority of voters rejected the 
DPP's call for Taiwan independence or self-determination. The electorate seems to 
understand that a formal declaration of independence would be a costly, risky venture 
with few payoffs. The voters prefer to promote continued political reform at home 
that will increase their power in the political system, and innovative diplomacy abroad 
that will increase their government's international political profile and influence and 
hence their own convenience in travelling around the world and doing business 
(Nathan 1989,14-30). This may mean that while politics will necessarily become 
even more competitive as participation increases, in the short term, issues such as 
Taiwan independence may lose some of their salience as the major proportion of the 
people support political change through incremental reform. This will be particularly 
true if the KMT continues on its present path to further opening up the political 
system. 
So far, the DPP has refused to make any change at all, in spite of the election results 
and pressure from the KMT. The DPP's uncompromising stand may seem irrational 
from the point of view of the party as a whole, after all, what is the good of clinging to 
a lost cause? Why do the DPP elements still insist on the advocacy of Taiwan 
independence and self-determination even though they are well aware that the 
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possibility of it is slim and ther6 exists risk and threat? Primarily because it is an 
effective mechanism to mobilise the population they seek to lead, and because it 
allows them to bring together a number of different and disaffected factions. Partly 
because of the sheer ambiguity of the term, it is the one unifying aim in a coalition of 
otherwise competing political forces. Therefore, most of the advantages of claiming 
Taiwan Independence and the right to self-determination are harvested in internal 
politics. It is evident that DPP politicians would never hesitate to use the ambiguous 
terms to attract needed votes and have a strong incentive to curry favour with the 
"independence" voters, even if Taiwan independence is more an emotional symbol 
than a real goal. 
3.5.4 A Successful Transition from Authoritarianism to Democracy 
Elections are the most important mechanism in the operation of a democratic 
political system. Governments are formed and changed as a result of free and fair 
competition among political actors. In brief, democracy cannot function without 
regularly held elections to reflect public preferences with regard to government 
officials, representatives, and policies. For elections to run effectively, political parties 
are necessary, for they articulate, aggregate, and represent the different interests and 
ideas of the people. Electoral victories empower political parties to form governments 
as well as to formulate and implement public policies. 
Taiwan has held regular elections ever since the Nationalist government retreated to 
the island. However, the elections held prior to the lifting of martial law in 1987 
could hardly be described as free and fair because no opposition party was permitted 
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and parliamentary elections were restricted to a small proportion of the seats. 
Elections for the national legislature (Legislative Yuan), for example, could not alter 
the fact that the majority of legislators had been elected in mainland China. The KMT 
was able to dominate the legislative chamber regardless of the election result. Also, 
none of the key government offices, including the president, premier, cabinet 
ministers, and provincial governor, were open to public competition. The KMT's 
domination of these offices, through its guaranteed majority in the national legislature, 
deprived Taiwan of democratic credentials in spite of the regularly held elections. 
Authoritarian regimes will usually seek to consolidate their legitimacy by holding 
elections that present little serious threat to their power. But by providing the political 
opposition with ample opportunity to mobilise and organise, such elections eventually 
accelerate the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, and this is the pattern 
that has been followed in Taiwan. From the election results for the period 1986-1995 
we can trace the further decline of authoritarianism on Taiwan. With the exception of 
the 1991 National Assembly election, the percentage share of the votes and seats 
gained by KMT candidates has increased significantly since 1986, the year the DPP 
was founded (see Table 3-6). And in the 1993 elections for country magistrates and 
mayors and the 1994 Provincial Assembly and municipal council elections the KMT's 
share of the votes dropped below 50 percent. The 1995 Legislative Yuan elections 
can only be described as disastrous for the KMT, which narrowly retained its majority 
by three seats. The KMT won only eighty-five seats (46.06 percent of the total, down 
from 53.0 in 1992). The rest went to the DPP, with fifty four seats, the NP, with 
twenty one seats. The defeat inflicted a hard blow on the KMT, which may find it 
extremely difficult to regain its dominance in the future. These findings provide 
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further evidence that the emergence and development of the DPP contributed to the 
final collapse of authoritarian rule. 
Table 3-6 
KMT's Share of Seats and Votes in Major Elections, 1972-96 
....................................................................................... 
Legislative Yuan Elections 
Year % Votes % Seats 
1975 77.61 81.08 
1983 70.7 83.0 
1986 66.9 77.2 
1989 58.5 71.3 
1992 53.0 58.4 
1995 46.06 51.8 
Magistrates' and Mayors' Elections 
1972 75.59 100.00 
1977 70.43 80.00 
1981 56.40 78.95 
1985 60.93 80.95 
1989 56.11 66.67 
1993 47.31 61.90 
Presidential Elections 
1996 54.0 
Sources: Huang 1995,95-96; and various newspaper reports. 
The emergence of the New Party (NP), founded in August 1993 by a group of 
dissident KMT members, accelerated the decline in the electoral performance. The 
NP appealed to traditional supporters, particularly mainlanders who had retreated 
with the government in 1949 and their descendants, who saw themselves caught 
between the DPP's advocacy of Taiwan independence on the one hand and the KMT's 
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"Taiwanization" movement on the other. These voters' unwavering loyalty to the 
Chinese "motherland" turned them away from the locally-oriented KMT toward the 
NP, which touched their hearts by proclaiming that Taiwan should remain a part of 
China and that it would fight against any separatist movement. Although it won no 
seats and only 3.1 percent of the votes in the 1993 elections for county magistrates and 
city mayors, the NP became a much more significant force in the 1994,1995 and 1996 
elections. It gained 7.7 percent of the votes in 1994 gubernatorial and mayoral 
elections, 6.1 percent in the Provincial Assembly and municipal council elections, and 
13.67 percent in 1996 National Assembly elections. 
In the race for Taipei mayor, the NP's share of the votes was 30.2 percent, higher 
than that of the KMT. The party also won eleven seats on the fifty-two-member 
Taipei Municipal Council with a 20.8 percent share of the votes. As a result, none of 
the three main parties holds a majority of seats, the first time that the KMT has been 
deprived of a majority in any representative body at any level of government since 
1945. The NP was considered the only winner in the 1995 Legislative Yuan elections. 
Above all else, this indicates a successful transition from authoritarianism to 
democracy on Taiwan. 
Conclusion 
In Chapter 3, we dealt with the political dimensions of Taiwan's security. The 
chapter began by exploring the domestic political factors and the interplay of 
international factors to provide the historical background for the emergence of TIM. 
It then moved to examine and criticise the TIM's justification for their claims based 
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on Taiwan nationalism, the uncertainty of Taiwan's legal status and the right to self- 
determination. Judging by the lack of the domestic support, the difficulty of gaining 
international recognition and the pressure from Peking, it argued that Taiwan 
independence is undesirable. 
To the PRC, Taiwan is an integral part of the territory controlled by the sole legal 
and legitimate government of China. Any advocacy or movement of Taiwan 
independence which violates the "One China" principle would be rejected by the 
PRC. Based on the scenarios for the use of force by the PRC illustrated in Chapter 2, 
the most likely one under which the PRC would invade is if and when Taiwan 
declares itself independent; and that is the most dangerous one to Taiwan, because an 
independent Taiwan would have implications for China's hold on Tibet, Sinkiang, and 
Inner Mongolia and there would be strong reaction inside the PRC to any Chinese 
leader who acquiesced in an independent "Republic of Taiwan". At the same time, 
Taiwan independence might cause internal upheavals on the island and thereby limit 
the ROC's capacity to mobilise resistance against external threats, and consequently 
might invite PRC aggression. In history, it has been extremely seldom that a 
government with internal chaos can successfully repulse a formidable enemy's 
invasion. 
Naturally, it is easier to criticise the approach taken by the DPP to the right to self- 
determination and independence than to suggest an answer to the problems thus 
identified. Taiwan's stability and security are not simply dependent on its economy 
and military, they are also contingent on the domestic political situation. Thus the 
best hope probably lies in seeking to make independence less attractive by stressing 
the right of all the people on Taiwan to participate in the governance of that state and 
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the right of minorities to respect for their separate identities. It is for the ROC's good 
to have a legal opposition party within the political system rather than an outlawed 
and terrorist group with the aim of overthrowing the KMT regime. If Taiwan's 
political dissidents believe that they can achieve their political interests through party 
politics, the chances of their resorting to violence are slim. This would also soften 
their tone in advocating the Taiwan independence and make the TIM less prone to 
challenge the ROC. The political reform has therefore become especially important 
and significant. The success or failure of reform measures may have profound 
implications not only for the island's internal political stability, but also for the future 
evolution of its relations with mainland China. 
This may mean that while politics will necessarily become even more competitive as 
participation increases, in the short term, issues such as Taiwan independence may 
lose some of their salience as the major proportion of the people support political 
change through incremental reform. This will be particularly true if the KMT 
continues on its present path to further opening up the political system. 
In short, Taiwan's political reform presents the independence movement with a 
choice between using it as a window to step up pressure for independence, or 
rejoining established political institutions, working within the electorally-oriented 
opposition movement. So far, the DPP has refused to make any change at all, in spite 
of the election results and pressure from the KMT. The DPP's uncompromising stand 
may seem irrational from the point of view of the party as a whole, after all, what is 
the good of clinging to a lost cause? Why do the DPP elements still insist on the 
advocacy of Taiwan Independence and self-determination even though they are well 
aware that the possibility of it is slim and there exist risks and threats? Primarily this 
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is because it is an effective mechanism to mobilise the population they seek to lead, 
and because it allows them to bring together a number of different and disaffected 
factions. Partly because of the sheer ambiguity of the term, it is the one unifying aim 
in a coalition of otherwise competing political forces. Therefore most of the 
advantages of claiming Taiwan Independence and the right to self-determination are 
harvested in internal politics. It is evident that DPP politicians would never hesitate to 
use the ambiguous terms to attract needed votes and have a strong incentive to curry 
favour with the "independence" voters, even if Taiwan independence is more an 
emotional symbol than a real goal. 
However, despite Taiwan's success in running elections and the KNIT's decision to 
undertake major political reforms, many formidable problems remain unresolved. 
The foremost of these problems is the issue of national identity. Thus the future 
political developments in Taiwan will probably encounter periodic setbacks with 
some activities perceived as threats to the political stability and security of the nation. 
The long term trends are against the survival of the KMT as a major political force 
unless it revitalises itself to meet Taiwan's changing social and economic needs. 
The Kuomintang will thus have to juggle carefully the independence/reunification 
problem in a way that is neither provocative to Peking nor to KMT stalwarts and yet at 
the same time marginalises the pro-independence movement in Taiwan, while also 
reassuring the majority of Taiwanese that they will not be ruled by the Chinese 
Communist Party. Therefore, until a suitably ambiguous formula does evolve, the 
next few years could bring an intensification of confrontation between the extremes of 
those who see Taiwan's future in strictly either/or choices between unification and 
independence. 
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Neither choice is feasible given the policy positions of the KMT and Peking and in 
any event, most Taiwanese are equally opposed to the two alternatives of reunification 
or independence. To make the choice moreover, would undermine the stable domestic 
environment Taiwan needs to maintain if it is to outperform its trade competitors in 
the 2000s. It seems there is not likely to be a crisis in the Taiwan Strait or in Taipei 




The Economic Dimension of Taiwan's Security: 
The Need to Enter the Major International Economic 
Organisations--GATT as a Case Study and its Implications 
of Membership for the Government and the Economy of Taiwan 
In trying to elucidate Taiwan's security needs, we have tried to delineate the structure of 
multiple threats and capabilities and outline corresponding diverse security measures. In 
considering Taiwan's security, the military, political and economic issues are closely 
interlocked. Among the factors that affect Taiwan's power capabilities, none is perhaps as 
important as its economy. Taiwan's efforts to maintain its military strength and capability, 
and political stability would be further secured by a continuation of Taiwan's outstanding 
4 
success in maintaining a high rate of economic growth. Therefore in Chapter 4 our attention 
turns to the economic dimensions of Taiwan's security. 
The novelty of the analysis in this chapter is that, contrary to the traditional approaches to 
the study of the economic security which concentrate upon the national rather than the 
international dimension, it uses the WTO (GATT) as a case study to examine the importance 
for Taiwan's entering the major international economic organisations and the implications of 
membership for the government and economy of Taiwan. We begin by examining the need 
to enhance Taiwan's legitimacy and defend its economic interests through membership of the 
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WTO. We then investigate the consequences for and impacts on the economy of Taiwan. 
The impact of Taiwan's WTO bid on cross-Strait relations is also explored in the final part of 
the Chapter. Conclusions are drawn about some policy recommendations and measures 
brought forward to the government in order to win a quick admission to the WTO. 
The economic content of security, i. e. to what extent security is influenced by economic 
variables, is a difficult and widely debated one (Luciani 1989,164). Economic threats are 
considered as "the trickiest and most difficult ones to handle within the framework of national 
security" (Buzan 1991,123-131). The connection between economic security, such as 
economic interdependence, and national security has not been well explored in security 
studies literature. Little attention has been paid to security issues in studies of 
interdependence despite the fact that its growth has generally meant that the nation-state is 
increasingly vulnerable to external forces, a phenomenon commonly thought to have security 
implications (Hirschman 1980; Knorr 1973; Knorr & Trager 1977). This is surprising 
because vulnerabilities arising from growing economic transactions and linkages have 
resulted from the increasing allocation of goods and services by international market forces. 
The expansion of these forces has meant the state's increasing material dependence on goods 
produced in other states, implying vulnerability to a disruption in the flow of raw materials, 
goods and services. They have meant a loss of autonomy in economic decision-making, and 
they have meant increasing political entanglements that constrain foreign policy choices 
(Crawford 1995,27-55). But the literature has not suggested hypotheses specifying the kinds 
of dependence, loss of autonomy or entanglements that would directly threaten the state's 
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ability to provide for military security. Despite the growing awareness of the overlap between 
the spheres of politics and economics and the growing intellectual interest in international 
political economy, the spheres of security and economics were considered separate and 
distinct issue areas. Security studies continue to be concerned more with the state's 'high 
politics' of war and military power than with the 'low politics' of international economic 
transactions (Keohane & Nye 1970; Waltz 1970). As a result, security studies have generally 
taken the state and its ability to ward off military threats and defend the nation in time of war 
as the central focus of analysis ((Walt 1991,211-39). 
The economic role in national security is vital because of its extensive spill-over effects on 
other national values. Persistent underdevelopment and deprivation of economic well-being 
degrade national morale and precipitate social unrest, thus furthering internal fragmentation. 
Such internal weakness can trigger hostile actions by potential or actual adversaries. 
Moreover, a weak economy undermines the base of military power, which is essential for 
even conventional national security. 
The multiplicity of national values, coupled with the precarious security context, produces 
security dimensions more diverse in Taiwan than in the West. In the conventional approach, 
the type, source, and level of threat are considered easily identifiable as either overt, external 
or military, being imposed by actual or potential adversaries. Threats to economic well-being 
and prosperity, however, are less apparent, making perception and recognition more difficult 
and controversial. As some experiences demonstrate, countries may face overt and 
behavioural threats such as interference in maritime trade, embargoes, restrictions on market 
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access and economic sanctions. Nevertheless, these types of threat are usually associated 
with political and military conflicts. 
Subtle, structural threats to economic well-being are more pervasive. These problems are 
related to the pattern and degree of integration in the international economic system. One 
noticeable threat in this regard is systernic vulnerability, which arises from the concerns of 
Taiwan, with limited domestic policy leverage, concerning the transmission of external 
economic disturbances originating in the international economic system (structure) per se. 
As discussed earlier in Chapter 2, a more recent dimension of the relationship between 
security concerns and international trade stems from increased patterns of economic 
interdependence. As national economic trends, pay-offs, and policies become more entwined 
with those of other societies, there is greater national susceptibility to disruptive and injurious 
impacts from abroad. In these circumstances, it becomes an increasingly realistic policy 
perspective to identify international trade matters with security concerns. In a basic sense, 
gaining and preserving security hinges upon national power capabilities to achieve essential 
values. Yet, with increased global interdependence, one country's relative capabilities often 
depend on external actors and events. In such an environment, international policy 
discontinuities can distort or defeat national efforts to achieve basic objectives--or even 
produce new difficulties for policy-makers. The perceptibly increased importance of Taiwan 
in contemporary international trade relations is predicated on the need for its effective 
participation in international negotiations, if broadly based multilateral trade accords are to be 
reached and made lasting. Thus, in this chapter, the economic dimension of Taiwan's security 
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will be explored by examining the need and the importance for Taiwan's joining and 
integrating in the major international economic organisations. 
4.1 The Need 
With a gross national product of well over US$200 billion, a GNP per capita of US$12,000, 
the largest foreign exchange reserves in the world, and the distinction of being one of the 
world's most prominent trading nations, it would seem that Taiwan's role in the international 
economic community would well be recognised and respected. Add this to Taiwan's status as 
a maturing democracy in Asia, there is even less reason to treat the prosperous island with 
indifference in the international community. The facts make it hard to believe that Taiwan 
should be excluded from any economic or trade organisations for any reason. While Taiwan's 
economy is thriving it is important that it participates in the international economic 
organisations (1EOs), in order to obtain fair and reciprocal treatment with its trade partners 
who are members. 
But today the majority of the world's intergovernmental economic organisations do not 
recognise Taiwan. Indeed, for the major IEOs--the former General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the Organisation for Economic Co- 
operation and Development (OECD), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund 
(IN4F)--Taiwan does not officially exist. Rather than admit it in any capacity, these 
organisations have ignored economic realities and have yielded to political pressures from 
Peking to force the international community to make a choice between itself and Taipei. The 
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continuing efforts by Peking to blackball Taipei have politicised the process of Taiwan's 
entrance into such organisations. Because the great majority of the nations that belong to the 
EEOs maintain formal diplomatic ties with the PRC, they bow to the PRC's efforts to block 
Taiwan's membership. For Taiwan, this has meant increasing isolation not only from the 
established venues of international decision-making, but also from much of the normal 
political dialogue among nations. IEO membership would help broaden its formal and infor- 
mal relations with most of the world's nations. Recognition in the major EEOs would provide 
Taiwan more extensive diplomatic help to defend its economic gains. Granting Taiwan 
membership in EEOs would benefit all parties because it would make the organisations more 
representative. It would enhance the exchange of ideas and broaden the range of contacts. 
One of the strong desires for Taiwan to enter GATT is that Taiwan's economic development 
was threatened by the imbalance between its obligations and its rights in foreign trade. In 
recent years, the island has encountered growing pressure from its trade partners, mainly the 
United States, to abide by GATT's liberal principles and to open up its domestic markets, 
liberalise import procedures, allow greater access to the domestic economy, modemise the 
financial framework of the nation, and further revalue the currency. Most of the concessions 
granted by Taiwan to the United States have also been extended to other trade partners. 
However, while Taiwan was abiding by many of the rules of GATT like a GATT member, it 
has not had a GATT member's rights and thus could not enjoy the benefits and privileges of 
GATT membership. Therefore, Taiwan has always been in a passive position and has to 
yield frequently to pressures in relation to trade retaliation. Besides, Taiwan could not take 
advantage of GATT rules to defend itself against excessive requests and unfair trade practices 
159 
from its trade partners such the US. Hence, with its economy heavily dependent on trade, Ta- 
iwan must seek to join the world's largest trade promoting agency if it wants to better protect 
its economic interests in the international arena. Its government believes that economic 
security would be enhanced by fuller and more open integration into the world economy, 
coupled with membership of international economic organisations. 
Another significance of being a member of an international organisation lies in 
communicating with other countries, in making decisions with them and in sharing informat- 
ion. But it is even more significant for Taiwan since it was forced out of the United Nations 
by the Chinese Communists and still lacks formal diplomatic relations with most members of 
the world community. "As far as political significance is concerned, membership in 
international organisations provides us with a channel for formal contacts with many 
important countries, and it has a very positive effect on raising our international status and 
increasing our substantive relations with other countries, " former Economic Minister Siew 
said. "As for economics, membership in world economic and trade organisations would allow 
us to work through multilateral channels and international arbitration to gain reasonable 
treatment and ensure our economic interests, avoiding bilateral consultations, where we are 
often at a disadvantage because the other side is too strong" (Sinorama January 1992,84). 
In addition, economic policy-makers in Taiwan believe GATT/WTO membership is vital to 
securing equitable and unobstructed access to world markets. This access is crucial since 
foreign trade accounts for 80 percent of Taiwan's GNP. Because of Taiwan's excessive 
dependence on exports, its economic success depends in no small way on its ability to keep 
open its avenues of trade with the outside world. Cutting off those avenues could threaten 
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both Taiwan's economic success and national security. A formal role in the international 
economic arena would thus provide Taiwan with a more reliable arena to defend its economic 
gains than the existing bilateral framework in which it is frequently forced to work. 
Membership in the GATT would: 
--Give Taiwan a wider forum to express its viewpoint on contentious economic issues and 
allow it access to established procedures for mediating such disputes. 
--Involve Taiwan in the international economic process as a player rather than as a pariah, 
giving it a voice in the search for common solutions to the prevailing economic problems 
of the day. 
By joining the GATT, Taiwan could make use of the GATT forum to discuss and settle 
trade disputes. Taiwan is a country with economic strength that certainly has status in the 
world. So joining the GATT, apart from shouldering a part of the responsibility for 
international society, could open up more space for diplomacy and raise its international 
status. On September 29,1992, more than two years and nine months after Taiwan had 
applied for accession, the GATT decided to form a working party to screen Taiwan's 
application and grant the island observer status. It "signifies a major breakthrough in the 
nation's flexible diplomacy and an international recognition of Taiwan's efforts to promote 
political democratisation and economic liberalisation" (China News, October 1,1992). 
Though it will not be too far away before Taiwan becomes an official member, there are still 
challenges ahead to be overcome, changes and adjustments to be made, and impacts worthy 
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of attention. The themes of this chapter are to examine the implications and the consequences 
of GATT membership for the government and the economy of Taiwan. 
4.2 The Significance for the Government 
4.2.1 A Need for Compromise 
The GATT or WTO is one of the most important world bodies. It can be considered as 
another United Nations. It permits governmental contact to promote world trade, the contact 
most of the countries shun in dealing with Taiwan for fear of the PRC's reprisal. There have 
been difficulties in Taiwan's efforts to rejoin GATT. Because the Nationalists were in 
nominal control of the mainland during the immediate post-war years when the major EEOs 
were established, they had represented China in the IMF, the World Bank and the GATT and 
had held the China seat in the UN even after their retreat to Taiwan. With the exception of 
the GATT they retained their membership in these organisations until they were voted out to 
be replaced by the PRC or until the PRC was admitted. 
In some cases the organisation's procedures would have permitted Taiwan to continue as a 
member, but the Nationalists adamantly refused to be present at any gathering containing 
representatives of the CCP or to accept any change in legal status that implied that Taiwan 
was subordinate to the Peking regime. In the case of the GATT the Nationalists, as 
representatives of China in 1947-48, had been a leader in the original drafting group of efforts 
to ensure that developing country interests were adequately covered. At the first round of 
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tariff negotiations under the new agreement in Geneva in 1950, the Nationalists 
representatives formally withdrew China from the GATT, explaining that their government 
could no longer ensure that all of the China would abide by the rules of the GATT. The 
Nationalists were aware that the negotiated tariff concessions would apply to all exports from 
China, and that the beneficiary would be primarily the mainland. Since Taiwan's interest in 
foreign trade in early 1950 was negligible and since it was then considering a policy of import 
substitution rather than export expansion, withdrawing from the GATT as a move against the 
mainland must have been perceived as in the short-run and long-run national interest of the 
KMT. 
By 1965, however, having entered upon a program of rapid economic growth based on 
export expansion, Taiwan sought and obtained observer status in the GATT. It remained as 
an observer until 1971 when the PRC was admitted to the UN as the sole representative of 
China. After seating the PRC, the UN recommended that its specialised agencies review their 
China representation; thereupon GATT withdrew Taiwan's observer status. 
Taiwan's trade after 1980 was conducted primarily on the basis of bilateral reciprocal trade 
agreements with its trading partners. As a consequence of the liberalising efforts undertaken 
by Taiwan in response to US pressure in thel. 980s, Taiwan's trade regime had been brought 
closer to that which would be required if the island were a full GATT member. In addition, 
upon embarking on the policy of flexible diplomacy, the government undertook a survey of 
all of its trade rules and regulations to determine what adjustments would be necessary to 
bring Taiwan into full compliance with GATT. 
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The ROC government began seeking re-entry to GATT in 1987. Late that year, an inter- 
ministerial panel was set up to solicit support from GATT members and to start making the 
necessary economic adjustments. Taipei filed its membership application in January 1990, 
but GATT had to wait for more than two and half years to act on the application because of 
the PRC's opposition. To gain membership in the major IEOs, Taipei must determine, or be 
willing to accept, a name by which it will be called. This name must address, or by-pass, the 
troublesome issue of Taipei's claim to be the capital of all of China--a claim which, 
understandably, has led Peking to block Taipei. The PRC has refused to accept Taiwan's 
membership in any international organisation if the ROC uses the title "Republic of China", 
or any other name that implies Taipei's sovereignty over all China or the existence of two 
Chinas. Taipei thus must show some flexibility on the name issue. Flexibility is the key to 
this issue. 
Extensive scrutiny of IEO charters, thus, may provide Taiwan with the means to avoid the 
contentious political issues that surround membership. For instance, according to the GATT 
Article XXXIII: Accession: "A government not party to this Agreement, or a government 
acting on behalf of a separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its 
external commercial relations and of the other matters provided for in this Agreement, may 
accede to this Agreement, on its own behalf or on behalf of that territory, on terms to be 
agreed between such government and the Contracting Parties" (GATT 1969,5 1). This article 
stipulates that any government can apply for GATT membership, and does not strictly require 
that this government be a sovereign state. It is on the basis of government and not as a nation 
or state. It was under Article XXXHI of the GATT charter that Taiwan filed the membership 
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application as a'Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu'. It was the 
first time Article XXXIII was used in an entrance application to GATT. 
However, some ROC officials and legislators voiced opposition to Taiwan's membership on 
the conditions GATT Chairman B. K. Zutshi had laid down, i. e., "that Chinese Taipei, the 
name the GATT has preferred to the Separate Customs Territory, would be treated like Hong 
Kong or Macao" (China News, October 5,1992). Both Hong Kong and Macao joined the 
GATT as colonies or dependencies. The United Kingdom and Portugal filed the applications 
on behalf of their respective colonies under the provisions of Article XXIV of the GATT 
Charter, in which their highest officials stationed there are "permanent representatives " and 
not "ambassadors" as for other sovereign countries. 
Should Taiwan accept the Zutshi conditions, the opponents believe, Taiwan would be 
treated as a colony or dependency of the PRC, which is also trying to become a GATT 
contracting party. Some opponents believed that if Taiwan joined GATT in that status, 
national dignity would be compromised. "We will never join the GATT at the expense of 
national character, dignity, and sovereignty" (China Post, October 1,1992). Government 
Spokesman Jason Hu called on the public to refrain from emotional overreaction, saying: 
"We have to take a pragmatic approach in striving for the greatest interests with our own 
prowess" (Ibid). International politics being what it is, Taiwan has no alternative but to be 
pragmatic. Taiwan's purpose is to accede to WTO, that is the very first step to take to return 
to the community of nations. "Pragmatism dictates that what we should do is to pocket our 
pride and join GATT" (China News, October 5,1992). 
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4.2.2 A Breakthrough in the PRC's Isolation and Blockade 
The dispute between Taiwan and China over their GATT membership is deeply rooted in 
their forty-year confrontation and hostility. In the last decade, Taiwan has developed its 
economy rapidly, becoming a strong economic entity in the world. As a result of this rapid 
economic growth and trade expansion, Taiwan felt its position would be jeopardised without 
joining the GATT. On I January 1990, Taiwan officially notified the Director-General of the 
GATT of its decision to accede to the GATT. Right after Taiwan submitted its application, 
the PRC sent a strong protest to the GATT, indicating that Taiwan has no right to apply on its 
own for accession to the GATT, and requesting the GATT not to accept such an illegal 
application. The PRC claims that negotiation of Taiwan's GATT membership should come 
after the accomplishment of the negotiations of PRC's GATT membership In fact Taiwan is 
very upset about the delay of the GATT in considering its application for GATT membership. 
It realises that support from the major industrialised countries, especially from the United 
States, will be crucial to the inclusion of its application in the GATT agenda. It was the firm 
and clear position and support from US and EC countries which changed the situation. With 
this, Taiwan was able to make a major breakthrough in the PRC's blockade and isolation. 
4.2.3. Providing Initiatives for Economic and Trade Diplomacy 
Taiwan's defeat in the United Nations in 1971 represented a remarkable turning-point in the 
history of its foreign policy and external relations. This is because since then, with increasing 
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international recognition of its Communist rival as the rightful spokesman for all China, it 
faced a heightened identity crisis and increasingly severe international isolation. During the 
1970s, many other former allies of Taiwan deserted it and established bilateral relations with 
the PRC. More than one hundred countries have since shifted their China policies, leaving 
thirty one countries now still recognising Taiwan. 
Given the current status of Taiwan, diplomacy does not narrowly mean the establishment of 
embassies and the exchanges of ambassadors. It implies that international trade and 
investment, economic contacts, social and cultural exchanges, even transport and 
communication facilities all are regarded as aspects of diplomacy. Even though Taiwan can 
not prevent the continued erosion of official relations, it can replace them with substantial 
unofficial relations. Thus after entering the WTO, through multilateral contacts and consult- 
ations, trade will be the most essential and useful means to make friends. In the previous 
years, businessmen in Taiwan found it extremely difficult and inconvenient to obtain visas 
from the countries such as Japan and the EC. Their officials may refuse to see Taiwan 
officials because of their sensitivity to possible PRC reactions or, in extreme cases, may even 
refuse to admit Taiwan officials to the country. 
The fact that Taiwan is now a major international trading power has underlined the 
importance of its political identity. The evidence for this has been that many countries and 
foreign firms, having previously abandoned Taiwan, have now shown willingness and strong 
interest to trade with it, despite harsh protests from the PRC. Taiwan's improved status can 
also be seen by the fact that in recent years most of the European countries have now estab- 
lished an unofficial office or representative in Taiwan, most staffed by government officials 
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and diplomats. Former prime ministers, presidents and high ranking officials from European 
countries are invited to visit Taiwan one after another. The multibillion-dollar Six-Year 
National Development Plan has attracted countries around the world to participate. After 
Holland and Austria, the United Kingdom launched direct flights to Taipei on March 29, 
1993. As a GATT member, all these relations will surely be further enhanced. 
4.2.4 Opening Doors Back to International Organisations 
When Taiwan was forced out of the United Nations, the PRC's representatives promptly 
replaced those from Taiwan in the Security Council and other organs of the organisation. 
According to figures of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "the Republic of China is currently a 
member of 769 international organisations, most of them non-political in nature, like the 
International Criminal Police Organisation and the International Olympics Committee. Just 
10 of them are officially governmental" (Sinorama 1992,85). Most of the inter-govemmental 
or international non-governmental organisations which Taiwan joined are either economic, 
cultural or scientific. As for international organisations that are political in nature and 
affiliated with the United Nations, as long as mainland China is a member or has applied to 
join, Taiwan will be locked out regardless of what name it goes by, since the mainland is one 
of the five permanent members of the Security Council. 
In this respect, it reflects the fact that the PRC's goal is not merely to prevent Taiwan from 
claiming to represent China in the international community, but also to eliminate representa- 
tives of Taiwan from all international organisations, whether or not such representatives use 
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the name "the Republic of China". In trying to join scientific, medical, cultural, athletic, 
academic, and other non-governmental organisations, Taiwan used to have a lot of problems 
because of its name. Taiwan has always been caught in the dilemma of choosing between the 
real thing without the name, or the name without the real thing. It is very hard to get both at 
the same time. Leaders in the private sector see it pretty much the same. They argue that 
"We are not happy with all the weird names for us, but if we don't belong to international 
organisations, we don't have a forum to make our point. We can't seek to change things 
unless we are on the inside" (Ibid, 85). Thus, the importance of rejoining the GATT is 
beyond doubt. It would open a door for Taiwan to return to international stage and provide 
greater room for existence. 
Returning to major international organisations has been a dream shared by all people on 
Taiwan. After becoming a GATT member, Taiwan could plan to join the IN4F, which regu- 
lates the world's financial system, the World Bank, which assists in the development of 
developing countries, and the OECD, which is made up of the world's leading industrialised 
countries, and as a result could return to the international community. 
4.3 Consequences for and Impacts on the Economy of Taiwan 
The GATT was drawn up in 1947 to provide a basis for trade negotiations. Intended merely 
as a temporary agreement to last only until the Geneva Charter was fully implemented, the 
GATT became the principal basis for the international trade regime with the failure of the 
International Trade Organisation. Despite its supposedly temporary status, the GATT 
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emerged as the most important international institution in the trade area. From a temporary 
treaty, GATT became not only an established commercial code but also an international 
organisation to oversee the implementation of its rules, manage dispute settlements, and 
provide a forum and support for multilateral trade negotiations. Since its inauguration, 
GATT has made significant contributions to global trade, mainly by reducing tariffs and 
bringing down world trade barriers. Global trade has ballooned 63-fold since then, from 
US$57 million in 1948 to US$3.6 trillion today (Chung-yangjih-pao, January 2,1995). The 
organisation's 112 member countries account for more than 90 percent of that total. 
The GATT and now the WTO, is based upon several norms of which two are fundamental 
(Gilpin 1987,191; Spero 1990,70; McMahon 1988,35; Nicolaides 1989,93). First, all 
members agree to extend unconditional most-favoured-nation (MFN) status to one another. 
Under this agreement, no country will receive any preferential treatment not accorded to all 
other MFN countries. Additionally, any benefits acquired by one country are automatically 
extended to all MFN partners. Second, it is based upon the norm of reciprocity, or the 
concept that any country that benefits from another's tariff reduction should reciprocate to an 
equivalent extent. This norm ensures fair and equitable tariff reductions by all countries. 
Before acceding to the WTO, Taiwan must adjust its trade regime to meet criteria that are 
far more complex and comprehensive than they have been in the past. Since the main spirit 
of the WTO is non-discrimination and reciprocity, therefore, there are some changes needed 
to be made by Taiwan in the process of consultations and negotiations with all other 
contracting parties. Before Taiwan is finally accepted as a full member of WTO, Taiwan has 
to satisfy member nations that are interested in joining the working party. The island must 
170 
abide by the outcome of Uruguay Round of trade negotiations and agreements reached in 
December 1993. The final agreement stipulates that GATT members must slash their tariffs 
by 36 percent of their total 1986 tariff revenues by 1999 (GATT Secretariat 1993). This will 
pry open agricultural markets and will allow entrance to previously inaccessible service- 
industry markets. The international textile trade will be liberalised, and the textile import 
quotas imposed by some countries will be dropped. The protection of intellectual property 
rights JPR), not within the scope of the Tokyo Round, was a major issue in the Uruguay 
Round. Showing movies, using software, and playing tapes or discs without honouring 
patents, trademarks, or copyrights has resulted in the loss of billions of dollars annually to the 
holders of these rights. 
In addition, tariffs on agricultural products, long considered off-limits for GATT, have now 
come under scrutiny for countries now joining the WTO. The removal of barriers to the 
provision of banking, insurance, legal, consulting, and engineering services across national 
borders has become important to countries whose industries want to expand their client base. 
There is also pressure for WTO countries to open their lucrative telecommunication services, 
such as cellular phones and all phone-line computer transmissions, to international 
competition. Further, each nation applying to WTO must have what is known as a 
"transparent" trading system. This concept means that the laws governing trade must be 
formalised in a clearly written and detailed commercial code that can be applied to all parties 
equally. 
As Taiwan applied to GATT as a developed economy, the criteria for accession are more 
stringent. The members ask detailed questions about the trade regime and expect 
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comprehensive answers. There are four areas in which Taiwan's answers have raised some 
concerns: (1) tariff and non-tariff barriers on agricultural goods; (2) protection for the 
provision of services across national boundaries; (3) intellectual property rights; and (4) the 
lack of "transparency" in Taiwan's trade regime. 
4.3.1 Agricultural Sector 
Multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) under the GATT have been quite successful in 
removing barriers to trade and distortions of international competition in many industries. 
One of the most notable exceptions has been agriculture. Until the Uruguay Round, 
agricultural trade and policy issues have rarely been dealt with in GATT negotiations and 
largely escaped the discipline of GATT. The principal reasons are: 
(1) "because at the inception of the General Agreement a number of countries (especially 
the United States) made it a pre-condition for their accession to the Agreement that special 
waivers and protocols be granted that allowed them to accord special treatment to their 
agricultural products" (United Nations 1990, ix); 
(2) Nations contend that self-sufficiency in agricultural products is a matter of national 
security and national sovereignty, hence non-negotiable; and 
(3) Most major agricultural trade participants but especially western Europe and Japan have 
well-placed, well organised farm interests over-represented in the political process. Such 
groups are sUled at special pleading and manipulating public opinion to serve farm interests 
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(Rapkin & George 1993,55-94; Moyer 1993,94-120); so agriculture was essentially taken 
out of the GATT. 
In virtually all other areas of trade, GATT rules were established to instruct countries on 
what they could and could not do to intervene in domestic markets and industries. However, 
in agriculture, the reverse was true. Instead of governments bringing their domestic practices 
into line with GATT rules, "GATT rules were written to fit the agricultural programs then in 
existence, especially in the United States" (Hathaway 1987,104). Subsequently, GATT rules 
have been fitted to the domestic agricultural programs of a variety of other countries. 
Efforts in previous rounds of MTNs to bring agricultural trade more fully under GATT rules 
proved unsuccessful. During the earlier MTNs, agriculture was a back-burner issue as 
negotiators concentrated on trade in manufactures. It was not until the Uruguay Round that a 
serious attempt was made to reduce the degree of protectionism in this sector and to bring 
agriculture under the rules and disciplines of the GATT. Although the round included fifteen 
separate negotiating areas in all, the agricultural negotiations proved central to the interests of 
both the rich countries of the North, where agriculture is heavily subsidised, and the poor 
countries of the South, where it is the principal source of export earnings and economic 
growth. 
The Uruguay Round Ministerial Declaration states that: "Contracting parties agree that there 
is an urgent need to bring more discipline and predictability to world agricultural trade by 
correcting and preventing restraints and distortion including these related to structural 
surpluses so as to reduce the uncertainty, imbalances and instability in world agriculture 
markets" (Bernard 1989,88). "The combination of agricultural trade war and budgetary 
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costs led countries for the first time in the post-war period to consider seriously multilateral 
negotiations that would change the GATT regime for agriculture and lead to reform of 
domestic agricultural policies" (Spero 1990,89). 
All governments intervene in agricultural markets. Their reasons include raising tax revenue, 
supporting producers' income, reducing consumers' food costs, attaining self-sufficiency, or 
countering interventions of other governments. Policy instruments for protection and 
intervention are numerous; several are listed in Table 4-1. All forms of protection are 
intended to improve the position of a domestic producer relative to foreign ones. Tariffs and 
non-tariffs are the most important forms of protection. Tariffs, which are simply taxes 
imposed on goods entering a country from abroad, result in higher prices and have been the 
most common form of protection for domestic producers. Tariffs have been popular with 
governments because it appears that the tax is being paid by the foreigner who wishes to sell 
his goods in the home economy and because the tariff revenue can be used to finance 
government services or reduce other taxes. However, it has declined due to many tariff 
reduction negotiations under GATT. 
Table 4.1. 
Examples of Policies Influencing Competitiveness and Trade 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Direct Trade Intervention 
Tariffs and taxes 
Import and export quotas 
Export subsidies 
Controlled exchange rates 
Fixed rates 
Differential rates 
Crawling -peg rates 
Exchange controls, licenses 
174 




Market Price Support 
Domestic price supports linked with border measures (quotas, tariffs, variables levies, and 
export restitutions) 
Two-price systems and home consumption schemes 
Price premiums (often used for fluid milk) 
Domestic price supports linked with production quotas 
Government inventory and commodity loan activities 
Marketing board price stabilisation policies 
State trading operations 
Commodity Programs 
Direct payments--deficiency, disaster, payment-in-kind entitlements, stabilisation payments 
Producer co-responsibility levies (taxes on commodity to pay for surplus disposal) 
Supply control--marketing quota, acreage diversion, land retirement 
Storage programs 
Programs Affecting Marketing of Commodities 
Transportation subsidies 
Marketing and promotion programs 
Inspection services 
Programs Affecting Variable Costs of Production 
Fertiliser subsidies 
Fuel tax exemptions 
Concessional domestic credit for production loans 
Irrigation subsidies 
Crop insurance 
Programs Affecting Long-Term Agricultural Production 
Research and extension services 
Conservation, environmental, and natural resource programs 
Structural programs to adjust farm size and numbers 
Infrastructure--roads, ports, etc. 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Tweeten 1992,50. 
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On the other hand, various other forms of protection, frequently termed non-tariff barriers, 
have become increasingly important. GATT had been designed to liberalise trade by 
removing quotas and tariffs. With the success of such liberalisation in manufactured 
products, the major remaining barriers to trade were non-tariff barriers. A GATT study of 
non-tariff barriers identified the following general categories: "Government participation in 
trade; customs and administrative entry procedures; health and safety standards, packing and 
labelling regulations; specific limitations on imports and exports; and restraints on imports 
and exports by the price mechanism" (Quoted in McMahon 1988,49; Meerharghe 1992, 
141). Spero (1990,85) even argues that the non-tariff barriers problem grew out of the very 
success of the GATT. 
The non-tariff barrier measures take numerous forms such as subsidies or quotas. For 
example, unofficial and unauthorised delays in processing import or export permits behave 
like quotas. The monopoly-like guild of wholesale merchants in Japan who frequently reject 
foreign merchandise also constitutes de facto quota behaviour. Excessive packing 
requirements or shipping costs behave like taxes. Credit concessions provided by the United 
States and other exporters to foreign buyers of wheat are agricultural export subsidies. The 
EC imposes a variable levy on imports equal to the difference between the domestic support 
price and the world price--a hybrid between a tariff and non-tariff barrier but generally 
classified as the latter. 
Governments in most developed countries subsidise their agricultural sectors, leading to 
reduced imports and increasing surpluses which can only be managed through substantial 
sales abroad. Nearly all analysts agree that national and global welfare could be enhanced by 
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reducing agricultural subsidies and returning to trade based upon the principle of comparative 
advantage; yet, politicians have found it difficult to resist demands from farmers for 
continued government intervention. "Particularly in the industrialised countries, political 
leaders are subjected to the push and pull of powerful and often contradictory political 
pressures so intense that international agreement on agricultural trade issues is nearly 
impossible" (Avery 1993,1). The problem of subsidised exports is now central. "The 
agricultural negotiations in GATT's Uruguay Round have tested many countries' faith in a 
free and open trading system because of its high rates of support, high budget costs, and 
numerous GATT violations and exemptions" (McDonald 1990,299). It cannot be denied that 
protection and state control of the economy have been important in achieving Taiwan's 
economic growth. In order to protect domestic prices and producers' income and to assure 
food security, Taiwan, like other countries, has been adopting the policy of production 
controls, price supports, export subsidies, and import protection, which are violations of the 
WTO rules. However, Taiwan can no longer do so if it wishes to be treated as a developed 
economy. Though Taiwan has been trying hard on the reductions of tariffs and the removal 
of non-tariffs, it seems insufficient, for there is still discrimination and unfairness towards 
trade partners. Thus A current economic and trade policies will face a new situation and 
challenges before and after entering the WTO. 
Before the 1970s, the agricultural sector was the main foreign exchange earner and 
contributed greatly to Taiwan's economic development. However, agriculture has slowly 
declined and increasingly depends for its survival on government protection as the 1990s get 
under way. While Taiwan has become a showcase of economic development, the changing 
177 
perceptions of its role in the international economy also have made its agricultural policy a 
focal point of trade friction. Like Japan and South Korea, Taiwan is a rich market that has 
attracted the attention of world agribusiness. It has been accused of unfair trade practices and 
has been under increasing pressure to open its agricultural market. This pressure was 
intensified in the mid-1980s when the trade surplus with the United States, the largest market 
for Taiwan's exports, grew rapidly. The trade surplus with the United States averaged $12.4 
billion during 1985-89, although it decreased to $9.1 billion in 1990, and to $6.7 billion in 
1994 (Chung-kuo shih-pao, January 18,1995). 
As Taiwan's agricultural sector comes under heavy internal and external pressure, the issues 
of structural adjustment have become increasingly important and will occupy government 
policy decision making for years to come. The total estimated loss to the country caused by 
entering the WTO will be $2 billion annually (Chung-kuo shih-pao, January 3,1995). 
Agriculture is "... the most highly protected sector in national economies, the most undis- 
ciplined area of international commerce, and the cause of the most dangerous frictions in 
international economic relations" (Quoted in Tweeten 1992,228). In Taiwan, more than one 
million people (see Table 4,2) farm for their living, and a total of 4.3 million people, or one- 
fifth of the entire population, depend on agriculture directly or indirectly for their livelihood. 
Thus how will Taiwan's agriculture based on small family farms survive? What are the 
barriers to future structural adjustments? And what is the direction of Taiwan's future 
agricultural policy? All these deserve more discussion. 
While the ROC government has made much effort to intervene in agriculture, the dominant 
form of agricultural protection has come from the restrictive border measures that have long 
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existed, partly because of a severe shortage of foreign exchange in the early years. Taiwan 
used to suffer chronic balance-of-payments deficits to such an extent that during 1951-61, 
when US aid (it was terminated in 1965) was in full swing, it paid for more than 30% of 
Taiwan's total imports (Liang, 1988,3). Nowadays, instead of pursuing the original goal of 
conserving scarce foreign exchange, Taiwan's trade barriers have increasingly become a 
protectionist scheme. 
Table 4.2 
International Comparisons of Agricultural Structure 
Taiwan Japan US Canada EC Australia 
Farmland 89 455 1,8778 4,595 7,818 4,688 
(10000 hectares) 
Output 6.7 49 115 16 115 7.9 
(Billion US$) 
% of GD 3.7 3.0 2.4 6.7 3.2 4.0 
Farmers 10 38.3 27.8 4.4 85.6 4 (1,000,000) 
% of employed 12.9 5.8 2.1 1.6 2.6 4.7 
population 




Source: Council of Agriculture, quoted in Min-shen-pao, June 14,1994. 
Although trade liberalisation is a relatively new concept in Taiwan's agricultural policy, 
tariffs and import controls on agricultural products have been relaxed over years. A big step 
toward relaxing trade barriers came in the 1978-79 bilateral agreement between Taiwan and 
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the United States; provisions were comparable to those applicable to developing countries set 
forth in non-tariff agreements concluded in the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations, even though Taiwan was not a contracting party to the GATT. Taiwan agreed, 
in exchange for US concessions on industrial products, to lower tariffs on a number of 
products stage by stage and gave concessions on some non-tariff measures. Since then, 
scheduled reductions in tariffs and non-tariff barriers have taken place. For example, the 
tariff rates for wheat decreased from 13% before the agreement to 6.5% for 1992, for corn 
from 6% to 1 %, for soybeans from 5% to 1 %, for raw cotton from 16% to zero, for duck from 
75% to 35%, and for pork from 75% to 15% (Huang 1993,43-65). Most vegetables, flowers, 
fish products, and grains (with the notable exception of rice) now can be imported into 
Taiwan. Agricultural imports topped US$7 billion in 1993. 
However, agricultural trade liberalisation has encountered some setbacks since 1987 because 
of rapid political liberalisation. Taiwan's farmers, long obedient and staunch supporters of 
the government, have begun to take more rebellious action against the government's trade 
liberalisation policy. In response, the government excluded most agricultural products from 
Taiwan's otherwise broad tariff cuts and temporarily banned imports of turkey meat in 1988 
and beef in 1989. Thus despite years of relaxing trade barriers, tariffs on many agricultural 
imports remain comparative high, and other import barriers, such as bans, import licensing 
restrictions, and unique sanitation or purity standards, still persist. The prices of most 
agricultural products are determined by market supply and demand. Nonetheless rice, 
sorghum, corn and soy beans produced in Taiwan enjoy a guaranteed purchase price, which is 
three to four times higher than the international price (Chung-yang jih-pao, October 5,1992). 
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According to the Council of Agriculture (COA), the price will be maintained to the present 
level and will not expand the application sphere, the price subsidy system will be adjusted 
gradually in accordance with the results of Uruguay Round talks. In Taiwan, farm subsidies 
are, on average, equivalent to 19% of the value of farm output, much lower than EC's 49% 
and EFTA countries'68% (The Economist, October 17-23,1992). 
Taiwan is currently conducting bilateral trade negotiations with WTO members. WTO 
members requested that Taiwan impose a 30% tariff ceiling on all agricultural imports. 
Taiwan has agreed to impose this ceiling on many imports, but not on key commodities. 
Taiwan also wants to maintain a 50% tariff ceiling on fruits and vegetables. The United 
States is particularly interested in Taiwan's growing market for processed foods, however, 
Taiwan is not willing to agree to a 30% tariff ceiling on these products. They want to 
negotiate tariffs on these products on a bilateral basis after their accession to the WTO. Such 
a delay is certainly unacceptable to existing members. 
The United States has proposed tariff reductions on a list of more than eight thousand items, 
demanding that duties not exceed 20 percent for agricultural products (Chung-kuo shih-pao, 
July 18,1994). This list will be an important reference for other nations when they conduct 
tariff negotiations with Taiwan as required for WTO entry. At present, Taiwan imposes 
tariffs of more than 20 percent for nearly half of all agricultural goods. Moreover, joining the 
WTO would force Taiwan to conform to the resolution requiring all members to cut tariffs by 
40 percent within four years. 
One of Taiwan's main non-tariff barriers to agricultural imports is its licencing structure. 
Before the Board of Trade will sign a licence for the importation of an agricultural good, it 
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requires pre-approval from either the COA or from one of the provincial agricultural 
agencies. Licences are rarely granted, and then only after long delays. Taiwan also imposes 
quotas and area-of-origin restrictions on produce including apples, bananas, pineapples, 
grapes, and grapefruit. The restrictions on import areas and import controls will have to be 
removed, because GATT Article XI: I dictated that "No prohibitions or restrictions other than 
duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export 
licences or other measures, shall be instituted by any contracting party on the importation of 
any product of the territory of any other contracting party... " (McMahon 1988,91 & 47; 
Meerhaeghe 1992,124). Therefore, all of these protective barriers face major challenges as 
the island prepares to join thw WTO. 
But the thorniest challenge of all faces Taiwan's staple food: rice. When it became known 
that Taiwan might have to open its rice market in its bid to join GATT, local farm leaders 
reacted strongly. In late November 1993, Taiwan farmers joined their Japanese and South 
Korean counterparts in issuing a statement in Tokyo strongly opposing even minimal rice 
imports. Rice importation, they contended, would lead to the collapse of the traditional 
cultures of Asian nations, which are rooted in rice production and an agricultural tradition. 
Farmers in Taiwan issued a strong appeal to the government to hold to its strict ban on rice 
imports, and legislators called on government leaders to stick to this policy or resign. If 
necessary, they urged, the government should delay or even cancel its efforts to join GATT. 
Some legislators even dubbed the opening of rice markets a "national disaster". Local 
farming leaders stressed that 390,000 farming households grow rice (among other crops), 
accounting for 40 percent of the total agricultural households (Lien-ho-pao, October 18, 
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1994). Of these, 160,000 households specialise in rice farming. The island has a total of 
400,000 hectares of rice paddies. 
US-grown rice, which sells in the United States at one-third local prices (see Table 4.3), 
would likely deal a devastating blow to the livelihood of domestic farmers and to the structure 
of the island's agricultural community. 
Table 4.3 
International Comparisons of Rice Price 
(Unit: US dollar/Ton) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Taiwan Thailand Japan us 
-PRC 1985 350 104 1,004 177 124 
1986 375 91 1,421 144 109 
1987 446 117 1,556 83 114 
1988 505 167 1,673 160 124 
1989 594 171 1,554 151 119 
Average 454 130 1,442 143 118 
Source: Council of Agriculture, quoted in China Times, July 12,1994. 
After heated debates during the Uruguay Round, the Japanese and South Korean 
governments eventually agreed to open their rice markets, at least to some extent. It has 
become clear that Taiwan must follow suit in order to join the WTO. Vincent Siew, ex- 
chairman of the Council for Economic Planning and Development, has pointed out that 
"liberalisation of international agricultural trade is inevitable, and that Taiwan cannot swim 
against this current alone" (Chung-kuo shih-pao, December 22,1994). But Siew has also 
emphasised that the government will adjust its policies on farmland and agricultural 
production and marketing to help local farmers weather possible adverse effects resulting 
183 
from Taiwan's entry into the GATT. A US $4 billion fund will be provided to compensate 
farmers for losses incurred from the opening of the rice market (Chung-yang fih-pao, January 
4,1995). In the area of rice imports, the government could strive to secure a minimum 
amount of imports, impose a long period of adjustment, and maintain some protective tariffs, 
at least to the extent afforded Japan and South Korea (see Table 4.4). 
Table 4.4 
Comparisons of Japanese and South Korean Rice Import Models 
(The unit of amount: 10,000 tons) 
Year 
. 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Japan 
Amount 6.8 8.2 9.5 10.9 12.2 13.6 
As % of 4.0 4.8 5.6 6.4 7.2 8.0 
domestic ice market 
S. Korea 
Amount 1.7 2.1 2.5 2.9 3.4 3.4 4.2 5.1 5.9 6.8 
As % of 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.7 2.0 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 7.0 
domestic rice market 
Source: Chung-kuo shih-pao, December 20,1994. 
Under international pressure, Japan has agreed to open four to eight percent of its rice 
market over a period of six years before opening it entirely (see Table 4.4). High tariffs will 
be imposed but will gradually phased down after the market is opened. The Japanese model 
also includes a set of government aid packages, such as buying farmland from farmers, 
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helping them to change professions, merging smaller farms into bigger ones in order to 
conduct more economical farming. 
South Korea, like its neighbour, has to open its rice market despite strong protests from 
farmers. But Seoul is committed to open only three percent of its market over a period of ten 
years to allow its farmers to accommodate to the changes. Though the South Korean model is 
more protective, it would be difficult for Taiwan to apply it, because under the GATT 
regulations, only developing nations are allowed to adopt such a measure as a kind of 
protection of their rice farmers. Taiwan applied to join GATT as an advanced economy, and 
thus will not be able to cite the South Korean model since Seoul registered as a developing 
economy. 
Rice imports can be handled directly by the government, and imported rice could be used for 
special purposes such as animal feed or aid to developing nations, so as to prevent its entry 
into the domestic market. In addition, the government should plan to provide rice farmers 
with "import relief' subsidies based on the area of farmland, and to increase insurance, 
retirement, and other benefits for farmers. Meanwhile, the government should also formulate 
a medium-and long-term agricultural development program aimed at reducing the farm 
population, expanding the unit scale of agricultural operations, and developing technology- 
intensive agriculture. Under this program, some marginal farmland will be released for 
residential, industrial, or recreational use. 
Regarding protection measures, Taiwan could raise tariffs to substitute import restrictions or 
gain more time for adjustment, then increasing import quotas annually. Actually, the average 
tariff standard on agricultural products in Taiwan is higher than in the US, but lower than in 
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Japan, South Korea and EC (Chung-kuo shih-pao, December 9,1994). Therefore, there will 
be no need for Taiwan to adopt an all-out tariff reduction in future negotiations. To meet the 
request for further reduction, Taiwan could refer to different types of tariff and tax rates of 
other countries as bases for comparison and adjustment. 
Facing pressure to open its markets and the likely initial increase in imports, Taiwan needs 
to adjust its production mode due to its weak competing capability. It could be a crisis but a 
turning-point as well, if Taiwan can make good use of this time. It may not only bring 
positive effects but facilitate Taiwan's agricultural structural change and help agricultural 
automation, mechanisation and modernisation. 
After intense economic development in past decades, Taiwan's agriculture faces 
unprecedented challenges as the last decade of the twentieth century gets under way. The 
very success of its industrialisation has resulted in rising production costs and a shrinking and 
ageing supply of farm labour in the agricultural sector. Labour-intensive farming has become 
uneconomical, yet substantial mechanisation of Taiwan's current small farms is often 
impractical. Furthermore, increasing import competition and other problems of Taiwan's 
overall economy--pollution, strong currency, labour shortage, and dwindling water resources- 
-have become major policy concerns. 
Entering the WTO will therefore imply a liberalisation of farm trade in Taiwan. Farmers 
will lose, but the economy as a whole stands to gain a lot, as resources are released into more 
productive activities and food prices fall. In general, farmers will face challenges temporarily, 
but will benefit in the long run. Fortunately, due to inherent Chinese characteristics of 
obedience and contentment, most farmers are not interested in politics. In addition, they have 
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always abided by government policies. As a result, farmers in Taiwan are not as influential 
and powerful politically as those in other countries. 
The farm sectors' political leverage in Taiwan appears insufficient to delay further market 
liberalisation, because Taiwan has not yet developed complicated legal and institutional 
frameworks designed for agricultural protection policies (Chu 1994,2). Therefore, the ques- 
tion of agricultural trade liberalisation is not whether it will proceed but, rather, how quickly 
and to what degree. In fact, the government has announced intentions to relax barriers against 
agricultural products for which Taiwan has no comparative advantage while continuing to 
seek protection for some politically sensitive farin products such as rice. Faced with a 
dwindling sector and increasing pressure for trade liberalisation, Taiwan's agriculture is in 
need of reform. Taiwan's application for membership in the GATT and its willingness to join 
the organisation as a developed economy represent a milestone in Taiwan's agricultural 
policy. The prospects of liberalisation depend in part on domestic structural adjustments, 
while the pressure for liberalisation will certainly intensify the need for restructuring 
agriculture. 
4.3.2 Service Sector 
In addition to agriculture, other sectors such as trade in services not adequately covered by 
the GATT raised important issues. In the late 1980s, the Uruguay Round began to focus on 
the thorny issues of services trade, an area of increasing interest to the United States and other 
countries which had been excluded from earlier negotiations. The rising interest in services is 
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not unjustified. In 1960, industrial countries generated 40% of their GDP in manufacturing 
and 54% in services; in 1986, manufacturing contributed 36% and services 61%. For 
developing countries, in 1960 agriculture accounted for 34% of their GDP and services 
40%; in 1986, agriculture contributed 18% and services 48% (Nicolaides 1989,19). World- 
wide, the services sector is not only large--roughly 19 percent of global trade is in these 
services, amounting to $810 billion annually--it is an extremely heterogeneous mixture of 
industries, comprising telecommunications, aviation, banking, securities, insurance, tourism, 
management consulting, shipping, packing, construction and engineering, accounting, 
advertising, legal services, audio-visual services, and data processing and so forth (GATT 
1992). 
Services, or invisibles, differ from goods in that they can not be stored, and therefore require 
some form of direct relationship between the buyer and seller. Due to being intangible, "ser- 
vices are therefore subject to more than the usual problems encountered in measuring the 
volume and terms of trade, in some cases, it is difficult to determine even whether the trade is 
taking place" (McCulloch 1990,335). As the economies of the developed countries matured, 
services came to play an even greater role in the production and distribution of goods. 
Governments have long regulated many of their domestic service industries--insurance, 
banking and financial services. Often differing dramatically from country to country, these 
regulations have become one of the most politically contentious barriers to trade. Frequently, 
such regulations discriminate against foreign services providers by denying access to national 
markets or by imposing constraints on activities of foreign firms operating in domestic 
markets. "Such barriers include discriminatory treatment of foreign firms in licensing and 
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taxation; policies through which a section of the market is reserved for domestic industry; 
investment requirements; and government monopolies" (Spero 1990,90). The most 
commonly encountered obstacles to trade in financial services are set out in Table 4.5. 
Table 4-5 
Obstacles to International Trade in Banking 
1. Obstacles related to establishment in a country 
Complete prohibition 
Prohibition for other than representative offices 
Restriction on equity participation in domestic banks 
Prohibition of establishment of branches 
2. Obstacles related to operating conditions 
Discriminatory reserve requirements 
Discriminatory capital asset ratios 
Discriminatory taxation 
Restriction on nationality of board membership 
Special requirements of local supervising authorities 
Special taxes 
3. Obstacles related to competing for business 
Limitations on government deposits 
Discriminatory access to subsidised or guaranteed credits for specific purposes 
Limitations on access to central bank discount facilities 
Restriction on acquisition of securities and other assets such as land or buildings 
Limitation on types of services offered 
Restrictions on local retail banking 
Restrictions on participation in the securities sector 
4. Obstacles not primarily related to banking services 
Foreign exchange controls 
Restrictions on transborder data flows 
Limitations on working permits 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: International Chamber of Commerce, quoted in Lanvin 1993,266. 
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Service sectors in Taiwan have been considered as much related with social and national 
security, hence, foreign firms are nearly barred from participation. However, the situation 
would be completely different after entering the WTO. Further opening of markets and 
greater competition will reduce prices and boost productivity. According to an estimate made 
by the Council of Economic Planning, annual growth in services will reach 7.4% between 
1993 and 2000, which will exceed industrial and macro-economic annual growth (Ching-chi 
jih-pao, April 15,1993). 
Services are an area of significance in Taiwan's negotiations, not only because they have 
become increasingly important in the Uruguay Round, but also because Taiwan's economy is 
an attractive market. The ambitious infrastructural projects in the Six Year Development Plan 
have attracted the attention of engineering, consulting and architectural firms, who would like 
to offer their services. In addition, services such as telecommunications, insurance, and 
banking must be opened to international competition. 
Taiwan's financial system still remains greatly underdeveloped, characterised by outdated 
financial practices and government controls of day-to-day operations. "Credit rationing, 
collateral requirements, and selective credit controls are widely practised by financial 
intermediaries" (Koves & Marer 1991,157-8). Entry to financial industries is strictly 
regulated, and most of the major domestic banks are government owned. Guidelines 
approved by Taiwan authorities in 1983 provide that any foreign bank that applies to open a 
new branch should have business connections with local banks for at least ten years and have 
transacted at least $1 billion of business with Taiwan banks or firms during the three years 
leading up to their application, of which at least $180 million must have involved the granting 
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of medium-term or long-term credits. No more than a total of two such branches may be 
established in any given year. Approvals for foreign branches or representative offices are 
granted only for Taipei and the port city of Kaohsiung. Foreign branches may take deposits 
with maturities of less than six months, make loans and discounts, issue letters of credit, 
underwrite, deal and invest in securities and transact foreign exchange business as decided by 
the Ministry of Finance, with an emphasis on commercial and industrial clients (Ministry of 
Finance 1983). 
Entering the WTO would bring heavy pressure to open Taiwan's financial markets. 
Restrictions on the establishment and operation of foreign banks and other financial institu- 
tions would be liberalised. Hence, future open policy will not only concern emigrants, 
investment and foreign-exchange, but also have the most essential impact on local financial 
businessmen and markets. The greatest possible impact on the financial sector would be a 
reduction in lending rates because capital mobility between Taiwan and other countries would 
be more convenient. Taiwan's efforts to promote the internationalisation of the financial 
sector should minimise possible damage. In fact, the US already imposes pressure on Taiwan 
to open up its financial markets and would likely continue to do so even if Taiwan did not 
join the WTO. A good example is the intellectual property rights talks between Taiwan and 
the US in April, 1993 forced Taiwan to yield to the most unfavourable requests raised by the 
US just the day before the US imposed retaliation. 
4.3.3 Industrial Sector 
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On the industrial side, the auto industry will suffer the most severe impact of WTO 
membership. The most difficult task would be the elimination of quantitative restrictions, 
especially those based on the country of a product's origin which were discriminatory in 
nature. In responding to US pressures for import liberalisation Taiwan had loosened 
restrictions on American goods while retaining tighter limits on import from other sources. In 
1989 imports of small saloons from Japan were banned, for example, and small car imports 
from Korea were subject to quota, while no quantitative limits were levied on automobile 
imports from the US and Europe. 
The United States has asked the ROC to cut automobile tariffs in half, to 15 percent (Chung- 
kuo shih-pao, May 19,1994), a level that many domestic automobile manufacturers believe 
will cause extensive bankruptcies in the industry. There will also be strong pressure to 
remove the ban on imports of Japanese-made cars. Imported automobiles accounted for 33 
percent of the island's market in 1993, up from 30 percent in 1992 and 24 percent in 1991. 
This increase follows a reduction of the tariff on autos from 42.5 percent to 30 percent, which 
is already relatively low, compared with the PRC, Malaysia and other countries, where duties 
range between 140 percent and 300 percent (Free China Journal, May 13,1994). 
The auto is subject to restrictive trade policy measures in a number of OECD countries, 
some of which are long standing. The types of trade restricting measures which exist include 
tariff quotas, quantitative restrictions, voluntary export restraints (VERs), measures to 
monitor imports and technical requirements. To protect the auto industry, the government 
could plan gradually to open Taiwan's car market by signing VERs agreements with member 
states of the GATT. WERs generally arise as a result of pressure or requests from an 
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importing country for the exporting country to limit its exports of specific products" (Willig 
1987,30). Such VERs will enable more countries to export automobiles to Taiwan--in 
restricted numbers, however. 
Since the island's auto industry is still developing, it is not feasible to open fully the market 
to foreign competition all at once. A hasty opening would flood the market with imports, 
causing many local auto industry workers to lose their jobs. Nevertheless the opening of the 
market to all foreign products on equal terms could be phased in over a period of time in 
order to minimise the impact and allow the domestic industry time to adjust. 
Since there is little room for a further reduction of Taiwan's auto tariff, the VER method is 
the most workable one for gradually opening the domestic market. By adopting the VER 
method, the ROC could show its sincerity about bringing economic policies in line with 
GATT principles. 
4.3.4 Intellectual Property Rights 
Intellectual property rights (IPRs) have become an area of international interest and 
controversy as the rate and cost of technological progress have increased, and as national 
borders have become ever more transparent. Disagreements have arisen not only over the 
mechanics of granting such rights, but even over the validity and merits of certain 
fundamental concepts concerning 1PRs. For example, there are those who argue that the 
existence of robust IPR laws speeds up innovation, and beneficially influences the economic 
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future of companies and nations. Others argue that such laws are economically inefficient 
and exploitative, and that they are harmful to the development of emerging nations. 
Much of the recent concern has focused on the developing world, particularly on the so- 
called newly industrialised countries (NICs), where patent and copyright laws have been 
weak or, in some cases, non-existent. In an effort to accelerate their rate of economic 
development and increase their level of wealth in the short term, some governments have, for 
example, conveniently looked the other way when products or technologies are copied or 
used without permission. Many of these governments argue that some degree of protection 
from the need to pay for the use of ideas or technologies developed elsewhere is required if 
they are successfully to promote the maturation of so-called infant industries, whereas others 
contend that their countries cannot afford to pay the monopoly prices charged for technology 
protected by IPRs. 
As a result of these concerns, EPR issues have been elevated to high political levels within 
the Group of Seven (G-7) advanced industrialised countries, and have also been a major point 
of discussion (and disagreement) in the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations within the 
GATT. In 1988, the US International Trade Commission published a study focusing on the 
economic effects of weak EPR protection. World-wide losses were estimated at US$23-8 
billion in 1986 (Jussawalla 1992,46). 
The danger posed by inadequate IPR protection is that economic losses suffered by 
innovating firms could lead to a reduction in the rate of industrial innovation in the techno- 
logically advanced countries capable of generating innovations. A lower rate of innovation 
could, in turn, result in slower world economic growth, which would hurt all countries. 
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Despite this argument, however, NICs and less developed countries that might benefit from 
more robust world economic growth have been reluctant to accept the premise that stronger 
IPR protection is in their long-term national interest. 
The protection of IPR has long been a thorn in the side of bilateral relations between Taiwan 
and the United States. In fact, the US began to raise questions about Taiwan's violation of 
patent, trademark, and patent rights as early as 1982. These violations became so flagrant in 
1992 that Taiwan was one of three countries in the world identified for retaliation with trade 
sanctions under Section 301 of the US Omnibus Trade Act of 1988. It was estimated that 
losses from unchecked piracy of computer software cost companies in the US US$585 
million dollars (Far Eastern Economic Review, April 8,1993). Further, Taiwan's booming 
cable TV industry, its popular and profitable MTV and Karaoke houses, have increased the 
temptation to use pirated movies, tapes, and discs. Intellectual property is of particular 
importance to the Clinton Administration. Moreover, US businessmen are exerting heavy 
pressure on both the Clinton Administration and on the Congress to encourage Taiwan to 
respect IPR. 
In Taiwan, foreign firms have claimed that patent protection for chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals has been inadequate and that there has been no unfair competition law 
dealing with false advertising, imitative product packaging, and inaccurate marks of origin. 
Taiwan has begun to take action against IPR violators. In 1986, a revised patent law was 
passed that extends full patent protection to chemical and pharmaceutical products. Also, 
firms unregistered in Taiwan can pursue trademark infringement cases in local courts, and 
copyright protection has been extended to computer software. In 1991, a new Fair Trade Law 
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was enacted, which provides for protection of trade secrets. The Legislative Yuan agreed to 
many of the articles of the IPR pact with the United States and passed copyright legislation in 
1993. The Legislative Yuan has also completed a review of its patent and trademark laws, 
and drafting work has been done on laws to protect semi-conductor chips, industrial designs 
and movies shown over cable TV. Taiwan is clearly making progress, however, a country on 
the list for retaliatory action or watching list is far from meeting the requirements for GATT 
accession. Thus more efforts are required. 
4.3.5 Transparency 
The last area of concern is the transparency of Taiwan's trade regime. To date Taiwan has 
relied on an informal and largely unmodified set of understandings between individuals to 
regulate its trade. Its relatively homogeneous society and common culture has enabled it to 
succeed using this informal method. However, the WTO requires that laws governing all 
aspects of trade be clearly codified and, therefore, transparent so all international players can 
read and play by the same rules. Taiwan wants a transitional period in which to codify its 
laws that could take place after its accession. Many WTO members, including the United 
States, want to require transparency as a condition for accession. 
Adjustments will also have to be made to existing economic and trade policies. For 
instance, the ROC government will have to adopt an open procurement process for state-run 
enterprises, allowing foreign firms to enter this huge market, annually worth an estimated 
US$11.5 billion (Lian-ho-pao, February 26,1994). Currently, the government often gives 
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priority bidding status to local or US companies. Likewise, the monopoly system for sales of 
tobacco products and alcoholic beverages will have to be abandoned. Monopoly sales 
currently generate US$2.3 billion for the government each year (Chung-kuo shih-pao, January 
18,1994). Finally, the government would have to remove existing restrictions on foreign 
investments, abolish duties on harbour construction, and revise restrictions on domestic sales 
by manufacturers in export-processing zones. 
4.4 The Impact of Taiwan's GATT Bid on Cross-Strait Relations 
In Taiwan, the application for accession to GATT aroused concern about the impact for both 
the ROC and the PRC on cross-Strait economic and political relations. At present, 
production in Taiwan and mainland China is complementary, but the island's labour-intensive 
industries would be sure to suffer from any further liberalisation of mainland China's foreign 
trade and development of labour-intensive production. As a WTO member, the PRC will not 
only enjoy MFN status but even secure WTO-sanctioned Generalised System Preference 
(GSP) benefits from the developed countries. These favourable conditions would be sure to 
attract more investment from Taiwan. Instead of complementing each other, the two sides 
would become competitors. 
Lifting the present ban on imports from mainland China would also affect the structure of 
Taiwan's production. For example, the Final Act required GATT members to open their 
markets to imports of agricultural products. As a WTO member, Taiwan would have to deal 
with the results of an influx of cheap farm products from mainland China (Shih 1993,219- 
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52). In general, Taiwan's trade dependence on mainland China would increase tremendously, 
and it is estimated that by 1998, mainland China would account for as much as 20 percent of 
Taiwan's total imports, compared to 1.4 percent in 1993. Of this 20 percent, capital-intensive 
products would likely account for approximately 4 percent and labour-intensive products for 
the remaining 16 percent (Lian-ho-pao, August 1,1994). 
There would also be advantages for Taiwan if both sides of the Strait were to admitted to the 
WTO. Taiwan's service sector, for example, which is well-capitalised and innovative, can 
expect to benefit from the opening up of the mainland market in such areas as banking, 
transportation, and communications. Nonetheless, Taiwan will also encounter strong 
competition from Europe, the United States, and Japan in this area. Consumers will also 
benefit from lower prices as a result of the abolition of tariff and non-tariff barriers. In 
addition, if both sides of the Strait join the WTO, it will be easier for them to solve their long- 
standing dispute over IPRs in line with the relevant WTO agreement. 
In comparison, the political issues which Taipei will face are much more complicated. 
According to the Guidelines for National Unification formulated by Taipei in February 1991, 
relations between the two sides have not yet reached the stage at which official channels of 
communication between Peking and Taipei can be opened. This will present a problem 
should the two sides gain admittance to the WTO, which requires contracting parties to hold 
direct trade negotiations. 
Once both Taiwan and PRC become WTO contracting parties, the indirect trade currently 
between them will emerge as an issue of controversy. Because according to the rules of rights 
and obligations, there will be "no discrimination among contracting parties and should 
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provide the most-favoured-countries treatment" (Gilpin 1987,19 1). Therefore, the future 
official contacts and negotiations between both sides will be inevitably involved. The 
indirect type of trade will face a severe trial. Also it will pose big challenges to the three 
exchanges, namely commercial, communication and navigation and flight exchanges 
proposed by Peking; and the three no's, namely no dialogue, no negotiations and no 
compromise which was the response from Taipei. Putting aside the problem of direct 
negotiations, WTO membership would be beneficial to both sides of the Taiwan Strait as it 
would provide them with an opportunity to build up a fair and free trade and solve their 
existing economic and trade problems. 
Conclusion 
In Chapter 4, we considered the economic dimension of Taiwan's security. WTO (GATT) 
was used as a case study, and the implications of membership for the government and the 
economy of Taiwan were examined. Why is Taiwan aggressively attempting to join or rejoin 
the world's major international organisations-including the GATT (now the WTO), the IMF, 
and the United Nations? What does it hope to gain from membership in these institutions? 
As with any initiative, many questions have been raised. As an island state that also happens 
to be one of the world's largest traders, Taiwan is heavily dependent on international 
commerce for its survival. While Taiwan's economy is thriving it is important that it 
participates in the international economic organisations (IEOs), in order to obtain fair and 
reciprocal treatment with its trade partners who are members. 
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But today the majority of the world's intergovernmental economic organisations do not 
recognise Taiwan. Indeed, forthe major EEOs Taiwan officially does not exist. Rather than 
admit it in any capacity, these organisations have ignored economic realities and have yielded 
to political pressures from Peking to force the international community to make a choice 
between itself and Taipei. The continuing efforts by Peking to blackball Taipei have 
politicised the process of Taiwan's entrance into such organisations. Because the great 
majority of the nations that belong to the EEOs maintain formal diplomatic ties with the PRC, 
they bow to the PRC's efforts to block Taiwan's membership. For Taiwan, this has meant 
increasing isolation not only from the established venues of international decision-making, 
but also from much of the normal political dialogue among nations. 
One of the strong desires for Taiwan to enter the WTO is that Taiwan's economic 
development was threatened by the imbalance between its obligations and its rights in foreign 
trade. In recent years, the island has encountered growing pressure from its trade partners, 
mainly the United States, to abide by GATT's liberal principles and to open up its domestic 
markets, liberalise import procedures, allow greater access to the domestic economy, 
modernise the financial framework of the nation, and further revalue the currency. Most of 
the concessions granted by Taiwan to the United States have also been extended to other trade 
partners. However, while Taiwan was abiding by many of the rules of GATT like a GATT 
member, it did not have a GATT member's rights and thus could not enjoy the benefits and 
privileges of GATT membership. Therefore, Taiwan has always been in a passive position 
and has to yield frequently to pressures in relation to trade retaliations. Besides, Taiwan 
could not take advantage of GATT rules to defend itself against excessive requests and unfair 
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trade practices from its trade partners such the US. Hence, with its economy heavily 
dependent on trade, Taiwan must seek to join the world's largest trade promoting agency if it 
wants to better protect its economic interests in the international arena. Recognition in the 
major EEOs would also provide Taiwan with more extensive diplomatic help to defend its 
economic gains. Membership in world economic and trade organisations would allow 
Taiwan to work through multilateral channels and international arbitration to gain reasonable 
treatment and ensure Taiwan's economic interests. 
After decades of rapid economic development, Taiwan's economy is now at a cross-roads. 
To continue developing, it must carry out a fundamental structural transformation. Despite 
the pain and dislocation it will cause, WTO membership will accelerate the island's progress 
toward the goal. Aggressive anti-protectionism is the best way for Taiwan to acquire the 
political capital that it needs to accede to WTO. And trade liberalisation would be the only 
and the best way for Taiwan to defend itself against other countries' protectionist measures 
and proposing a timetable would help convey its willingness to liberalise its trade. 
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Chapter 5 
The Cross-Strait Arms Race and 
Major Constraints on the ROC's Military Modernisation 
After analysing the various dimensions of security, in this chapter we will further explore 
the the main variable affecting Taiwan's future security, i. e., the cross-Strait arms race and 
major constraints on Taiwan's military modernisation. We first consider the PRC's arms 
build-up as the primary impetus for Taiwan's military modernisation. We take an overview 
of the evolution of Taiwan's military modernisation from complete reliance on US as sole 
arms supplier to seeking for autonomy in weapons supply through indigenous research, 
development and production. We then seek to test whether the much cited negative defence 
spending effect on economic development and social welfare found in most countries is valid 
in Taiwan's context. Our new results, in contrast to evidence about the impact upon other 
countries, suggest that Taiwan presents a deviant case to the cross-national generalisations 
about the relationships among defence burden, economic performance, and social welfare. 
Judging from a global point of view, one of the main characteristics of the post-Cold War 
era has been arms reduction and the easing of international tension. The superpowers have 
taken steps to eliminate arms production and proliferation. Some nations such as the United 
Kingdom (Financial Times, February 10,1993) and Germany (The Economist, February 13- 
19,1993) have announced unilateral cuts in military forces and defence spending. However, 
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states like the ROC and the PRC, on the contrary, have increased their defence expenditures, 
and launched major efforts to acquire advanced weapons and the technologies for domestic 
arms production. In its proposal to parliament, the ROC Defence Ministry issued a draft 
military budget of NT$280.0 billion (US$10.6 billion) for the 1996/97 financial year (China 
Post, February 26,1996). If approved by the Legislature, it would represent the most money 
Taiwan has spent on defence in any single year since 1949. This is not be surprising if we 
simply look back to Taiwan in the 1980s. 
The 1980s were a tough decade for Taiwan's efforts to keep pace with military 
developments, a challenge Taipei has met through local production supported by overseas 
technology and substantial investment. Prior to 1979, Taiwan was for 25 years under the 
protective umbrella of a defence treaty with the USA. Washington's diplomatic recognition 
of the PRC in that year saw this replaced by the Taiwan Relations Act. However, Peking then 
pressured the US into quantitative and qualitative reductions in arrns exports to Taiwan. 
This constraint produced a 12-year delay in gaining Washington's approval for the sale to 
Taiwan of F-16 fighters, a key requirement finally met in 1992. The result was a Taiwanese 
air force of less than 300 ageing combat aircraft. The navy, meanwhile, was denied 
replacements for its old frigates and updated systems for its destroyers. 
The 1990s have so far seen the collapse of the Soviet Union and double-digit growth in the 
PRC. One consequence of this has been Moscow's emergence as a key supplier to Peking of 
advanced military equipment and technology. This has promoted some observers to talk of 
the "awakening of the dragon": a reference to Peking's growing importance as a market as 
well as to its expanding military capabilities. Both have a significant bearing on Taiwan's 
security. 
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Militarily, the primary strategy to counter such a threat is centred on efforts to increase the 
defence budget and enhance Taiwan's military might. Bolstered by its growing wealth, 
Taiwan has increased its defence spending and strengthened its defence hardware through 
both acquisition of foreign weapons and its indigenous effort in research and development, 
production, and deployment. Taiwan's current military acquisition program, launched in the 
early 1980s, should see an estimated $30 billion spent on procuring new weaponry by the end 
of the century (Chung-kuo shih-pao, January 10,1995). The key characteristic of this 
modernisation program is Taiwan's effort to intemationalise procurement and lessen its 
traditional heavy reliance on US equipment. This trend is particularly evident in the navy. 
The end of the Cold War is a major factor, since it has helped both to create a buyer's market 
for military equipment and ease some political constraints. Such constraints have in the past 
hindered Taiwan's efforts to buy military systems from foreign suppliers. However, 
diplomatic problems still present a challenge, as many nations continue to be influenced by 
Peking's pressure to halt the sale to Taiwan of advanced weaponry. 
This chapter will try to answer the following questions: (1) What are the main motives 
driving Taiwan's accelerated military modemisation? (2) Will Taiwan be able to break 
through Peking's blockade and procure the weaponry needed for defence? (3) Will the 
economy of Taiwan be able to sustain such a huge amount of defence expenditure? (4) Will 
the armed forces be able to recruit and retain an adequate number of skilled military 
personnel for the advanced and sophisticated weapons procured? and (5) What will be the 
potential impact of the arms race on Taiwan Strait stability? 
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5.1 The Primary Impetus of Taiwan's Military Modernisation: 
The Threat of the PRC's Arms Build-up 
While modemisation of the PRC's national defence was originally the lowest priority among 
the "four modernisations" outlined in the 1980s by Teng Hsiao-ping and is reputed to remain 
in the fourth place, it has been stepped up since 1985 and has received greater emphasis in 
recent years. At that time, Peking's ultimate aim was to become a major power that could 
militarily contend with the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France in the twenty- 
first century. It made preparations to qualify as a real player in the strategic triangle and gain 
a certain freedom of action and a decisive influence on Asian affairs. In the early 1990s, the 
decline of the PRC's strategic importance after the disintegration of the Soviet Union has 
forced Peking to switch the focus of its strategy from the global theatre to the Asia-Pacific 
region. Peking, however, still wants to play the role of a big power. 
In order to become a big power with decisive influence on regional affairs or fully to play its 
part in the emerging multipolar world, Peking needs to be backed by solid military strength. 
Peking, therefore, wants greatly to increase its military power in the 1990s and beyond. Now 
that the Soviet Union has disintegrated and the PRC is free from any significant military 
threat, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) deems this to be a favourable opportunity to 
implement its own modernisation programs and procurement plans. 
The general objective of Peking's strategy is to have the capability for strategic initiative in 
the Asia-Pacific region. The acquisition of this ability will not only consolidate Peking's 
international standing, but will also alleviate its concerns about national security and 
territorial integrity, including the "peaceful evolution" menace from the West, the separatist 
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trend among minor nationalities, the development of the Taiwan independence movement, 
the sovereignty dispute over the South China Sea, and the potential threat from Japanese 
militarism. The best way to ensure this is to increase its military strength and promote 
modernisation. 
In reality, Peking's national defence modernisation efforts have two objectives: military 
deterrence and preparing for local wars. Considering Peking's recent emphasis on peace and 
development, the foremost objective is deterrence. Since the 1980s, Peking has emphasised 
that the fundamental national defence task in peacetime is to prevent possible wars through 
deterrence (Chen 1987,93). Peking believes that a deterrent force should have both relatively 
strong defence and attack capabilities. Such a dual deterrence can ensure better control of a 
situation and can better prevent enemies from starting wars. 
To build up a strong military deterrent force, Peking began to reform its national defence 
system in 1985. The policy of achieving military superiority by maintaining a large number 
of troops was abandoned. Measures were taken to improve the structure of the PLA and to 
enlarge and update its weaponry. 
5.1.1 Defence Budget 
Reversing a declining trend since 1979, the PRC's defence budget has grown continuously 
since 1989 with an increase of 13% in that year, and up to 21.2 in 1995, (see Table 6.1), or a 
net increase of 66% since 1988, in spite of the fact that the Soviet threat has disappeared, and 
other borders seem peaceful. 
206 
But these official figures understate real expenditures or income, since they do not include 
some capital expenditures, or research and development or a good deal of procurement or, on 
the other hand, income from arms sales abroad or that from army-owned factories. Most 
analysts estimate that the actual budget is double the stated amount (Far Eastern Economic 
Review, February 19,1994). Many reasons have been offered for this increase in defence 
outlays. The Chinese explain it away by citing a variety of reasons: the need to raise military 
standards of living; increased pay and benefits; an attempt to keep up with inflation; and the 
need to modernise a sorely outdated military force after years of neglect. Given Peking's 
robust economic growth, further expansion of defence expenditure should encounter few 
constraints. 
Table 5-1 
PRC Defence Expenditures in Billion Yuan 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Defence 20.0 20.9 21.8 25.1 29.0 32.5 37.0 42.5 54.0 63.9 69.8 
Expenditure 
% of Budget 8.8 8.6 8.2 8.3 8.6 9.10 10.0 13.5 10.0 10.0 na 
Increase M 4.8 4.4 4.0 13.3 15.4 12.0 13.9 21.0 21.2 14.6 10.6 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: The Military Balance 1987-1995, London: IISS. 
SIPRI Year Book 1987-1995, Oxford University Press. 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 1994. "Balancing the Books", February 19. 
Chung-yang jih-pao, March 6,1995. 
Lien-ho-pao, February 28,1996. 
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5.1.2 Ground Force 
The PLA ground force is the world's largest at 2.3 million, despite the 1985-87 reduction of 
one million in overall PLA manpower. For this reason alone, the modernisation of the PLA 
Army ought to be, and has been, very selective. Due to short funding, the army holds the 
lowest priority. A series of efforts has been made to streamline overlapping structures and 
downsize or reorganise the various units across the branches. The objective of this troop 
reduction is to economise defence expenditures, and to increase the number of combined 
armies to raise the PLA's combat effectiveness. One important change has been to combine 
the armoured forces, the artillery, the anti-chemical warfare forces, and the engineering corps 
directly under the PLA General Staff Headquarters into a Special Forces Department (Ikuo 
1992,2). Rapid deployment forces, consisting of combined armies established under various 
military regions since 1989, will be further expanded to improve the PLA's ability to deal 
with unexpected events. Military training has been intensified at all levels to incorporate the 
requirements of modem warfare: enhanced mobility, skills, and co-ordination. 
During the last decade the PLA ground force has gradually added some modem weaponry 
and military equipment to its huge inventory. Due largely to the lack of available funds for 
the upgrade of its obsolescent weaponry, however, no significant breakthroughs have been 
achieved. The PLA ground force's 1994-1995 inventory of major weapon systems and 
equipment is as follows (The Military Balance 1994-1995,17 1). 
Tanks: A total of over 12,000, including about 8,000 main battle tanks (MBTs) and 2,000 
light tanks. Most of the MBTs are T-59s and T-69s. 
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Armoured Fighting Vehicles: Over 3,000 pieces, including 2,800 Type-531 armoured 
personnel carriers (APCs). 
Artillery Pieces: The PLA ground force has an outmoded, but huge inventory of howitzers, 
multi-launch rocket systems (MLRSs), anti-tank weapons and anti-aircraft (AA) guns. 
Among the 14,500 towed artillery pieces, most are the older Types 54,59,50 and 66. A 
recent improvement in self-propelled (SP) artillery is reported, including the largest and the 
latest 203 mm. SP howitzers, the 155 mm SP gun/howitzer, and the indigenous 122 mm 
Type 54-1 SP howitzer. 
Among the 4,000 MLRSs the PLA has been able to add some new ones, Types 83 and 85, as 
well as those for some special purposes such as minelaying and mine clearance. There are 
also over 15,000 air defence guns, but the PLA is relatively behind in AA and anti-tank guns. 
On balance, the main feature of the ground force's modernisation has been streamlined 
organisation, a relatively improved command and control system, and better training for 
soldiers. These efforts, together with the creation of combined-arms units, are geared to 
strengthen the mobility and operational co-ordination in preparation for small-scale, low 
intensity warfare along border areas. 
5.1.3 Navy 
The PLA Navy (PLAN) has received special attention since defence modernisation efforts 
began in earnest in the early 1980s. This partly reflects not only the easing of tensions along 
the Sino-Soviet border but also constitutes long-term planning by Chinese security planners 
to develop a real blue-water navy. The virtual dissipation of the land force requirement on 
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the Sino-Soviet border has allowed them to divert limited resources to secure its maritime 
interests: a long-term PRC goal of a deep-water navy, its 200 nautical-mile Exclusive 
Economic Zone, and its sovereignty over disputed island groups and territorial waters such as 
the Paracel and the Spratly islands in the South China Sea. 
The PLAN has a troop level of 360,000 and is organised into three fleets-East, South, and 
North Sea Fleets-as well as submarine, marine corps, and naval aviation units. A large fleet 
of medium-sized ships is the mainstay of the PLAN fighting force. Principal surface 
combatants consist of 19 destroyers, mostly in the Luda class, and 37 Jianghu, Jiangdong, 
Jiangnan, and Chengdu frigates. Patrol and coastal combatants, totalling about 900, include: 
217 missile craft, some 160 torpedo craft, and around 500 patrol craft. The PLAN's 
submarine fleet comprises about 100, including two strategic missile, five Han-class attack, 
and 84 Romeo-class submarines (The Military Balance 1994-1995,171-3). The most recent 
introduction of new classes of resupply vessel and LSM (amphibious assault ship) reinforces 
the view that the PLAN is decidedly pursuing a blue-water capability. These new vessel 
classes include: the Dayun-class resupply ship, the new LSM, the Luhu-class destroyer, 
Jiangwei-class missile frigate, Houxin-and Houjian-class FAC and the Huludao-class coastal 
patrol craft. 
The PLAN's continuing efforts to acquire an aircraft carrier are well-known. The recent 
PLAN procurement of helicopters and in-flight refuelling systems could well be part of the 
PRC's grand naval plan looking beyond the year 2000. In February 1992, the Jane's Defence 
Weekly reported that the PRC, as well as India, was negotiating the purchase of the 67,500- 
ton Varyag, a sister ship of the carrier Kuznetsov (Jane's Defence Weekly, February 8,1992, 
18 1). If armed with Russian naval versions of the Su-27 FLANKER or MiG-29 FULCRUM 
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fighter aircraft, the purchase would have significantly augmented the PLA's power projection 
capability and certainly upset the naval power balance in Asia. 
The acquisition of an aircraft carrier would enable Peking to increase its capability for long- 
distance air operations to the South China Sea and expand its sea power. Without doubt, 
rivalries between the PRC and the Asia-Pacific nations have already shifted from its northern 
border to the sea. In addition, the focus of Peking's current economic development plan is on 
the coastal areas. Because of this, Peking attaches great importance to the expansion of sea 
power. 
However, it seems that the PRC will not be able to afford it. Some experts suggested that 
the selling price for the carrier is approximately $200 million (WuDunn 1992,2). Even if the 
PRC could acquire the carrier for a reasonable price, various factors militate against the 
purchase. Maintenance costs are substantial, and planes capable of taking off and landing on 
its deck would have to be acquired. Additional ships would be needed to form a carrier battle 
group. The need of skilled personnel for putting it on active service all will pose a serious 
financial and technical burden on the PRC. No matter whether or not Peking obtains it in this 
century, its frequent attempts to negotiate arms purchases clearly indicate its intention of 
building up a strong deterrent force. Obviously, Peking has adopted a forward defence 
strategy: by strengthening its air and naval forces, it will expand the defence of its territories 
from the mainland to the islands on the sea and the defence of its territorial waters and air 
space from the coastal to the off-shore areas. 
5.1.4 Air Force 
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The modernisation of the PLAAF has also resulted in massive manpower reduction, 
reorganisation and the merger of numerous research institutes and training schools on a scale 
similar to the other services of the PLA. Now that the possibility of a massive Soviet land 
attack is virtually gone, however, it is the PLAAF that would make possible the PRC's new 
military objectives of rapid response, mobility and close air cover in future conflicts. 
The PLAAF has a total inventory of some 5,500 aircraft of varying types. This includes 120 
Tu-16 (H-6) (some may be nuclear-capable) bombers, about 4,000 fighters, some 600 
transport, and more than 400 helicopters. In addition, there are over 1,500 trainers (The 
Military Balance 1994-1995,173) 
The well-publicised purchase of 24 Su-27 Flanker fighter from Russia will significantly 
strengthen the PLAAF's power projection capability. Despite its defence role in original 
design, it can be converted into a multi-role combat/attack version. It has a combat range of 
1,500 kin. and has enough fuel capacity for a range over 4,000 km (Chung-yang jih-pao, 
April 10,1995). Given the 1,000 km between an airbase on Hainan Island and the Spratly 
Islands, it would greatly enhance PLAAF air cover in a contingency situation. 
In addition, the PLA has long been interested in acquiring the Su-25 Frogfoot ground attack 
and the MiG-29 Fulcrum air craft that Iraqi pilots flew to Iran during the Gulf War (Tyson 
1991,7). It has also acquired an in-flight refuelling system and some of the A-5 and F-8 
aircraft are equipped with such kits (Kristov 1992,2). This in-flight refuelling capability will 
also substantially increase the PLAAF's operational flexibility. It will be able to extend the 
radius of its air operations to the South China Sea, and gradually to establish air control over 
Taiwan, Vietnam, and ASEAN countries. The Russians also sold the Chinese one hundred 
RD-33 jet engines (used in the supersonic Russian MiG-29) for use in upgrading the PRC's 
indigenously-produced fighters (Jane's Defence Weekly, February 19,1994). Other deals 
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rumoured to be under discussion include the acquisition of another 70 Flankers, 50 Mach-3 
MiG-31 high-altitude interceptors, additional Kilo-class submarines, and an undisclosed 
number of Tu-26 Backfire long-range bombers (Richardson 1993,11). Armed with anti- 
shipping cruise missiles, the Backfires would be a serious threat to shipping as far south as 
the Malacca Straits. 
Peking's efforts to purchase advanced fighters clearly indicate that gaining air control is the 
foremost objective of its defence modemisation plan. Back in the 1980s, some PLA analysts 
believed that conventional wars in the future may possibly be triphibious ones with emphasis 
on air control. They concluded that in order to achieve air control, the PLA should organise a 
highly-combined triphibious army (Chen 1987,217-8). This concept has been further 
reinforced particularly after the lessons learned from the most sophisticated and advanced 
weapons used by US forces in the Desert Storm Operation during the Gulf War against Iraq. 
To sum up, PRC military modernisation efforts have paid off in terms of streamlined 
organisations and better weapons. In conjunction with its new strategy for peripheral defence 
the PLA has achieved improved mobile, rapid response capabilities geared to requirements of 
the small-scale, limited combat theatre. The resumption of Western and Russian military ties 
will also augment the PLA's naval and air power projection capabilities, which will have 
significant implications for the other Northeast Asian nations and could adversely affect the 
regional balance of power. 
5.2 The Evolution of Taiwan's Military Modernisation 
5.2.1 Heavy Reliance on US as Sole Arms Supplier 
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Right after the withdrawal of the Nationalist Government from Mainland to Taiwan, for a 
brief period, the US government showed indifference to the fate of the people on Taiwan and 
adopted a hands-off policy (see Chapter 1). It was only after the outbreak of the Korean War 
in 1950, that Washington decided to resume protection and support for Taiwan. The US 
Seventh Fleet started to patrol the waters of the Taiwan Straits and some of the most 
advanced fighters were based in central Taiwan. It was also since then that the US has 
become the most important arms supplier to Taiwan. Almost all the arms and equipment 
employed by the nearly five hundred thousand active service men were procured from US, 
"paid for in part through concessional and grant provisions advanced to the ROC until 1974, 
and thereafter with the assistance of military credit, which continued until 1979" (Gregor 
1984,303). In a 1951 National Opinion Research Centre poll, 58 percent of American 
respondents said that the United States should give aid to the Kuomintang to launch a new 
attack on the mainland, while only 24 percent were opposed (Rosen & Jones 1980,13 1). 
However, the policy of arms supply adopted by the US seemed just to meet the requirements 
for Taiwan's self-defence, but was not sufficient for it to initiate an attack against PRC. 
Besides, most of the arms were defensive-oriented rather than offensive. By the beginning of 
the 1970s, there were signs of a US disposition to entertain some kind of rapprochement with 
the PRC in an effort to exploit Sino-Soviet disagreements to the advantage of Western. 
security interests, and it had become increasingly obvious that "the ROC on Taiwan could no 
longer entertain complete confidence in the United States as its defence partner and its sole 
military supplier" (Gregor 1984,303). Since Taiwan has been so isolated internationally, it 
was extremely difficult for Taiwan to find substitutes for the US as an external source of arms 
and equipment except Israel and South Africa. Western countries frequently yielded to 
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pressure and threats from the PRC to lower or sever the official ties. The sale of two 
submarines to Taiwan by Holland was a good example. When Holland agreed to construct 
two submarines for Taiwan, the PRC immediately downgraded relations from full diplomatic 
to liaison office. The cancellation of a sale of 10 submarines to Taiwan by Germany is 
another case in point (Financial Times, January 29,1993). The purchase of 60 Mirage 2000 
fighters and frigates from France has taken a long time to secure due to the PRC's pressure 
and objections. 
In order to recognise the Peking regime, the US terminated full diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan as well as its Mutual-Defence-Treaty, which had provided security for Taiwan for 
twenty years since 1954 and withdrew all US troops stationed on this island. It implied that 
the US was about to abandon Taiwan. As a long-terin faithful friend of Taiwan, the Reagan 
Administration began a slow process of bargaining with Taiwan to sell advanced air- 
superiority fighters such as F-16s. The deal was finally reached at the end of 1992 after ten 
years of hard efforts. Without regular infusions of major military equipment, spare parts, and 
supplies, the defence potential of Taiwan would rapidly be degraded, destabilising the already 
precarious military balance in the Taiwan Strait. Therefore according to Gregor's observation: 
Some mix of the following three basic policies (Taiwan's security policy) seemed 
dictated by looming realities: (a) reliance on 'bottom line' ultimate US assistance in 
a crisis, whether or not foreshadowed by prior US pronouncements; (b) an all-out effort 
at indigenous arms development, even despite the obvious inherent limitations; and (c) 
movement towards reliance on a massive destruction deterrent, either nuclear or chemical, 
which, if combined with a weak conventional posture, would amount implicitly to a first- 
use doctrine, even if not so declared beforehand. (Gregor, Harkavy & Neuman 1986,236). 
However, Taiwan chose the second one, that is to develop and produce its own arms. 
Therefore, Taiwan entered another stage of military modernisation-self-reliance. 
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5.2.2 Seeking for Autonomy in Weapon Supplies 
Krause points out that if arms were traded as purely commercial goods, the pattern of 
production would correspond to the distribution of international comparative advantage, with 
perhaps different suppliers meeting the demands of different market segments. So he asks 
"Why do states develop an independent arms production capability? " (Krause 1992,136). 
It is evident that the most important factor driving Taiwan to produce arms is to seek for 
autonomy, that is, freedom of action from US and in the international arena. This autonomy 
implies a reciprocal decline in the manipulation and control that can be exercised by other 
nations. "For any nation, being in the position of having some other nation choke off needed 
arms supplies in order to get it to alter its behaviour is unacceptable" (Katz 1984,5). "From a 
structural realist perspective, the motive forces driving military spending, arms transfer, and 
arms production are subsidiary elements of Third World states to increase their autonomy 
against the dependence that arises from their weak relative position in the international 
hierarchy of power" (Krause 1992,122). Hence, in a great number of developing countries, 
the drive to be self-sufficient and to reduce the dependence on decision-making in developed 
countries has led to domestic arms production. 
The availability of domestically produced arms is considered a safeguard in a crisis. Not 
only Taiwan, but also countries like Israel, India, Brazil, South Korea and South Africa, have 
either been subjected to actual arms embargoes and constraints, or have had threats of such 
actions made by their suppliers at various points in the past two decades. Their first response 
was to seek other sources of arms. However, to build its own defence industry to support its 
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autonomy is the eventual solution to the problem. It is the reason why "self-sufficiency in 
arms production is given even higher priority than industrialisation in Israel, South Africa 
and, more recently, Taiwan and South Korea" (Wulf 1983,329). 
Though it would seem that the establishment of defence industries may prove to be 
expensive, this has not deterred Taiwan from the development of such industry in order to 
supply at least some of its military requirements by indigenous production. By doing so, 
Taiwan may minimise its dependence on the US which currently holds the main control arms 
supply, and can reduce the risk of the possibility of a US cut in supply. It is a vivid lesson 
that "the extent of Israel's dependence on arms imports and the fact that Israel has typically 
relied only on a single supplier have led to political vulnerability reflected in the sudden 
cessation of the supply of arms and attempts to impose political conditions on Israel" (Mintz 
& Steinberg 1989,150). Therefore, an autonomous defence industry is perceived "to 
strengthen national defence capabilities; to foster independence from foreign suppliers who 
may be unreliable for political reasons; and to be a central element to national sovereignty" 
(Louscher & Schwarz 1989,43). 
After the Reagan Government's decision not to sell Taiwan an advanced fighter aircraft, the 
government on Taiwan determined that it could no longer depend on the United States to sell 
it advanced weapons systems "off the shelf' and it would have to develop the capacity to 
manufacture those weapons itself The underlying objective to manufacture weapons for 
defence was to achieve three goals: control of the territorial air space and approach routes, 
control of the Taiwan Strait plus its sea lanes in case of blockade, and repulsing any 
amphibious assaults. Wherever possible, old weapons systems were to be modernised to 
extend their life span and increase their firepower. But the heart of the program was to 
develop new systems-a fleet of frigates with anti-ship, anti-submarine, and anti-aircraft 
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capabilities; advanced fighter aircraft; modemised main battle tanks; and a range of ground- 
to-air, air-to-air, and anti-ship missiles. 
All these new systems were designed to replace obsolete items in the ROC's inventory that 
will be retired sooner rather than later--frigates for ageing destroyers, fighters for American F- 
104 and F-5E interceptors, and new missiles for Hawks, Nikes, and Sidewinders. In addition, 
Taiwan can produce the weapons it has been unable to purchase from the US--an advanced 
fighter instead of the FX, and the Hsiung Feng-2 antiship missile instead of Harpoon. 
US firms now provide technological assistance, including design and construction, once 
their transfers have been approved by a government review board composed of representa- 
tives of the departments of State and Defence. If the items to be transferred to Taiwan are on 
the munitions control or commodity control lists, US firms must first secure licenses from the 
US government. A key institution in Taiwan for the development of the systems is the Chung 
Shan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST) in Taoyuan, the government's key defence- 
related research and development facility. 
Indeed, it is self-reliance that Taiwan has been pursuing hard, and only through indigenous 
arms production programs that Taiwan will be able to exercise the independent national 
policies that it has. As long as the United States is willing to continue a program of 
technology transfer, as long as the government on Taiwan is able to commit some of its 
human and budgetary resources to the costly effort to build a military-industrial complex, and 
as long as the PRC places a relatively low priority on defence modernisation, the ROC can 
gradually enhance its capacity to deter a PRC attack. Taiwan will also gain the confidence 
that comes from having made that accomplishment. 
For the perception of threat to its national security, the unreliable and insecurity of arms 
supply from US, and the determination to seek for sufficient capabilities for self-defence, 
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autonomy seems to be a better way out for Taiwan. "While on all bases but one--security of 
the sovereign state--arms imports represent the most efficient strategy for national defence, 
most nations will pursue development of indigenous arms industries regardless of their 
ultimate costs" (Arlinghaus 1984,48). It is evident that Taiwan has developed a significant 
arms production capacity in a very short time. However, to ensure a credible defence 
capability against PRC's aggression, Taiwan still needs arms supplies from Western 
countries. Without the arms required for self-defence, the future of Taiwan will be 
unpredictable and dim. 
5.2.3 Current Status of Arms Procurement and Modernisation 
A. Air Force 
Although the end of the Cold War and the demise of communism has removed most fears of 
a renewed ideological and strategic alliance between Peking and Moscow, Russia's assistance 
in ream-ling the PRC has set alarm bells ringing in many neighbouring countries. 
Among the countries most concerned is Taiwan, which sees its security immediately 
affected by Peking's military contacts with Moscow. The cornerstone of Taiwan's military 
deterrence towards Peking has been to maintain a significant qualitative edge in weapons, in 
particular in the air balance. Peking's acquisition of the Su-27s, however, threatens to end 
Taiwan's technological superiority. A Pentagon assessment of the implications of the Su-27 
sale for the air balance across the Taiwan Straits apparently concluded that Taiwan's ageing 
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fleet of F-104 and F-5 fighters were hopelessly outclassed by the introduction of the Russian 
warplanes (Far Eastern Economic Review, June 4,1992). 
Thus, Taipei has been urgently looking to acquire more sophisticated aircraft to offset the 
Su-27s. After several years of unsuccessfully lobbying the US to sell advanced fighter 
aircraft, Taiwan finally met with success in September 1992 when US President George Bush 
decided to sell up to 150 F16 A/B aircraft to Taipei. One of the primary reasons for this 
turnabout in US policy was because of the PRC's acquisition of the Su-27s (Klintworth 1994, 
70). It can also be seen "as an act of American electoral politics ... [and] ... as an attempt to win 
market share that might have otherwise been taken by France" (Segal 1992,1). 
In contrast to Taipei's failure to find any foreign state willing and able to sell them fighters 
in the early 1980s, there are now several possibilities. Notably, Taiwan signed a contract with 
the French to purchase 60 Mirage 2000-5 multi-role fighters. An updated export version of 
the Mirage 2000, the Mirage 2000-5 is due to enter French service in 1995. The deal, worth 
$2.6 billion, includes an option for an additional 40 fighters. Related contracts were signed 
for the Mirage 2000-5's M53-P2 engine; about 500 Mica imaging infrared/active radar-guided 
and 1,000 Magic 2 infrared-guided air combat missiles, and air-to-surface guided weapons 
such as the BGL laser-guided bomb (Kuo-hui suan-chou-kan, March 17-30,1995). 
Two other major purchases involving the air force are the E-2C Hawkeye airborne early 
warning and control aircraft and an electronic warfare aircraft. The former contract, worth 
$700 million, was signed in August 1993 and covers the delivery from 1995 of four aircraft, 
making Taiwan the third country in East Asia (after Japan and Singapore) with this capacity 
(Jane's Defence Weekly, January 22,1994). 
Due to the rise in overseas purchase, the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology has 
begun to shed staff and trim its organisation as its own production falls (Chung-kuo shih-pao, 
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June 13,1994). The Indigenous Defensive Fighter (IDF) is a case in point. The IDF program 
was launched in the early 1980s when Peking's political and diplomatic pressure made it hard 
for Taiwan to purchase advanced aircraft from overseas. Defence Minister Chen Li-an latter 
explained, "We had the money, but nowhere to buy the aircraft" (Free China Journal, 
November 19,1990). Making matters worse, Taipei began to experience difficulties 
obtaining spare parts for its warplanes. 
The IDF was developed by the Aero Industry Development Centre (AIDC), a subsidiary of 
Taiwan's primary defence-related research and development facility, the CSIST. The new 
warplane was unveiled officially on December 12,1988, and military officials announced that 
it would eventually replace Taiwan's ageing stock of more than 80 Lockheed F-104G and 
over 300 Northrop F5E/F aircraft. Estimates of the total cost of the aircraft's research and 
production budget vary. In 1988, sources in Taipei estimated that "the budget for 
development and production of the fighter runs up to US $1 billion" (China Post, December 
12,1988). By 1990, the budget had climbed to US $2.2 billion" (Free China Journal, August 
23,1990). An initial production run of 250 was planned at a further cost of $6 billion, but 
1992 saw the USA at last agree to sell Taipei 150 F16 A/B fighters and 60 Mirage 2000-5 
fighters from France. These breakthrough sales led Taiwan to reduce its order for the less 
sophisticated IDF to 130 aircraft (Chung-yang Jih-pao, October 13,1995). The first IDF 
wing is to be built in 1996 and the production is scheduled to end in 1998. 
B. Navy 
The navy was the weak link in Taiwan's defence, especially with the loss of US military 
guarantees in 1980. Taiwan's -immediate response was to try and buy submarines from 
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Europe. In 1981, it bought two Dutch-built submarines, delivered in 1987-88. Further 
purchases were blocked by Peking's pressure on the Netherlands and other European 
countries. Taiwan also concentrated on upgrading its existing fleet of destroyers and frigates. 
Taiwan currently deploys 24 destroyers--a mix of Gearing, Summer and Fletcher-class ships 
built by the US--as well as nine frigates (The Military Balance, 1994-1995). Admiral Yeh 
Chang-tung, former ROC navy commander-in-chief, has acknowledged that "today they 
average over 45 years in service, and are almost at the stage where they are too old to use" 
(Sinorama 1991,89-90). But Taiwan's dockyards converted most of them into relatively 
modem warships with an extensive refit program that added anti-ship and anti-submarine 
warfare (ASW) missiles, ASW sensors, anti-aircraft missile defence, five-inch gun turrets, 
new electronic systems, ASW helicopters, and new propulsion systems (Ko 1989,65-88). 
Of greater significance is Taiwan's fleet modemisation program. The remainder of this 
decade will see the ROC navy re-equipped with modem US or European-designed frigates 
and submarines. It is perhaps the biggest naval modernisation program in East Asia and will 
significantly upgrade Taiwan's naval capabilities, especially in the area of ASW. 
The first phase in this effort involves construction of eight Cheng Kung class frigates, which 
are based on the US Navy's Perry class. Work on the first of class began in 1990 and the ship 
was commissioned in May 1993 (China Post, May 8,1993). All eight of class are due to be 
operational by 1999 (ROC National Defence Report 1992,156). The last of the class will be 
refitted with an advanced combat system with capabilities similar to the US Aegis system. 
The onboard radar will be able to track up to 300 targets simultaneously and lock on to 16 
(Jane's Defence Weekly, January 22,1994). 
The naval program was supplemented in August 1991 with the purchase from France of six 
3,000-ton La Fayette class frigates at a cost of $1.7 billion (Far Eastem Economic Review, 
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March 19,1992). The first of the class is undergoing trials and in 1993 the French 
Government announced its willingness to sell Taiwan a $2.6 million equipment package 
including combat systems, 100 mm guns, missiles and electronic warfare equipment. 
Thomson-CSF is the prime contractor, but high prices have made Taipei consider other 
sources for some of the equipment required to fit the French frigates. The total bill for the six 
La Fayettes, including fittings, could reach $3 billion. This has forced the navy to abandon 
plans to buy a further 10 ships and turn instead to a smaller vessel, most likely a corvette of 
under 1,500 tons, under a new program now being evaluated. 
Submarines have topped Taiwan's military shopping list since 1980, but efforts to obtain a 
new class of submarine from Germany, or submarine technology from the Netherlands for 
local construction have been unsuccessful. However, despite pressure from Peking, the 
Dutch, French, and German governments are now re-considering their options in the light of 
recent Mirage and F-16 fighter sales. Bonn had hoped to sell its IKIJHDW Type 209 
submarines and Blohm & Voss MEKO 140 or 200 type corvettes to Taiwan to help save 
5,300 jobs in Germany's struggling shipbuilding industry (China Post, September 8,1992). 
The Dutch indicated that if it was good enough for France to sell weapons to Taiwan, they 
might follow suit and allow the Rotterdamse Drrogdok Mij shipyard to sell Walrus-class 
submarines to Taiwan. The alternative was to close the shipyard for lack of orders (Far 
Eastern Economic Review, February 4,1993). 
The navy's current fleet includes four minesweepers from Germany and three second-hand 
Knox class frigates obtained on lease from the USA in 1993. Talks on obtaining a further six 
Knox frigates are due to start soon. Taiwan's navy had 32 major warships during the 1980s. 
By the year 2000 its fleet should comprise 28 major vessels: eight Perry class, six La Fayette 
class and nine Knox class frigates; four modernised Yang class destroyers; and an Italian 
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survey ship. These represent a considerable advance in capability but, as the ships and 
fittings are sourced from so many countries, future logistic support may pose a serious 
problem. 
Army 
In order to maintain its ability to repulse an amphibious invasion, Taiwan began over a 
decade ago to upgrade its nearly obsolete M48A1 main battle tanks (MBT). Over 300 MBTs 
are now believed to have attained the much-improved M48A5 standards. As opposed to the 
M48Al, the M48A5 is powered by a new diesel-driven engine and fitted with modem 
thermal imaging and fire control systems. Fire power has also increased with the installation 
of a 105-mm. gun. 
Army procurements are more modest in comparison with the other services. The service 
planned to invest $1.13 billion in the production of 450 M48H tanks consisting of the M60 
MBT chassis and the M48 turret with improved fire control (ROC National Defence Report 
1992,157). The new MBTs are equipped with a laser rangefinder, infrared night vision 
system, ballistic computer and improved armour protection. The first M48H entered service 
in 1993. The army intends to supplement these with 160 M60A3 MBTs from the USA at a 
cost of $185 million (China News, September 9,1994). 
The army has also bought 42 SuperCobra helicopter gunships and 26 OH-58D 
reconnaissance helicopters from the USA (Jane's Defence Weekly, February 28,1992). 
Deliveries started from April 1993. Beyond this, the army is preparing to purchase up to 
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1,000 APCs. Taiwan's shopping list also includes an unspecified number of 105 mm guns 
and the RITA battlefield communications system (Jane's Defence Weekly, May 22,1993). 
Taiwan is producing versions of several domestically manufactured missiles. In addition to 
the development of a surface-to-surface missile (SSM), the CSIST has developed at least two 
varieties of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and air-to-air missiles (AAMs) and anti-ship 
missiles. The government hopes to become self-sufficient in such weapons. 
The CSIST meanwhile poured $700 million into developing an anti-aircraft missile for the 
army. Production of the resulting Sky Bow missile was budgeted at a further $200 million, 
but the order was cut from nine systems to six when the USA indicated a willingness to sell 
Taiwan its Patriot system (or a variant) for $120 million (Jane's Defence Weekly, January 22, 
1994). 
The enormous volume of procurement spending mentioned above has placed severe pressure 
on Taiwan's defence budget, and this is expected to intensify over the next decade when high 
maintenance costs required to keep the systems at peak capability come into play. The 
Defence Ministry is consequently looking to produce savings and has already planned 
manning level cutbacks from the current 470.000 to 400,000: a 15 percent cut over 10 years 
(Chung-yang Ah-pao, October 13,1995). Therefore, one of the critical issues is whether 
Taiwan will be able to maintain existing levels of defence effort during the next decade. This 
is a question which generates considerable controversy. 
To many of the supporters, Taiwan has to maintain its military preparedness in the light of 
the continued growth of PRC's military power. The perceived dangers of this significant 
expansion lead to the conclusion that if Taiwan is to survive, Peking's military effort has of 
necessity to be effectively deterred, though not matched. A reasonable prediction, therefore, 
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according to this view is that defence spending in Taiwan will have to be increased after the 
year 2000. 
To the opponents of such defence policies the critical issue is not how to match Peking's 
military effort. Rather, it is the basic question of whether Taiwan can indeed afford to 
maintain its existing levels of defence expenditure and defence effort. This question both 
acknowledges the increasing costs of these forces and mounting public and private worries 
over rising budget deficits, increasing levels of public indebtedness, and rates of inflation. 
The acute policy dilemma to which Taiwan is being subjected is, in this view, how to 
maintain existing defence effort without bankrupting Taiwan's society. Although it would be 
incorrect to see this debate in economic terms alone, it is clear that much of the discussion 
stems from the financial implications of the "warfare versus welfare" controversy. This is a 
theme which has attracted and which continues to attract considerable attention. 
5.3 Major Constraints on Taiwan's Military Modernisation 
5.3.1 Economic Implications of Military Modernisation: 
Can high defence expenditure be continuously sustained 
economically; and what are the impacts of modernisation 
on Taiwan's economic performance? 
There has been much debate over the years about the economic effects of defence spending 
and the burdens or benefits that military spending contributes to economic development. 
Ever since Benoit's studies (1978,271-80) of the impact of defence spending on economic 
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growth and development, a great number of scholars have tried to analyse this controversial 
subject both conceptually and statistically. Nonetheless, no consensus has yet been reached. 
Benoit used data for 44 less developed countries between 1950 and 1965 and employed a 
sample that covered growth rates, investment rates, defence spending and foreign aid. These 
materials were analysed primarily by means of correlation analysis. He found a positive 
association between defence spending and growth of civilian output per capita. In his view 
higher defence spending was more likely to be the cause rather than the effect of economic 
growth. Benoit concluded that "countries with a heavy defence burden generally had the most 
rapid rate of growth, and those with the lowest defence burdens tended to show the lowest 
growth rates" (Ibid). 
Kennedy (1983) and Whynes (1979) agreed with Benoit that the effects of defence spending 
on economic growth is positive. Frederiksen and Looney (1983,113-24) also used a growth 
equation that had investment and defence outlay as regressors. Using data for a cross- 
sectional sample for the period 1960 to 1978, they concluded that defence spending helps 
economic growth in resource-rich countries but not in resource constrained countries. Deger 
and Sen (1983,67-83) employed an optimising model to analyse the strategic causes and the 
economic spin-off effects of military expenditure in less developed countries. They found 
that the econometric evidence for India indicates that claims about the positive effect of 
military expenditure on economic growth are exaggerated and that the economic spin-off 
from defence to development is weak. Lim (1983,377-84) examined within the framework 
of the Harrod-Domar model a sample of 54 less developed countries for the period 1965-73 
and concluded that the negative impacts of defence spending on economic growth were more 
apparent among the poorer countries in Africa. By using macro models to analyse the impact 
of arms spending, Faini, Annezand Taylor (1984,487-98) found that "with the exception of 
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the developed countries, an increased military effort has an economically important real cost 
in forgone investment, lower growth rates, and lagging agricultural supply". Similarly, using 
data for the periods 1960 to 1970 and 1970 to 1977 for a large number of middle income and 
low income countries, Biswas and Ram (1986,361-72) found no consistent, statistically 
significant relationship between military spending and economic growth. 
According to the different findings and conclusions drawn by scholars, defence spending has 
positive as well as negative impacts on economic growth and development. What then has 
been the impact of military modernisation on Taiwan's economic performance? Chan (1988, 
913-20) used time series data to analyse three models of the effects of defence burden on 
Taiwan's economic growth: the modernisation model, the capital formation model, and the 
export-led growth model. However, the results indicate that all these models capture parts of 
the empirical reality, but none can account for all the complexity of this reality. In some 
major respects each of the models is contradicted by the Taiwanese time series. Davis and 
Chan (1990,87-100) investigated the security-welfare relationship in the case of Taiwan. 
Their results suggest that Taiwan deviates from general cross-national patterns. Therefore, 
Taiwan's success in eliminating the widely suspected trade-offs between defence burden on 
the one hand, and economic growth and social welfare on the other needs further study. 
A. National Economy and Defence Spending 
For over 40 years, the ROC armed forces has had to keep a permanent high alert and 
maintain a state of combat-readiness. Such threats have kept defence security as the ultimate 
national goal, and the defence sector has enjoyed a privileged position in the allocation of 
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national resources. The state of readiness has cost Taiwan, on an annual average, 10 percent 
of its gross national product and over 30 percent of national budget. In FY 1983-1988, the 
defence budget took up between 57.15 and 50.00 percent of the central government budget 
(see Table 5-3), but has decreased gradually to 24 percent in 1995. Despite constant military 
threats from the mainland, however, defence spending in Taiwan has varied. In what follows, 
we attempt to determine the nature of variation of defence spending in Taiwan not only by 
examing the relative weight of defence spending vis-ý-vis the national economy and public 
expenditure, but also by analysing the structure of defence spending in terms of the categories 
of appropriation. 
One way of understanding the pattern of defence spending is to measure the relative share of 
defence spending in the gross national product. In Taiwan, defence spending as a percentage 
of gross national product (GNP) has varied slightly over time (see Table 5-2). Throughout 
the years from 1961 to 1987, the average defence spending has been maintained at the level 
of 8.30 percent of GNP. There was no sharp increase nor decline. It was only in the late 
1960s that Taiwan began organising itself for indigenous defence production, and by the 
beginning of the 1970s, that the US government started a reassessment of its East Asian 
security policy as a result of the Viet Nam War, and the eroding security commitment from 
the US, which drove Taiwan's defence spending to over 10 percent of GNP. 
Overall, compared with most countries, defence spending in Taiwan, measured by the share 
of gross national product, is quite high. This indicates that defence spending constitutes an 
important portion of the national economy in Taiwan. 
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Table 5-2 
The ROC Defence Budget as a Percentage of GNP 
FY 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
% 9.50 9.40 9.60 9.50 7.70 11.20 11.70 10.50 10.40 10.60 10.00 8.80 
FY 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
% 8.10 6.80 7.30 6.80 7.40 7.50 6.70 6.60 6.50 7.80 9.19 7.70 
FY 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
% 7.67 7.85 6.80 6.76 7.10 5.80 5.60 5.40 5.00 4.30 4.30 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: 1992 National Defence Report, 106. 
Lian-ho-pao, October 29,1994. 
Chung-kuo Shih-pao, July 15,1996 
B. Defence Spending and Fiscal Structure 
National security is a collective good, and defence spending is an important instrument for 
creating that collective good. However, defence spending is usually constrained by a 
country's fiscal capacity simply because national survival is not the sole objective, but one of 
several. The greater the share of government expenditure allocated to defence, the higher the 
policy priority of national security; and vice versa. Defence spending as a share of public 
expenditure is also a useful indicator for measuring substitution effects between guns and 
butter. Since public finance involves the authoritative allocation of scarce resources, a greater 
allocation to the defence budget usually entails trade-offs in other categories of public 
spending. 
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Just as defence spending in Taiwan has accounted for a large portion of GNP, it also has 
constituted a major portion of total government expenditures. The relative share of defence 
spending in total government expenditure has shown a trend similar to that in GNP. From the 
late 1960s to the 1980s, defence spending accounted for more than 50 percent of government 
expenditure. This figure has gradually declined since 1988, dropping to 24 percent by 1995 
(see Table 5-3). However, it rebounded suddenly to 35 percent in 1996 due to Peking's 
continuous military exercises and missile tests. 
Table 5-3 
ROC Defence Budget as a Percentage of Total Government Budget 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
FY 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 91 92 93 94 95 96 
% 57.1 54.6 53.0 51.8 50.8 49 47 35 31 28 27 26 24 35 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Source: 1992 National Defence Report, 104. 
Lian-ho-pao, July 31,1994. 
Chung-yang jih-pao, October 29,1995. 
The disparity between the growth rate of the defence budget and that of the central 
government budget has been increasingly widened during the past ten years. The growth rate 
of the defence budget decreased from 15.07 in FY 1989 to only 3.42 in FY 1992, while that 
of the central government was 18.62 in 1992, showing a more reasonable ration than previous 
years (see Table 5-4). 
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Table 5-4 
Growth Rate of Defence Budget and Government Budget 
(for selected years compared to the previous years) 
............................................................................................................ 
FY 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Defence Budget 13.3 -5.3 8.6 12.1 1.1 8.72 15.0 10.6 7.8 3.4 
Govemment 2.9 -1.0 12 14.6 3.2 12.2 19.4 23.3 19.4 18.6 
Budget 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: ROC National Defence Report 1992,105. 
The trend in the defence budget allocations in Taiwan between 1961 and 1996 has thus been 
curvilinear. The defence sector has been the largest recipient of government funds for years. 
Since the early 1990s, however, the gap between defence spending and social-development 
spending has been narrowing, while the allocation for economic development has visibly 
decreased (see Table 5-5). In 1993, for example, the government allocated 27 percent of 
public expenditure to the defence sector, 13.3 percent to social development, and 17.8 percent 
to economic development. By contrast in 1995, the defence budget decreased to 24 percent 
of total government expenditures, while the budget for social development increased to 16.1 
percent. This variation in budget allocation reflects the shifting pattern of government policy 
priorities over time. In the 1960s, modernisation and economic growth were the top national 
priorities, making it possible to allocate large portion of government spending to economic 
development. Entering the 1970s, a rapidly changing security environment such as the 
eroding security commitment from the United States shifted the hierarchy of national goals in 
favour of the defence sector. In the 1990s, distribution and welfare have become new political 
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issues. As a result, the government began to pay more attention to these sectors, including 
changes in budget allocations. 
Table 5-5 
Public Expenditures by Appropriation Category, 1993-97 (percentages) 
Year Defence Social Welfare Economic Development Education 
1993 27 13.3 7.8 15.2 
1994 26 14.1 16.2 15.4 
1995 24 16.2 13.8 15.0 
1996 35 17.6 11.8 15.0 
1997 47 19.0 10.2 15.0 
Source: Executive Yuan, 1997. Chung-hua-min-kuo pa-shih-liu lien-tu chung-yang 
cheng-fu chung yu-suan. Vol. 1. 
(ROC Central Government Budget, FY 1997). 
C. Structure of Defence Spending 
In order to understand the precise impact of defence spending on the national economy, it is 
essential to disaggregate defence spending by appropriation categories. Table 5-6 presents 
the structure of Taiwan's military expenditure by appropriation categories. A great portion of 
the defence budget has gone to the military's personnel costs such as wages and salaries in 
kind. The relative share of personnel costs has declined over time, however. In 1983, 
personnel costs accounted for 52 percent of total defence spending. This figure declined to 
37 percent in 1992, and in 1996, the military's personnel costs represented a little more than 
one-third of defence spending. 
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Table 5-6 
ROC's Military Expenditures by Appropriation Category, 1983-96 (percentages) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Personnel 52 57 53 49 49 50 47 35 36 39 35 42 35 40 
Maintenance 20 20 18 18 18 16 15 20 17 20 20 20 20 20 
Investment 28 23 29 33 33 34 38 45 47 41 45 43 45 40 
(Equipment) 
Source: ROC National Defence Report 1992,110. 
While the proportion of personnel costs has decreased, expenses involving the maintenance 
of systems and equipment, investment in equipment acquisition and base construction, and 
defence-related research and development have increased rapidly. In the 1990s, the relative 
share of personnel costs further declined, accounting for only 37 percent of defence spending. 
By contrast, maintenance costs rose to 20 percent, and investment in equipment acquisition 
and base construction accounted for 43 percent. 
These appropriation trends reveal several interesting aspects of defence spending in Taiwan. 
First, the personnel component of the defence budget has declined over time. Several factors 
explain this trend: a gradual reduction of troop size over time; a relative increase in defence 
spending; a relative stable wage structure in the military sector, which is less sensitive to the 
conditions of the labour market; and changing defence priorities. Second, the most visible 
growth has occurred in the category of investment in military equipment purchase and base 
construction. In the early 1980s, investment in equipment and base construction accounted 
for only 30 percent of defence spending. In the 1990s, however, that percentage increased 
significantly to 43 percent. The phase-out of military assistance from the United States and 
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the conscious efforts to catch up with the PRC through ambitious force-improvement plans 
were largely responsible for heavy investment in this category. The increasing share of 
defence budget for systems maintenance and investment in equipment in turn suggests 
enhanced defence capabilities in terms of combat readiness, sustainability, and modernisation. 
Third, the allocation of a noticeable share of the defence budget to investment in R&D since 
the 1980s is the result of efforts to increase military self-reliance through defence 
industrialisation and modernisation. 
In the structure of defence spending, the relatively high proportion of personnel cost in the 
defence budget not only presents a problem because less is available for investment, but also 
because it seriously limits the flexibility of military defence policy in the short and medium 
terms. Because personnel costs absorb a disproportionate share of the defence budget, 
changes and improvements of weapons systems, when they are necessary, are constantly 
dependent on other sectors of the national budget making sacrifices on behalf of defence. 
The competition between military defence efforts and other political programs, such as social 
welfare or education, then becomes particularly noticeable. Only in the long run can a 
reduction of personnel costs be expected through a shift from a labour intensive military 
organisation to an armed force dependent on the use of sophisticated weapons systems. And 
even then there will be a continuing need to meet the high costs of the personnel required to 
service such systems. 
D. Defence Spending and Economic Growth 
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As mentioned earlier, the impact of defence spending on economic growth remains a 
controversial issue. How does the Taiwan's case fit in this debate? Taiwan has a population 
about 20 million, but maintains the same size of armed forces as the former West Germany, a 
country with 60 million people. The purpose of these forces is to deter and defend against 
Communist invasion. Despite such adverse circumstances, Taiwan still counts as one of the 
miracle economies. Taiwan's economy has been regarded as one of the most successful 
cases among the developing countries. While the world is in serious regression, Taiwan still 
enjoys 6% of economic growth rate annually. 
Severe security threats from the PRC have caused Taiwan to bear a rather heavy defence 
burden. Despite this continued threat to national security and the heavy defence burden, 
Taiwan's performance in economic growth and social welfare has remained impressive, 
which not only challenges the theories of the trade-offs between "guns and butter", but 
dependency theory as well. As Table 5-7 indicates, defence spending does not appear to have 
undermined economic growth in aggregate terms. Growth rates in defence spending have 
been positively related to aggregate economic growth rates. Similarly, growth rates in 
defence spending have consistently been positively related to the rates of growth in exports. 
In view of the above, it would be difficult to make a case supporting the argument that 
defence expenditures in Taiwan have "crowded out" economic growth. Therefore, "Taiwan 
presents an interesting deviant case to the cross-national generalisations about the 




Defence Spending and Economic Growth Rate 
....................................................................................................... 
Year 1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Defence 8.9 10.26 9.43 9.2 7.32 8.25 7.85 5.6 5.4 5.0 4.3 4.3 
Spending 
(as % of GNP) 
Economic 5.5 6.8 13 13.7 5.8 12.6 7.6 6.8 6.3 6.5 6.1 6.4 
Growth Rate 
Source: ROC National Defence Report 1992,98. 
E. Defence Spending and Social Welfare 
According to Davis and Chan (1990,87-100), military expenditures can affect social welfare 
indirectly through their effects on various aspects of economic performance--such as GNP 
growth, export competitiveness, capital investment, inflation, and unemployment. However, 
there are different views regarding the substitution effects between defence spending and 
social welfare. 
In 1981, two authorities on Taiwan's politics described a possible attempt by Taiwan to 
produce, domestically, the weapons necessary for its own defence as "an elaborate cost- 
inefficient employment of resources now committed to industrialisation and modernisation" 
(Gregor and Chang 1981,138). Furthermore, it was argued that such an effort would likely 
necessitate the adoption of austerity programs which would "invariably bring increased 
political control and population-management necessities" (Ibid, 140). Although Taiwan's 
push for defence self-sufficiency has not led to the adoption of austerity programs or resulted 
in increased political control, it is undoubtedly an elaborate cost-inefficient employment of 
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the government's resources. Taipei would save billions of dollars in research and 
development funds if it was able to secure its aircraft, missiles and other sophisticated 
weaponry from abroad. Thus far, the government's enormous hard currency reserves have 
enabled it to invest substantial sums in defence-related projects without cutting back on social 
services. If government revenue should drop, however, all of this may change. 
In April 1992, lawmakers slashed a record NT $3.6 billion from the military budget (China 
Post, April 27,1992). However, some members of the opposition DDP still charge that far 
too large a share of the national budget is committed to defence. The DPP disputes the 
government's claims that less than 30 percent of the national budget is allocated for military 
spending. It charges that the military's real share of the fiscal budget is much higher. If the 
government experienced a revenue shortfall and opted to reduce social spending rather than 
cut defence, thousands of those affected by such cuts might take to the streets. This situation 
could well lead to instability, violence and government repression. 
Then what is the impact of defence spending on Taiwan's social welfare? Based on the 
social and economic indicators, it seems that there is no explicit trade-off between them. 
Taiwan has shown rather strong performance relative to most countries. The welfare of its 
citizens has undergone rapid improvement. "It has now achieved a lower infant mortality rate 
than the USA, and its literacy and life expectancy levels are not far behind" (Davis & Chan 
1990,87-100). Income distribution in Taiwan "is much more equal than in any other 
developing or newly industrialising country ... and is the most egalitarian of all capitalist 
countries" (Scitovsky 1989,32). Besides, Taiwan has accumulated a foreign reserve of 
US$95 billion. The extra high savings rate of above 30 percent of GNP has always 
stimulated the willingness to invest either domestically or abroad. 
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Taiwan has historically borne a heavy defence burden in both dollars and manpower. Heavy 
defence spending has been the outcome of the dynamic interplay of military interaction with 
the PRC, the shifting nature of alliance ties with the United States, and domestic and political 
changes. Taiwan has combined a heavy military burden with fast and sustained economic 
growth, a very competitive export sector, and unusually high levels of capital formation. It 
has also achieved rapid economic growth while maintaining relative political stability and 
income equality. Nonetheless, can Taiwan sustain the current pattern of defence spending? 
Both domestic and international changes are likely to make it more difficult. Defence 
spending has enjoyed the lion's share of whole government annual budget and has been 
always criticised as a "black box" which is beyond legislators' supervision. However, recent 
democratic transition and political liberalisation has brought it under the scrutiny. The 
government can no longer sacrifice distribution and welfare in the name of national security. 
Moreover, since the resources of society in the 2000s may continue to be severely limited 
and since financial constraints will reduce the freedom of choice, the disagreement between 
those who advocate more defence spending and those who prefer more welfare spending is 
likely to continue over the next decade. Thus, the dilemma of how to finance increased 
expenditures with less income cannot be resolved without a reordering of political priorities. 
To a considerable degree, the priority which will be given to defence expenditure as com- 
pared with other public functions will depend on the willingness of the population to defend 
itself. In other words, the decisions which will have to be taken over the next decade will not 
only based on economic considerations but will also reflect the political and social 
preferences of the people on Taiwan. 
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5.3.2 Will the armed forces be able to recruit and retain an 
adequate number of qualified personnel? 
Although the defence budget is essential to Taiwan's military modernisation, however, 
another important question to be faced is whether the ordinary man in the street is prepared to 
come forward and accept his share of defence obligations. Put another way, the critical issue 
is that after creating in Taiwan a sophisticated and diverse pattern of military structures, we 
are left wondering how over the next decade, we will be able to man the armed forces which 
we have established. There is ample evidence within Western society that the recruitment and 
retention of skilled military personnel present major problems for some national 
governments. 
Consistently we are presented with evidence which appears to imply that for an increasing 
number of individuals in society, the critical question is "Who wants to join the military? " 
Such attitudes, in combination, then imply the existence of a more general public reluctance 
to accept those obligations of citizenship which involve service in the national armed forces. 
The question that follows from this is whether there is any pressure for change in military 
structures within Taiwan. Given that there may be reluctance to accept existing structural 
patterns, can it inferred that Taiwan's society over the next decade will be seek to establish 
alternative structures? 
A. Recruiting Problems 
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As to the manpower problem it must be noted, first, that even now the armed forces are 
unable to recruit an adequate number of qualified personnel. Second, turnover rates, have 
reached truly alarming proportions, while no changes for the better can be expected in the 
near future. The military organisation, moreover, is relatively powerless to influence these 
developments. Thus, one of the first problems which has to be solved is the major issue of 
maintaining adequate force levels. 
Since the 1970s the armed forces have unsuccessfully tried to attain the planned manpower 
strength of 500,000. The present actual strength of the armed forces is 470.000. These 
recruiting difficulties reflect common problems faced by industrialised nations. On the one 
hand, armed forces with modem equipment require sufficient qualified personnel to use the 
technical capabilities of present and future weapon systems in combat. On the other hand, the 
armed forces have to compete with industry and other civilian competitors for national 
manpower. Often the civilian competition provides better working conditions. Engaged in 
this way in a fierce and costly labour-market competition, the armed forces find themselves in 
a rather disadvantageous position. Even when the pay and working conditions are not 
superior, civilian professions in Taiwan usually carry a higher social prestige than comparable 
activities in the armed forces. 
The problem, however, is not only one of quantity. It is also a question of quality. The 
armed forces have persistent difficulty in recruiting personnel whose professional qualifi- 
cations correspond to the skills required in specific military roles. This is especially so since 
these much needed specialists are also sought by competing civilian organisations and to a 
large extent are readily absorbed by them. A selective draft concentrating on certain 
occupations or professions can solve this problem only to a limited extent because, after 
completion of their military training, these soldiers are available to the armed forces for just a 
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few months. Yet the alternative of meeting the specialist needs of the armed forces through 
an expanded in-service program of professional education and training within the military is 
no easy solution either. A major difficulty is that such a program is beneficial only where the 
trained serviceman is prepared to remain within the military organisation for longer than the 
required minimum engagement. 
Another problem which has to be faced is that an unopposed trend towards frugality will 
make a military career less and less attractive. A policy that stresses nothing but efficiency 
and economy will lead to the cancelling of more and more fringe benefits, thereby further 
reducing the attractiveness of the military organisation. One phenomenon stands out in this 
respect: Even in a period of high unemployment rates and economic slump, the armed forces 
were unable to recruit an adequate number of personnel. 
This unsatisfactory manpower situation is a persistent source of strain in the armed forces, 
especially the navy and the air force. In the navy, basic problems such as an unfavourable 
ratio between ship and shore assignments, especially affects electronics and engineering 
specialists. Indeed, long periods at sea are for many sailors an important reason to look for a 
civil job ashore (a decision even more likely to be affected by family pressure). Furthermore, 
the introduction of new, technically advanced warships necessitates the retaining of quite a 
number of personnel in just those sectors to cope with considerable shortfalls. 
The air force is also troubled by the reduced possibility of retaining adequate numbers of 
technicians and, especially jet pilots (Chung-yang jih-pao, December 28,1994) due to 
Taiwan's flourishing civil aerospace industry. This problem is too serious to be neglected, 
especially when the newly purchased aircraft start to be delivered in the following years. The 
air force now considers its shortfalls sufficiently alarming to initiate more specific 
recruitment campaigns (Chung-yangfih-pao, October 29,1995). 
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The army, too, has to cope with important shortfalls in the officer ranks (lieutenant-colonel, 
ma or and captain) as well as in some NCO areas. The situation for short service NCOs has 
been less promising. The deficiency has seriously affected combat readiness of the units. On 
the other hand training, education and tactical leadership of the soldiers is primarily an NCO 
responsibility. They have the largest direct influence on the level of training and morale of 
the troops. The upper NCO grades particularly represent experience and technical knowledge, 
which cannot simply be replaced by lower ranking soldiers. 
Along with the structural transformation of the society as a whole, the traditional values 
have also been forced to change. As a result, the source of new cadets to the military acad- 
emies has gradually shrunk. Though the MND has tried to raise the number of long-term 
volunteers by attracting and encouraging primary school graduates (12 years old) to enter the 
military preparatory school (equivalent to junior middle school), it is still too early to try to 
evaluate its results. Whether it will be possible to attract the missing men is a complex issue. 
On the one hand the basic question is how to effect a radical change in the way of thinking 
about serving in the military. The question relates back to more general issues of societal 
attitudes towards the armed forces. On the other hand the fundamental problem may be 
dependent for its solution on demographic trends from which recruits to the armed forces are 
traditionally drawn in Taiwan. In looking at the latter an initial hypothesis can be put forward 
that there is no apparent reason to suggest that the numbers will not be available. Table 5-8 
illustrates this point. According to this table, there were about 150,000 conscripts available in 
1991. It is estimated that there will be an annual average of 144,000 conscripts available 
from 1991 to 1995, and 164,000 from 1996 to 2000. Thus, there is no reason to suppose that 
in the overall size of the part of available males in the 1990s will make it hard to recruit the 
manpower required. In other words, the critical question may continue to be that of societal 
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attitudes towards service in the military organisation. However, one point to be noted is the 
birth-rate in Taiwan has dropped markedly with the industrialisation process, and this is likely 
to continue. Taiwan will, given current trends, reach zero population growth in about thirty 
years (Chung-yangfih-pao, October 10,1995). 
Table 5-8 
Predicted Number of Draftable Males Liable for Military 
Service (born during 1971-1980) in the Taiwan Area, 1991-2000 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 
. 
1995 
Draftable Males 149,728 143,406 144,424 140,194 140,786 
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Draftable Males 167,677 155,475 163,759 166,799 162,544 
Source: ROC National Defence Report 1992,118. 
Alternatively it would be possible, of course, to reduce the shortages in manpower by 
intensifying the recruitment of women. Programs for recruiting more female officers and 
NCOs have been launched since 1991. Up to the present, their number has been tiny. We 
can, however, conclude that in comparison with the situation in the United States and, to a 
lesser extent, in the United Kingdom, the Ministry of National Defence in Taiwan has 
preferred not to recruit women as a substitute for male personnel. 
Of course, the MND is also looking for other ways to turn these developments in a more 
favourable directions. The MND has initiated a study aimed at investigating the causes of the 
inadequate recruiting results and of the high turnover rates. Facing current requirements as 
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well as future development, the MND has been making every effort to draw up a series of 
plans to try to raise the military personnel's social status, improve their living and working 
environments, readjust their salaries and terms of service, review the policy of retirement, 
reform the system of military education, and so forth, so as to encourage and attract more and 
more youths with lofty ideals willing to enrol themselves in the army (ROC Ministry of 
National Defence 1992,139). 
The government will have to: 
1. introduce adequate remuneration and compensation for extra duties 
2. accept that many soldiers serving now in the armed forces consider this to be "just another 
job"; 
3. enhance the scope of education in order to increase the labour-market chances of the 
soldiers after their retirement from military service; 
4. urgently improve and intensify the public relations of the military organisation. 
B. Conscription versus All-Volunteer Forces 
Faced in the past with comparable defence problems, governments traditionally adopted one 
of four options. First, some relied heavily on conscription as a means of bringing into the 
military organisation an adequate number of recruits. Alternatively, in adopting an all 
volunteer force (AVF) structure, governments depended on a whole variety of motivating 
factors ranging from market forces to appeals to patriotism, as a means of meeting manpower 
targets. Third, smaller and less vulnerable states in the West created military structures based 
on the assumption that a small cadre of professional soldiers could be readily supplemented in 
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time of emergency by civilian reservists. Finally, governments continually used their 
preferences for compromise solutions to devise mixed strategies which combined one or more 
of the outlined options. 
According to Sidgwick (quoted in Ross 1994,109-129), if the number of soldiers required 
is not large in proportion to the population, and their services can be obtained at about the rate 
at which labour of similar quality would be hired for industry, voluntary enlistment seems 
clearly the most economical system; since it tends to select the persons most likely to be 
efficient soldiers and those to whom military functions are least distasteful. But a nation may 
unfortunately require an army so large that its ranks could not be kept full by voluntary 
enlistment, except at a rate of remuneration much above that which would be paid in other 
industries, and in this case the burden of the taxation requisite to provide for such an army 
may easily become less endurable than the burden of compulsory service. 
Therefore, the question which now has to be faced is whether the adoption of any single 
traditional option or indeed a mix of these options can ensure that Taiwan will be able in the 
2000s to implement its defence policies. In some Western countries, we already witness 
considerable opposition to the retention of conscription. In others the preference for an AVF 
structure has resulted in greatly increased personnel costs as the military are forced to 
compete with other employers in the labour market for skilled and potentially skilled recruits. 
Elsewhere, the increasing technological sophistication of modem weaponry raises severe 
doubts about the ability of recalled reservists to switch readily from a civilian to a military 
role. What this suggests is that it will be increasingly difficult in the 2000s to continue to rely 
on traditional means of implementing defence policies. Yet any conclusion which may be 
drawn about the nature of these has also to acknowledge that over the next decade, a wide 
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range of subsidiary factors--unemployment levels, inflation, fear of the PRC's threat and so 
on--may shape public attitudes towards their armed forces. 
In light of these problems, it is interesting to have a closer look at the discussion about the 
abolition of conscription and its replacement by an all-volunteer force. 
Conscription has been considered an inefficient method of obtaining manpower. Labour 
appears relatively cheap in budgetary terms, but these fail to reflect the true opportunity cost 
of society's alternative use value of the manpower. Being relatively cheap, military 
commanders are encouraged to substitute labour for capital (weapons) and adopt labour 
intensive force structures. However, conscription will become decreasingly feasible as a 
means of manning conventional force structures when its increased social costs are seen 
within a given society to be an unacceptable burden. At the same time, the budgetary 
advantages of conscription will lose their attractiveness when the rate of remuneration and the 
conditions of service applicable to conscripts equate more closely to those of volunteer 
servicemen. 
Even though it may have been clear to all who participated in the development of the armed 
forces that conscription was a means of ensuring the political legitimacy of the armed forces, 
a new generation may be less willing to accept the personal obligations of compulsory 
military service. Their objections and their specific opposition to such service can then 
materially affect the rationale underlying the retention of this form of recruitment to the 
armed forces. 
Currently, the number of conscripts annually drafted fluctuates around 33 percent of the total 
military population (ROC National Defence Report 1992,122). The conscripts who were 
drafted could well argue that they were seriously disadvantaged. They had to serve for at 
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least 2 years, in this way losing valuable time as regards finding a job or starting some form 
of higher education. 
In a technically highly advanced military organisation, the conscripts' motivation will be 
impaired by the tendency to assign to them the simpler jobs. As time is lacking to train them 
for complex tasks, they have to content themselves with the less challenging and attractive 
roles. In this way quite a number of relatively highly educated conscripts will be confronted 
with jobs that are definitely below their competence and interest level. As the army has by far 
the greatest number of these simple jobs to distribute, this problem, of course, is troubling 
this organisation more than the navy and the air force. 
These should not lead us to overlook other issues such as those of military efficiency, for the 
reliance on conscription has led to considerable operational problems. One of these has been 
the way in which, where a senior NCO with a longer service commitment has not been 
available, a junior NCO has had to fill his position. In turn a draftee has often had to carry 
out the duties of a junior NCO without having received the necessary training. These 
problems stem from the basic difficulty faced by all armed forces which rely on relatively 
short periods of conscript service, that is, trained personnel are only available to carry out 
operational tasks for a very limited period. In other words, the military organisation tends to 
over-emphasise the importance of its training role at the expense of its operational role. Even 
so, the debate about the operational effectiveness of conscripts starts from the premise that an 
adequate number of draftees will be available. 
In short the military organisation is predominantly manned by conscripts and very limited 
career personnel, a situation which inevitably engenders considerable difficulties. These 
problems will be hard to solve in the 2000s. New weapon systems and changed organisational 
structures will produce rising demands. Thus there arise the following questions: is the 
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government still entitled to demand for the sacrifice of conscription? Is it right to force 
young men who reject the legitimacy of the armed forces, into service? Do a majority of 
people in Taiwan still support conscription? And finally the fundamental question: will 
conscription have to be abolished? The arguments for and against abolishing conscription-- 
not markedly different from those used abroad--need not be repeated here. What is worrying 
is that under conditions presently prevailing in Taiwan, parting with conscription would result 
in an organisation that would be, quantitatively and qualitatively, below the mark. 
It is expected that in the course of the 2000s the strain between, on the one hand personnel 
and maintenance costs and, on the other hand, hardware investment will go from bad to 
worse. In the present organisation it will be hardly possible to reduce further the number of 
military personnel, while the highly trained specialists which the armed forces mostly need 
will demand even higher salaries to keep up with what private industry is willing to pay. 
Consequently the armed forces will have to reckon with higher turnover rates of personnel 
and with higher costs for the returning problem of adequately training the recruits substituting 
for the leaving specialists. Government attempts to trim the organisation by cutting fringe 
benefits will in this respect only backfire in the end by aggravating this already high turnover 
rate. 
Therefore, the future dilemma is that a modem society in a period of limited resources will 
hesitate at the expense of making the military sufficiently enticing to attract an adequate 
number of personnel. A shortage of suitably qualified personnel then creates problems of 
over-stretch, and the external efficiency of the armed forces may be considerably reduced 
where these forces are insufficient to meet a complex pattern of military roles. Yet if the 
offered incentives are sufficiently high to overcome recruitment and retention problems, there 
may be acute resentment within society at this allocation of scarce resources. Such incentives 
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also create a major difficulty for armed forces if the cost of high rates of remuneration prevent 
the purchase of new equipment which is deemed necessary to constitute an effective response 
to heightened threat perception. 
The Consequence of Cross-Strait Military Modernisation. 
The rivalry and confrontation between Taiwan and the PRC has lasted for more than forty 
years. Recent developments in cross-strait relations seem promising and the exchanges of 
various kinds between both are increasing, still, the PRC has never intended and is reluctant 
to renounce the use of force as a means of reunification and never provides any positive 
response to Taiwan's good-will and appeals. Despite the vast changes in the international 
politics of Asia in recent years, Peking continues to regard the issue of Taiwan as one of the 
paramount challenges for Chinese policy in the future. 
Thus, one of the important contemporary events which affects Taiwan's defence policy is the 
growing ambiguity of the PRC's threat. Assessments of threat are always notoriously difficult 
given the problem of weighing intentions and capabilities. Indeed, very little consideration 
had been given, in general, to the impact of the changing nature of Taipei-Peking relations on 
the future of Taiwan's defence policy. In particular, the question must be asked whether there 
still exists a threat from the PRC which necessitates the kind of defence posture Taiwan has 
sustained for the past four decades? 
Though defence is vital to security and survival, and no matter what the impact of defence 
spending may be on Taiwan's economic performance --either positive or negative, procure- 
ment by Taiwan can easily lead to arms racing with PRC. This has been the case in many 
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Third World countries such as Argentina-Brazil, South-North Korea, India-Pakistan, and 
Israel-the Arab states. Many people think that high levels of armament guarantee war rather 
than insure against it, while others consider that only stable competition in arms prevents 
existing conflicts from erupting into war. In other words, "it is not arms races that lead to 
war, but rather a nation's failure to maintain its military capabilities vis-A-vis its potential 
rivals and adversaries" (Wallace 1979,4). Then, is arms race a cause of war or a guarantee of 
peace? 
With the end of the cold war, it seems true that the arms race between US and former Soviet 
Union did prevent the outbreak of war. But is it applicable to the Taiwan Strait? Russet 
argues that "mutual arms strength cannot banish mutual insecurity, but a one-sided failure to 
arm would produce the insecurity of weakness" (Russet 1983,3). Each national defence 
force is looked upon by its rivals not as protection, but rather as a potential threat; therefore, 
there is a continued struggle to achieve a margin of superiority in military force. Each nation 
in the race will constantly increase its import requirements at increasing cost. Once an arms 
race is started, it is extremely difficult to stop. It is a way leading to no end. Furthermore, 
"the mutual threat posed by such competitive military growth intensifies other conflicts and 
contentions among nations, leading to additional uncertainty and insecurity" (Wallace 1979, 
4). Therefore, "what used to be security has turned into double insecurity: insecurity because 
of the enormous destruction potential and insecurity because of the waste of the scarce 
resources" (Tuomi & Vayrynen 1982,2). 
Moreover, in order to achieve strategic superiority, the weapons imported will have to be as 
advanced and sophisticated as possible, and this will lead to increasing costs of operation and 
maintenance. Therefore, "increased levels of armaments under conditions of the security 
dilemma lead to an upward spiral of arrnaments and military spending, the exacerbation of 
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conflicts by worst-case thinking, and a concomitant decline in interstate security" (Krause 
1992,127). Benoit holds the same view by arguing that "the resultant arms races end by 
creating much larger defence forces on both sides than necessary with no commensurate gain 
in security--just the opposite, in fact" (Benoit 1967,53). 
Defence spending is a way to strengthen national security, but cannot guarantee it. As Chan 
points out that "To the extent that efforts to boost one's defence capabilities result in a process 
of mutual armament escalation, national security is more likely to be undermined than 
enhanced" (Chan 1992,2). 
It is the tendency for most countries to seek defence cuts and troop reductions. Besides, the 
end of cold war and the ease of tension will make it possible for future conflict and disputes 
to be settled by negotiations and peaceful means rather than resorting to force. In short, 
viewing the global military environment in the foreseeable future, we can say that, with the 
relaxation of East-West confrontation, large-scale conflicts are unlikely; but limited regional 
war, on the other hand, may possibly break out at any time. Under these circumstances, it 
appears even more important for a country like Taiwan to maintain an appropriate amount of 
self-defence strength to guarantee its national security. 
Taiwan, therefore, faces hard choices. As former US President Eisenhower said: 
Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in 
the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, from those who are 
cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is 
spending sweat of its labourers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its 
children" (Quoted in Russett 1983,48-49). 
However, to Taiwan, not only is security or defence necessary as a precondition for econ- 
ornic development, it is also a vital prerequisite for its continued existence, "... Defence 
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expenditure might be better spent on development, but only in a perfect world in which 
defence is unnecessary" (Arlinghaus 1984,42). Therefore, "a well-organised and effective 
system of defence is a necessary art of state expenditure" (Quoted in Balis 1989,72). 
Despite the defence spending and human resources problems to which reference has been 
made, fortunately, there is no sign within the armed forces or within Taiwan's society as a 
whole of any loss of confidence in the military. The importance of defence as a major 
characteristic of Taiwan's political preferences--an importance which is reflected in the 
portion of the GNP devoted to defence expenditure--is such as to indicate a societal 
willingness to strive to maintain the armed forces in its traditional form. This perception thus 
emphasises the lack of opposition to conscription, the willingness to accept the financial 
burden of defence, and the acceptance of the military as the defenders of national sovereignty. 
Conclusion 
In view of the long-term threat facing the ROC--both in terms of PRC capabilities and inten- 
tions, the ongoing modernisation of the PLA, and the approaching obsolescence of Taiwan's 
current inventory of fighters and destroyers, it is questionable whether Taiwan, without 
significant upgrading of its military equipment, will be able to maintain an effective deterrent 
against the PRC much beyond the latter half of this decade. 
The purchase of modem weapons, therefore, is seen in Taipei as crucial to Taiwan's future as 
a free political and economic system. In the long run, it is the sale of advanced weapons that 
will give the people of Taiwan an opportunity to determine their own future in peace. 
Without the weapons to defend itself, Taiwan's absorption by Peking on Communist terms is 
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almost inevitable. The likelihood of a peaceful, negotiated settlement agreed by both parties 
is greatly improved if Taipei is confident of its ability to defend its own interests. 
However, one of the critical issues is whether Taiwan will be able to maintain existing 
levels of defence effort during the next decade. This is a question which generates 
considerable controversy. Some argue that Taiwan has to maintain its military preparedness 
in the light of the continued growth of PRC's military power. The perceived dangers of this 
significant expansion lead to the conclusion that if Taiwan is to survive, Peking's military 
effort has of necessity to be effectively deterred, though not matched. A reasonable pre- 
diction, therefore, according to this view is that defence spending in Taiwan will have to be 
increased after the year 2000. 
To the opponents of such defence policies the critical issue is not how to match Peking's 
military effort. Rather, it is the basic question of whether Taiwan can indeed afford to 
maintain its existing levels of defence expenditure and defence effort. This question both 
acknowledges the increasing costs of these forces and the mounting public and private 
worries over rising budget deficits, increasing levels of public indebtedness, and rates of 
inflation. The acute policy dilemma with which Taiwan is being presented is, in this view, 
how to maintain existing defence efforts without bankrupting Taiwan's society. Although it 
would be incorrect to see this debate in economic terms alone, it is clear that much of the 
discussion stems from the financial implications of the "warfare versus welfare" controversy. 
This is a theme which has attracted and which continues to attract considerable attention. 
Therefore, in Chapter 5, we examined the impact of military modernisation on Taiwan's 
economic development. 
Most existing research suggests that high military spending tends to have a deleterious effect 
on a country's economic growth, export competitiveness, and capital formation. However, 
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the study shows that Taiwan presents an interesting deviant case to these cross-national 
generalisations about the relationships among defence burden, economic performance, and 
social welfare. Taiwan has historically bome a heavy defence burden in both dollars and 
manpower. Heavy defence spending has been the outcome of the dynamic interplay of 
military interaction with the PRC, the shifting nature of alliance ties with the United States, 
and domestic and political changes. Yet its economy has achieved one of the world's fastest 
and most sustained growth rates in the past four decades, and its successful export drive has 
made it the world's largest holder of foreign reserves. Moreover, the island's rapid economic 
growth has taken place in a context of political stability and increasing income equality. 
With respect to the political economy of military expenditure, we find that Taiwan presents 
a number of contradictions to expectations derived from cross-national research in the West. 
Taiwan has combined a heavy military burden with fast and sustained economic growth, a 
very competitive export sector, and high levels of capital formation. It has also achieved 
rapid economic growth while maintaining relative political stability and income equality. The 
accomplishments mentioned above make Taiwan a rather exceptional case in regard to the 
generally supposed negative impact of defence burden on economic performances. 
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Chapter 6 
Outlook and Conclusions 
General Conclusions and Major Findings 
In the Introduction, we pointed out the reasons for adopting Taiwan's security as a research 
programme were that there was no single text or collection of readings, written from a Republic 
of China perspective or addressing issues of ROC concern, which was available for people 
interested in national security. This dissertation is therefore intended to fill that gap by 
broadening the theoretical and empirical evaluation of Taiwan's national security to encompass 
military, political and economic factors. The primary objective of this study has been to 
develop an in-depth understanding of the ROC's approach to national security through an 
examination both of the dynamics of the numerous security threats confronting Taiwan and of 
the measures instituted to preserve and enhance national security. 
In Chapter 1, we tried to establish a conceptual framework for the analysis of national 
security. We found that the need to define the concept is even more necessary in regard to the 
ROC on Taiwan, which is seldom explored comprehensively and in its own right. The 
concept of national security and its applicability to the ROC is of central importance to this 
study. 
Judging by the sacrifices that many national states are willing to make when territorial 
integrity or national interests are threatened, it is evident that national security is highly 
valued by most people. However, as countless discussions of the concept have indicated, the 
256 
idea of "security" is hardly precise. Different countries have very different concepts of secur- 
ity. Each concept of security corresponds to specific values, threats, and capabilities to meet 
the perceived challenges. Most developing countries emphasise the economic and social as 
well as the domestic dimensions of security. The feeling of security involves not only 
confidence on the part of the state in its ability to maintain its prosperity and way of life, but 
also the freedom to develop and improve its position in the future. 
As for the possibilities of insecurity, it is necessary to examine the nature of the threats to 
obtain a more accurate understanding of the magnitude and intensity of the threats 
confronting a state. The sources of threats were divided and examined by military, political 
and economic sectors. Of these, the military dimension is the most visible and tends to attract 
greater attention from policyrnakers and observers. However, in the long run, the political 
dimension is the most important that has to be addressed if the conflicts--both internal and 
across the Taiwan Straits--are to be resolved satisfactorily. 
Since the security of a state is a function both of its own vulnerability and the threats posed 
by external sources, approaches to national security may take one or more of the following 
forms: security through strengthening the state; security through power and alliance; and 
security through regional order and co-operation. These approaches are not mutually 
exclusive. When taken collectively, they address both the internal and external dimensions of 
national security. However, the approaches are not necessarily complementary either. The 
potential for contradictions is inherent, especially when choices are constrained by the linkage 
of national security to an external actor--be it a state or an organisation. In reality, many of 
the states employ a combination of these approaches with the total approach dependent on the 
circumstances of the individual state. 
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A variety of policy instruments may be employed to preserve national security. Given the 
nature of the threats, the policy response and the instruments of policy employed to counter 
them will be multifaceted and encompass political, socio-economic, military and foreign- 
policy dimensions. The discussion in this chapter is just an indication of the nature and the 
role of the variety of policy instruments that may be employed in the pursuit of national 
security. The specific combination and relative emphasis of the measures adopted will vary 
and be related to the source and nature of threat and the approach adopted to preserve the 
national security of the state. 
Against this backdrop, this chapter tried to refine and expand the concept of national 
security, suggest and expand the concept of security concerns, and elucidate the complex 
structures associated with them. From the analysis presented in Chapter 1, it is clear that the 
range of national security issues is wide, stretching across the military, political and economic 
sectors. However, the full richness and meaning of security is to be found in the interplay 
among them rather than the primacy of one. The concept of security binds together these 
sectors so closely that it demands to be treated in an integrative perspective. It is thus worth 
examining the character ot threats within each of these sectors in order to try to get a general 
sense of the legitimate national security agenda. Therefore we started from chapter 2 by 
exploring the military, political and economic dimensions of Taiwan's national security 
respectively. 
In Chapter 2, we considered the military dimensions of Taiwan's security. The Chapter 
started by asking: Is the probability of military confrontation across the Taiwan Strait 
increasing or decreasing? There is little doubt on Taiwan that the PRC will eventually invade 
the island if it is able to do so at an acceptable cost and if Peking is unable to gain control of 
Taiwan in any other way. The short-term variables inherent in those conditions are infinite, 
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but the long-term threat is itself a constant. The Peking leadership's recent behaviour has not 
helped to mitigate the fear. Military activities in and around the Taiwan Strait after President 
Lee Teng-hui's visit to the United States and the continuous waves of military exercises prior 
to Taiwan's presidential election have aggravated the already tense situation. 
Despite continued military threats from Peking against Taiwan, a number of analysts believe 
they are no longer credible. Even if the threat were real, others argue, no government on Tai- 
wan-be it KMT or DPP-would be so foolish as to provoke Peking by an explicit declaration 
of Taiwan independence. Since a move to separate Taiwan from Chinese territory is thought 
to be the only trigger which would lead the PRC to use force against Taiwan, scholars from 
this school of thought therefore concluded that the probability of war in the Taiwan Strait is 
remote. Nevertheless, several trends discussed in Chapter 2 have given cause for concern that 
the PRC may be re-examining the utility of using force in the Taiwan Strait to achieve 
unification. These trends suggest that the threat environment in the Taiwan Strait during the 
1990s will be characterised by a degree of uncertainty and differences of perception in 
Washington, Taipei, and Peking. Certainly, the PRC threat will remain and it will be 
perceived by some as growing. All the factors mentioned also suggest that the PRC must 
keep its military option as a possible way to solve the Taiwan issue. However, a major use of 
force against Taiwan seems unlikely without severe provocation on the part of Taiwan, 
although limited PRC military pressure to speed up the unification negotiating process may 
be possible. 
A comparison between the military capabilities of Taiwan and the PRC is illuminating 
because it establishes one fact. The PRC is so overwhelmingly superior to Taiwan in 
virtually all categories of military force that the outcome of a struggle between the two 
Chinese governments is more likely to be decided by Peking's determination to pursue the 
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fight than by an actual contest of military superiority. In other words, the cost of taking 
Taiwan would be enormous, but Peking has, or will have by the next decade, enough 
resources to accomplish the task if it elects to do so. Then, what are the most likely military 
options to be selected by the PRC should it decide to attack Taiwan? It has a variety of 
military options available. These range from low-level harassment at one extreme, through 
blockade, to an all-out attack, invasion, and siege at the other extreme. 
After analysing Taiwan's insecurity dilemma and assessing the threats, it is necessary to 
explore further how Taiwan could cope with them and what national security policy Taiwan 
should establish. Some states seek security by maintaining strict neutrality; others seek it by 
joining alliances. Some seek security by confronting potential adversaries with military force; 
others seek it by trying to be accommodating "good neighbours". 
Since seeking for alliance and nuclear weapons has proved impractical, what alternative 
measures could Taiwan adopt in order to reduce its vulnerability and prevent threats? The 
choice is straightforward for Taiwan. Owing to its status as a weak state, structural incapacity 
for offence, and the power asymmetry compared to the PRC, a more appropriate policy for 
Taiwan to adopt in order to survive is "non-provocative defence". 
A state like Taiwan whose aim is defensive will prefer deterring an adversary such as the 
PRC to having to fight. In order to make deterrence credible, Taiwan has to devote 
considerable effort to trying to persuade the PRC that it would indeed defend itself despite the 
odds against it. Like most states, Taiwan prefers not to have to fight. But if it has to fight, its 
goal must be to make the cost of victory higher than the gains of victory can justify. As was 
mentioned earlier in Chapter I by Walter Lipmann: "A nation is secure to the extent to which 
it is not in danger of having to sacrifice its core values if it wishes to avoid war, if challenged, 
to maintain them by victory in such a war" (Quoted in Buzan 1991,16). 
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By employing non-provocative defence strategies, Taiwan could signal to the PRC 
unambiguously defensive intentions. Such strategies act to dispel the suspicion, tension and 
hostility which can not only minimise the probability of crises occurring, but remove entirely 
all incentives for the PRC to resort to pre-emptive or preventative war. 
In Chapter 3, we dealt with the political dimensions of Taiwan's security. This chapter 
began by exploring the domestic political factors and the interplay of international factors to 
provide the historical background for the emergence of TIM. It then moved to examine and 
criticise the TIN4's justification for their claims based on Taiwan nationalism, the uncertainty 
of Taiwan's legal status and the right to self-determination. Judging by the lack of the 
domestic support, the difficulty of gaining international recognition and the pressure from 
Peking, it argued that independence for Taiwan is undesirable. 
To the PRC, Taiwan is an integral part of the territory controlled by the sole legal and 
legitimate government of China. Any advocacy or movement of Taiwan independence which 
violates the "One China" principle would be rejected by the PRC. Based on the scenarios for 
the use of force by the PRC illustrated in Chapter 2, the most likely one under which the PRC 
would invade is if and when Taiwan declares itself independent; and that is the most 
dangerous one to Taiwan, because an independent Taiwan would have implications for 
China's hold on Tibet, Sinkiang, and Inner Mongolia and there would be strong reaction 
inside the PRC to any Chinese leader who acquiesced in an independent "Republic of 
Taiwan". At the same time, Taiwan independence might cause internal upheavals on the 
island and thereby limit the ROC's capacity to mobilise resistance against external threats, 
and consequently might invite PRC aggression. 
Naturally, it is easier to criticise the approach taken by the DPP to the right to self- 
determination and independence than to suggest an answer to the problems thus identified. 
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Taiwan's stability and security are not simply dependent on its economy and military, they are 
also contingent on the domestic political situation. Thus the best hope probably lies in 
seeking to make independence less attractive by stressing the right of all the people on 
Taiwan to participate in the governance of that state and the right of minorities to respect for 
their separate identities. Political reform has therefore become especially important and 
significant. The success or failure of reform measures may have profound implications not 
only for the island's internal political stability, but also for the future evolution of its relations 
with mainland China. 
This may mean that while politics will necessarily become even more competitive as 
participation increases, in the short term, issues such as Taiwan independence may lose some 
of their salience as the major proportion of the people support political change through 
incremental reform. This will be particularly true if the KMT continues on its present path to 
further opening up the political system. 
In short, Taiwan's political reforrn presents the independence movement with a choice 
between using it as a window to step up pressure for independence, or rejoining established 
political institutions, working within the electorally-oriented opposition movement. So far, 
the DPP has refused to make any change at all, in spite of the election results and pressure 
from the KMT. The DPP's uncompromising stand may seem irrational from the point of view 
of the party as a whole, after all, what is the good of clinging to a lost cause? Why do the 
DPP elements still insist on the advocacy of Taiwan Independence and self-determination 
even though they are well aware that the possibility of it is slim and there exists risk and 
threat? Primarily because it is an effective mechanism to mobilise the population they seek to 
lead, and because it allows them to bring together a number of different and disaffected 
factions. Partly because of the sheer ambiguity of the term, it is the one unifying aim in a 
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coalition of otherwise competing political forces. Therefore, most of the advantages of claim- 
ing Taiwan Independence and the right to self-determination are harvested in internal politics. 
It is evident that DPP politicians would never hesitate to use ambiguous terms to attract 
needed votes and have a strong incentive to curry favour with the "independence" voters, 
even if Taiwan independence is more an emotional symbol than a real goal. 
However, despite Taiwan's success in running elections and the KMT's decision to undertake 
major political reforms, many formidable problems remain unresolved. The foremost of 
these problems is the issue of national identity. Thus, the future political developments in 
Taiwan will probably encounter periodic setbacks with some activities perceived as threats to 
the political stability and security of the nation. The long term trends are against the survival 
of the KMT as a major political force unless it revitalises itself to meet Taiwan's changing 
social and economic needs. 
The Kuomintang will thus have to juggle carefully the independence/reunification problem 
in a way that is neither provocative to Peking nor to KMT stalwarts and yet at the same time 
marginalises the pro-independence movement in Taiwan, while also reassuring the majority 
of Taiwanese that they will not be ruled by the Chinese Communist Party. Therefore, until a 
suitably ambiguous formula does evolve, the next few years could bring an intensification of 
confrontation between the extremes of those who see Taiwan's future in strictly either/or 
choices between unification and independence. 
Neither choice is feasible given the policy positions of the KMT and Peking and in any 
event, most Taiwanese are equally opposed to the two alternatives of reunification or 
independence. To make the choice moreover, would undermine the stable domestic 
environment Taiwan needs to maintain if it is to outperform its trade competitors in the 
2000s. It seems there is not likely to be a crisis in the Taiwan Strait or in Taipei provided the 
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KMT and the DPP can agree to preserve the present ambiguity on the reunification- 
independence question. 
In Chapter 4 we considered the economic dimension of Taiwan's security. In trying to 
elucidate Taiwan's security needs, we have tried to delineate the structure of multiple threats 
and capabilities and outline corresponding diverse security measures. In considering Taiwan's 
security, the military, political and economic issues are closely interlocked. Among the 
factors that affect Taiwan's power capabilities, none is perhaps as important as its economy. 
Taiwan's efforts to maintain its military strength and capability, and political stability would 
be further secured by a continuation of Taiwan's outstanding success in maintaining a high 
rate of economic growth. Therefore in Chapter 4 our attention turned to the economic 
dimensions of Taiwan's security. 
The novelty of the analysis in this chapter is that, contrary to the traditional approaches to 
the study of the economic security which concentrate upon the national rather than the 
international dimension, it used the WTO (GATT) as a case study to examine the importance 
for Taiwan of entering the major international economic organisations and the implications of 
membership for the government and economy of Taiwan. 
Why is Taiwan aggressively attempting to join or rejoin the world's major international 
organisations-including the GATT (now the WTO), the IMF, and the United Nations? What 
does it hope to gain from membership in these institutions? As with any initiative, many 
questions have been raised. As an island state that also happens to be one of the world's 
largest traders, Taiwan is heavily dependent on international commerce for its survival. 
While Taiwan's economy is thriving it is important that it participates in the international 
economic organisations (IEOs), in order to obtain fair and reciprocal treatment with its trade 
partners who are members. 
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But today the majority of the world's intergovernmental economic organisations do not 
recognise Taiwan. Indeed for the major IEOs Taiwan officially does not exist. Rather than 
admit it in any capacity, these organisations have ignored economic realities and have yielded 
to political pressures from Peking to force the international community to make a choice 
between itself and Taipei. The continuing efforts by Peking to blackball Taipei have 
politicised the process of Taiwan's entrance into such organisations. Because the great 
majority of the nations that belong to the IEOs maintain formal diplomatic ties with the PRC, 
they bow to the PRC's efforts to block Taiwan's membership. For Taiwan, this has meant 
increasing isolation not only from the established venues of international decision-making, 
but also from much of the normal political dialogue among nations. 
One of the reasons for Taiwan's determination to enter the WTO is that Taiwan's economic 
development was threatened by the imbalance between its obligations and its rights in foreign 
trade. In recent years, the island has encountered growing pressure from its trade partners, 
mainly the United States, to abide by GATT's liberal principles and to open up its domestic 
markets, liberalise import procedures, allow greater access to the domestic economy, 
modernise the financial framework of the nation, and further revalue the currency. Most of 
the concessions granted by Taiwan to the United States have also been extended to other trade 
partners. However, while Taiwan was abiding by many of the rules of GATT like a GATT 
member, it did not have a GATT member's rights and thus could not enjoy the benefits and 
privileges of GATT membership. Therefore, Taiwan has always been in a passive position 
and has to yield frequently to pressures in relation to trade retaliation. Besides, Taiwan could 
not take advantage of GATT rules to defend itself against excessive requests and unfair trade 
practices from trade partners such the US. Hence, with its economy heavily dependent on 
trade, Taiwan must seek to join the world's largest trade promoting agency if it wants better 
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to protect its economic interests in the international arena. Recognition in the major IIEOs 
would also provide Taiwan with more extensive diplomatic help to defend its economic 
gains. Membership in world economic and trade organisations would allow Taiwan to work 
through multilateral channels and international arbitration to gain reasonable treatment and 
ensure Taiwan's economic interests. 
After decades of rapid economic development, Taiwan's economy is now at a cross-roads. 
To continue developing, it must carry out a fundamental structural transformation. Despite 
the pain and dislocation it will cause, WTO membership will accelerate the island's progress 
toward the goal. Aggressive anti-protectionism is the best way for Taiwan to acquire the 
political capital that it needs to accede to WTO. And trade liberalisation would be the only 
and the best way for Taiwan to defend itself against other countries' protectionist measures 
and proposing a timetable would help convey its willingness to liberalise its trade. 
in Chapter 5 we further explored the main variable affecting Taiwan's future security, i. e., 
the cross-Strait arms race and major constraints on Taiwan's military modernisation. In view 
of the long-term threat facing the ROC--both in terms of PRC capabilities and intentions, the 
ongoing modernisation of the PLA, and the approaching obsolescence of Taiwan's current 
inventory of fighters and destroyers, it is questionable whether Taiwan, without significant 
upgrading of its military equipment, will be able to maintain an effective deterrent against the 
PRC much beyond the latter half of this decade. 
The purchase of modem weapons, therefore, is seen in Taipei as crucial to Taiwan's future as 
a free political and economic system. In the long run, it is the sale of advanced weapons that 
would give the people of Taiwan an opportunity to determine their own future in peace. 
Without the weapons to defend itself, Taiwan's absorption by Peking on Communist terms is 
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almost inevitable. The likelihood of a peaceful, negotiated settlement agreed by both parties 
is greatly improved if Taipei is confident of its ability to defend its own interests. 
However, one of the critical issues is whether Taiwan will be able to maintain existing 
levels of defence effort during the next decade. This is a question which generates 
considerable controversy. Some argue that Taiwan has to maintain its military preparedness 
in the light of the continued growth of PRC's military power. The perceived dangers of this 
significant expansion lead to the conclusion that if Taiwan is to survive, Peking's military 
effort has of necessity to be effectively deterred, though not matched. A reasonable pre- 
diction, therefore, according to this view is that defence spending in Taiwan will have to be 
increased after the year 2000. 
To the opponents of such defence policies the critical issue is not how to match Peking's 
military effort. Rather, it is the basic question of whether Taiwan can indeed afford to 
maintain its existing levels of defence expenditure and defence effort. This question both 
acknowledges the increasing costs of these forces and mounting public and private worries 
over rising budget deficits, increasing levels of public indebtedness, and rates of inflation. 
The acute policy dilemma to which Taiwan is being subjected is, in this view, how to 
maintain the existing defence effort without bankrupting Taiwan's society. Although it would 
be incorrect to see this debate in economic terms alone, it is clear that much of the discussion 
stems from the financial implications of the "warfare versus welfare" controversy. This is a 
theme which has attracted and which continues to attract considerable attention. Therefore, 
in Chapter 5, we examined the impacts of military modernisation on Taiwan's economic 
development. 
Most existing research suggests that high military spending tends to have a deleterious effect 
on a country's economic growth, export competitiveness, and capital formation. However, 
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the study shows that Taiwan presents an interesting deviant case to these cross-national 
generalisations about the relationships among defence burden, economic performance, and 
social welfare. Taiwan has historically borne a heavy defence burden in both dollars and 
manpower. Heavy defence spending has been the outcome of the dynamic interplay of 
military interaction with the PRC, the shifting nature of alliance ties with the United States, 
and domestic and political changes. Yet its economy has achieved one of the world's fastest 
and most sustained growth rates in the past four decades, and its successful export drive has 
made it the world's largest holder of foreign reserves. Moreover, the island's rapid economic 
growth has taken place in a context of political stability and increasing income equality. 
After exploring the various dimensions of Taiwan's security we obtained a number of major 
findings and intellectual gains--both substantive and theoretical. 
Theoretical 
Based on the analysis advanced in Chapter I we found that the traditional approach to 
national security is inappropriate to Taiwan as well as to developing countries, and singled 
out the following major weaknesses. 
First, this literature has focused chiefly on the military dimension, especially threat 
perceptions of contending elites, doctrinal responses, security resources and capabilities to 
meet external threats to the state. However, defining the concept of national security in terms 
of physical protection of the nation-state from external military threats is not only narrow, but 
also misleading. The threats facing the developing states are diverse and complex, and so are 
the dimensions and content of national security. 
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Second, the accumulation, maintenance and development of military force is no panacea for 
security problems. Military strength is a necessary but insufficient guardian. The complex 
and multiple vulnerabilities of developing states compel us not only to look at a deeper 
structure and a broader spectrum of security issues, but also to search for different resources 
and capabilities corresponding to each pertinent threat. Furthermore, excessive preoccupation 
with military power can entail extensive trade-offs with domestic social, political and 
economic issues, which could eventually undermine overall security posture. 
Third, the security environment is important, but it does not necessarily determine or dictate 
the nature of security issues. Domestic factors such as legitimacy, integration, ideology, and 
policy capacity play equally important roles in shaping the national security posture. Security 
challenges in many parts of the developing world are of endogenous rather than exogenous 
origin. Moreover, it is fallacious to understand the developing states' national security from 
the perspective of superpower rivalry. The superpowers may affect the parameters of 
national security in some countries, but they do not deterrnine its nature. As current 
developments in many parts of the world illustrate, the superpowers are seldom able to 
contain, manipulate, or dictate regional and country-specific security problems, whether 
military or economic. 
Finally, direct emulation and adoption of national security management tools and techniques 
from the West also appears unwise. The search for effective management techniques should 




1. Taiwan is to a significant degree representative of the states classified as "small", "weak" 
and "developing". Thus the study of Taiwan's search for national security should provide 
useful insights into the study of the national security of other developing states. When a small 
nation like Taiwan faces a strong military adversary that claims sovereignty over its land and 
people, what are the policy options available to it? International relations theory offers little 
help in answering this question. While IR theorists have addressed the security policies of 
great powers, they have tended to ignore the study of small states. The reasoning is as 
follows: since small states are more preoccupied with survival than are the great powers, the 
international system will be the most relevant level of analysis for explaining their security 
policy choices (Handel 1981,36). Moreover, even when scholars do refer to weak states, 
systemic rather than domestic factors are accorded primacy. The received wisdom in the 
field is that domestic determinants will be less salient when studying small states' behaviour 
because external constraints are more severe and the international situation is more 
compelling. 
Therefore the Taiwan-Mainland dyad permits us to re-examine the relationship between the 
strong and the weak, between large and small states. Weakness is commonly agreed upon as 
the central feature of a state's insecurity dilemma. The condition most feared among 
governments as a cause of war is power asymmetry--that is, an unfavourable tilt in the 
distribution of power. Many small or thinly populated states are not weak because they do not 
confront obviously superior enemies. What makes Taiwan distinctive is the margin of 
superiority that the PRC enjoys. Therefore the rivalry between the ROC and the PRC is a 
case that deserves careful examination in its own right. It can provide an ideal testing ground 
for contending theories of regional conflict. 
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Although the power parity and power preponderance schools present competing arguments 
and contradictory empirical findings, they both indicate that the initiation of conflict is in 
some way connected with the balance of national capabilities between a pair of rivals. 
However, this study reveals that the ROC-PRC confrontation is a special case on account of 
its apparently asymmetrical attributes. The ROC-PRC security interaction offers an inter- 
esting dyad to test propositions linking asymmetric rivalries. This dyad is theoretically more 
significant than the Israeli-Arab conflict, as Taiwan's small size, international isolation, 
questionable support from its ex-ally, and its adversary diplomatic prowess make the odds it 
faces far more unfavourable than those Israel faces. If being isolated internationally and small 
in terms of power is not a fatal factor in Taiwan's management of the relationship with its 
giant rival, it is probably not likely to be a hindrance to other similar countries in less adverse 
situations. In other words, the Taiwan-Mainland dyad can be a critical single case and theory- 
testing study. 
2. The cross-Strait relations over the past decade have been characterised by an intricate 
mixture of compromise and conflict. The dynamics of the Taipei-Peking dyad can be 
attributed to the two regimes' respective concern for security and sovereignty and the mixed 
strategies adopted by both sides. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that decision-making 
is dependent on each other's assessment of its own payoffs, our findings suggest that the 
selection of strategies is in fact determined by each other's calculation of the opponent's 
payoffs. This finding generates numerous interesting theoretical as well as policy 
implications. 
Given that an actor's strategy is highly sensitive to the payoffs of the others, the issue of 
perception and misperception becomes especially important in cross-Strait interaction. There 
may be various sources of misperception, but its outcome can be simple yet dangerous. For 
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example, Peking may misperceive Taiwan's effort to achieve international survival as a move 
to challenge the sovereignty of the PRC, and hence intensify its military threats. This 
outcome is obviously undesirable to both governments. Accordingly, we argue that the 
setting up of certain channels of communication is of special importance in managing 
conflicts across the Strait. In addition, the establishment of some mechanism conducive to 
confidence-building is vital in maintaining peace and stability between the two sides. 
Economic 
1. The cases of Taiwan's WTO bid and Taiwan-Mainland economic interaction can also shed 
light on the debate between structuralism theorists, such as Waltz and Gilpin, and their liberal 
globalist critics such as Keohane, Nye, Rosecrance, and Rosenau. Both schools of thought 
focus on the systemic level of analyses, but are amenable to an analysis on dyadic interaction. 
To a structural realist, military security is the primary national concern. Military prowess is 
the principle composition of national power; other sources of power, such as economic 
capability, are not readily usable and can be put to use only at high conversion and 
opportunity costs. As long as nation-states continue to be the basic units of anarchical 
international system, all issues bear national security implications. To liberal globalists, 
complex interdependence in the modem world has upset the hierarchy of issues, interactions 
are issue-specific, and threats or coercion tend to give way to bargaining for mutual gains 
(Wagner 1988,461-83). Economic interdependence might affect state policy behaviour by 
three "causal paths": via the transformation of national goals or values; via the creation of 
interest groups and hence the alteration of domestic political processes; or simply by issue 
linkages (Rosecrance 1986). Structural realists deny the first two causal links while 
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disagreeing with their global critics on the third one. Economic interdependence, if not too 
asymmetrical, permits the strategic use of economic resources to reduce a nation's security 
threat. 
But economic interdependence between two nations may also give rise to reversed leverage 
if trade and investment become hostage to political coercion. The liberal globalists do not 
deny that issue linkage and asymmetrical interdependence can be a source of influence. But 
when are issues credibly linked? How asymmetrical does economic interdependence need to 
be to become a source of power? What is the threshold? When do the gains from trade turn 
into a national security issue (Hirschman 1945)? It is over these questions that the two 
schools of thought clash. In addition, most empirical works on interdependence leave its 
central premise--increased [positive] interdependence leads to increased political co- 
operation--implicit and untested. Only a few works have gone on to make that assumption 
explicit and to test it by looking at the empirical links between economic flows and the degree 
of co-operation and conflict. 
The Taiwan-Mainland dyad provides an excellent laboratory in which to refine the 
theoretical thinking on power and complex interdependence. Other cases, notably the 
European oil pipeline, technology licensing, and grain export to the socialist countries, have 
been used to examine various propositions on the linkage between trade and security. 
However, most of these conventional cases pertain to bloc-to-bloc relations and intra-alliance 
politics. The Taiwan-mainland dyad, in contrast, is a case of asymmetry. The size disparity 
between Taiwan and the mainland can never be overstated. How Taiwan, as a small country, 
manages economic interaction with its formidable adversary, mainland China, without 
jeopardising its national security, can be very educational to other asymmetric dyads. 
Moreover, the Taiwan-Mainland relationship also highlights policy intentions in shaping the 
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structure of dyadic interaction. We find that despite the unexpected momentum of economic 
interaction across the Strait, so far at least, Peking has shown no sign of exploiting Taiwan's 
dependence on the mainland market, and the current trends lead neither towards co-operation 
and integration, nor conflict and disintegration, which proved that both the realist and the 
liberal theories are partially erroneous when applied to the Taiwan-mainland case. The 
evidence also shows that mutual sovereignty claims force both sides to calculate political 
objectives and security implications of trade and investment. Interaction between these two 
societies or economies does not just grow in accordance with market forces. Rather, it is 
intimately conditioned by political calculus. Almost all the policies and measures governing 
cross-Strait economic relations have carried political overtones. Thus, how far and how fast 
the cross-Strait economic links will develop seems to depend upon political rather than 
economic factors. The Taiwan-Mainland dyad, in short, exemplifies the conscious 
management of power and interdependence. 
2. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the economic role in national security is vital because of its 
extensive spill-over effects on other national values. The multiplicity of national values, 
coupled with the precarious security context, produces security dimensions more diverse in 
Taiwan than in the West. In the conventional approach, the type, source, and level of threat 
are considered easily identifiable as either overt, external or military, being imposed by actual 
or potential adversaries. Threats to economic well-being and prosperity, however, are less 
apparent, making perception and recognition more difficult and controversial. Unfortunately, 
little literature attention has paid to the study of national security from institutional levels 
which are related to the pattern and degree of integration in the international economic 
system. One noticeable threat in this regard is systemic vulnerability, which arises from the 
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concerns of Taiwan, with limited domestic policy leverage, concerning the transmission of 
external economic disturbances originating from the international economic system per se. 
We also pointed out in Chapter 2 that a more recent dimension of the relationship between 
security concerns and international trade stems from increased patterns of economic 
interdependence. However, the connection between economic security, such as economic 
interdependence, and national security has not been well explored in security studies 
literature. Little attention has been paid to security issues in studies of interdependence 
despite the fact that its growth has generally meant that the nation-state is increasingly 
vulnerable to external forces, a phenomenon commonly thought to have security implications 
(Hirschman 1980; Knorr 1973; Knorr & Trager 1977). This is surprising because 
vulnerabilities arising from growing economic transactions and linkages have resulted from 
the increasing allocation of goods and services by international market forces. The expansion 
of these forces has meant the state's increasing material dependence on goods produced in 
other states, implying vulnerability to a disruption in the flow of raw materials, goods and 
services. They have meant a loss of autonomy in economic decision-making, and they have 
meant increasing political entanglements that constrain foreign policy choices (Crawford 
1995,27-55). But the literature has not suggested hypotheses specifying the kinds of 
dependence, loss of autonomy or entanglements that would directly threaten the state's ability 
to provide for military security. Despite the growing awareness of the overlap between the 
spheres of politics and economics and the growing intellectual interest in international 
political economy, the spheres of security and economics were considered separate and 
distinct issue areas. Security studies continue to be concerned more with the state's 'high 
politics' of war and military power than with the 'low politics' of international economic 
transactions (Keohane & Nye 1970; Waltz 1970). As a result, security studies have generally 
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taken the state and its ability to ward off military threats and defend the nation in time of war 
as the central focus of analysis ((Walt 1991,211-39). 
As national economic trends, pay-offs, and policies become more entwined with those of 
other societies, there is greater national susceptibility to disruptive and injurious impacts from 
abroad. In these circumstances, it becomes an increasingly realistic policy perspective to 
identify international trade matters with security concerns. In a basic sense, gaining and 
preserving security hinges upon national power capabilities to achieve essential values. Yet, 
with increased global interdependence, one country's relative capabilities often depend on 
external actors and events. In such an environment, international policy discontinuities can 
distort or defeat national efforts to achieve basic objectives--or even produce new difficulties 
for policy-makers. The perceptibly increased importance of Taiwan in contemporary 
international trade relations is predicated on the need for its effective participation in 
international negotiations, if broadly based multilateral trade accords are to be reached and 
made lasting. It is thus worthwhile to explore the economic dimension of Taiwan's security 
by examining the need and the importance for Taiwan's joining and integrating in the major 
international economic organisations. 
Political 
The inquiry into the dynamics of the threats confronting Taiwan indicates that for 
developing states the sources of threats to their national security are to be found not only in 
the anarchic international environment but also in the domestic environment. For many of 
them the domestic dimension is an equally important if not the primary component of their 
national security. Therefore a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics underlying the 
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national security of the developing states requires that the state be related not only to the 
international environment but also to the substate level where disharmony of interests among 
the individual, the group, and the state levels may explain the cause of domestic conflict and 
the susceptibility of the state to external threat and intervention. 
It is possible to argue that internal challenges are really a struggle for political authority 
within the state and therefore do not affect the survival of the state, which should be the focus 
of national security. On closer examination, the force of this argument is reduced at least on 
three counts. First, some of the internal threats like separatism can radically alter one or more 
components of the state. Second, internal conflicts invariably invite external intervention, 
and this occurrence influences the perception of external threats. In the context of the 
contemporary world, states are highly permeable, and isolating the domestic environment 
from external forces is difficult, especially in the developing states. Third, such a distinction, 
if strictly adhered to, will preclude consideration of many of the activities carried out in these 
states in the name of national security. Theory would then be divorced from reality and 
would serve no policy function. 
Policy Recommendations 
Military 
Though relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits are warming, the threat to the 
ROC's security goes unabated. Peking has been calling for the recovery of Taiwan by 
peaceful means for a long time, it still threatens Taipei with the possibility that it might use 
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force if and when necessary. But, far from frightening Taipei into submission, Peking has 
only succeeded in making the people on Taiwan more suspicious of its intentions, thus 
undermining the effectiveness of its own effort. In addition, a conquest of Taiwan by the 
PRC not only would result in a substantial weakening of its relative international position, 
both politically and militarily, but would also face the risk that Taiwan might declare 
independence and then produce nuclear weapons with which to defend it. The ROC's 
adherence to the "one China" policy is a valuable asset to the PRC, which it should not lightly 
jeopardise. Thus the PRC's use of force seems unlikely under the present circumstances. 
However, it is unlikely that the CCP will formally renounce the military option. 
Since incentives for the PRC to initiate conflict against Taiwan are real, it is vital for the 
ROC to navigate carefully the troubled waters ahead. To maintain stability across the Strait, 
and further, to improve relations between the two sides, the ROC must work hard to promote 
internal stability and to improve relations with other nations in the international system. 
There are both positive and negative tendencies in the current development of cross-Strait 
relations. Although the two governments continue to argue over many issues, they have both 
adopted more realistic policies in recent years. This is helping to build up understanding and 
trust between the two sides. Nevertheless, unification is still a very distant prospect, and a 
divided China will continue to present a threat to the security not only of Taiwan, but of the 
region. 
In the foreseeable future, the possibility of direct Taipei-Peking negotiations depends on 
whether both sides are willing to make concessions. As long as Peking demands Taipei's 
subordination, the chances for talks between the two are almost nil. Thus both Taipei and 
Peking should try to avoid provoking each other over the sovereignty issue. Peking should 
cease trying to isolate Taipei internationally as far as it adheres to "one China" policy. Taipei 
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should adopt a more open and positive mainland policy, allowing direct trade and more 
contacts. At the same time, Peking should continue its open door policy and give up the 
option of using force to settle the Taiwan issue. Current quasi-official communications 
between Peking and Taipei would probably make war less likely. A dialogue could reassure 
Peking that the ROC's leaders were not about to set up an independent state and reassure 
Taiwan that Peking did not intend to seek any resolution of Taiwan by military force. 
"Reassurance is developed through increased 'transparency' of military forces and 
confidence-building mechanisms". It could reinforce the tacit understandings that for many 
years have minimised the risk of military clashes in the Taiwan Strait. Although the large gap 
in military capability between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait makes it hard to establish 
confidence-building measures in this area, Taiwan is paying more attention to this aspect of 
security. In the present circumstances, it would be difficult for Peking and Taipei to adopt 
open confidence-building measures in the form of a treaty. Yet, regulations on military 
encounters that are tacitly agreed by the two sides should be encouraged. Such measures 
might include banning military exercises in the most sensitive areas, limiting the number of 
troops stationed on the off-shore islands, and agrceing not to deploy long-range weapons. No 
one can predict when unification will come true, but reducing suspicion and broadening 
contacts are the safest and the most constructive ways of settling differences between the two 
sides of the Taiwan Strait. 
Though tensions are decreasing and mutual exchanges are increasing across the Taiwan 
Strait, still, directly and indirectly, PRC will continue its efforts to isolate Taiwan and to 
undercut its political and military position. However, from both military and political points 
of view, the disadvantages for Taiwan to develop and possess nuclear weapons for security 
outweigh the advantages. Since Taiwan is theoretically a part of China, military actions by 
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the PRC against the island would be an improper means of resolving this domestic issue, 
because it could provoke public resentment and damage economic strength on both sides. It 
would cost the PRC much and offer little in return. Besides, it would destabilise the Asian 
region and damage relations with the US and with Asian neighbours. 
Therefore, PRC leaders should continue economic and political reforms. Taiwan's industrial 
and economic infrastructures and its technical and managerial skills could provide both a 
useful assistance to Peking and needed impetus for economic development. Both sides 
should prefer compromise and negotiations to conflict and confrontations and build mutual 
confidence. Only by doing so can the peace, wealth, and prosperity of all Chinese people on 
both sides be ensured. 
Political 
A democratic future for Taiwan looks promising, although some aspects of the current 
situation are worrisome. With the emergence of the DPP, Taiwan finally has a competitive 
party system. Nonetheless, the KMT is generally viewed as conservative and interested only 
in preserving the status quo, while the DPP is seen as a not entirely trustworthy coalition of 
anti-KMT groups. A healthy pattern of interaction has not yet developed between the KMT 
and the DPP. Unlike Western political parties which compete against each other and yet still 
accept each other's existence, the KMT and the DPP lack a tradition of harmony and mutual 
respect. The animosity between the two is quite intense and deep-rooted. It is rooted in a 
variety of factors: the fierce and even ruthless struggle for power between the KMT and the 
Tangwai in the past; their different perceptions of the current international position of Taiwan 
and its future; and more important, their sharp ideological differences. Party legacy and 
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practical concerns made the KMT stick to the "one China" policy. Moreover, the KMT 
strongly opposes Taiwan independence. The DPP, on the other hand, called for self- 
determination and independence. The effect of the political reforms carried out by the KMT 
has been to weaken the appeal of Taiwan independence as a political option. Although 
almost all the leaders of the DPP personally favour Taiwan independence, the mainstream of 
the leadership has decided that for the time being, it is politically unwise to push for 
independence, mainly because of the results in the 1994 and 1996 elections, and partly 
because of the anticipated strong reaction from the PRC. The political developments have 
thus confronted the TIM with dilemmas. On the one hand, the Taiwan independence forces 
fear that political reform will legitimise and strengthen KMT rule; yet if they continue to 
hold aloof from participation in the political system, they risk becoming increasingly 
irrelevant in the eyes of the electorate. 
In short, Taiwan's political reform presents the independence movement with a choice 
between using it as a window to step up pressure for independence, or rejoining established 
political institutions, working within the electorally-oriented opposition movement". It is 
expected that the DPP will continue to point to the limits on the Taiwan's formal diplomatic 
relations as a fatal flaw in its foreign policy, and supporting the establishment of an indepen- 
dent "Republic of Taiwan". If this trend continues, tension in the Taiwan Strait will increase. 
It is the PRC's policy to isolate Taiwan from the international community that helps the 
advocates of Taiwan independence. They are convinced that only when Taiwan becomes 
independent can it break its present international isolation. 
Taiwan is acknowledged to have made enormous achievements in democratisation, 
especially in the area of elections. The mayoral, provincial governor and presidential 
elections certainly enhanced Taiwan's international image as a country consolidating its 
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democracy. Taiwan can certainly claim unique achievements politically, and many people 
there believe its experience makes it a model other countries can emulate. 
However, despite Taiwan's success in running elections and the KMT's decision to 
undertake major political reforms, many formidable problems remain unresolved. The 
foremost of these problems is the issue of national identity. Thus in the future political 
developments in Taiwan will probably encounter periodic setbacks with some activities 
perceived as threats to the political stability and security of the nation. The long term trends 
are against the survival of the KMT as a major political force unless it revitalises itself to 
meet Taiwan's changing social and economic needs. It will be essential for the KMT to work 
hard to create a balanced political structure representative of all Taiwanese interests. The 
DPP should make itself a responsible and credible watchdog opposition and concentrate their 
efforts on pressing the KMT for more rapid democratisation, instead of advocating Taiwan 
independence which will only intensify tension between the KMT and the DPP, thus 
endangering Taiwan's political stability and national security. 
The KMT's efforts to maintain political stability would be much helped by a continuation of 
Taiwan's outstanding success in maintaining a high rate of economic growth. 
Economic 
WTO entry will help accelerate Taiwan's economic liberalisation and internationalisation, 
which will in turn boost Taiwan's economic development. The most important measure for 
Taiwan to adopt at this moment is to concentrate on making the necessary trade and economic 
adjustments to meet admission requirements. Most of Taiwan's policies and practices are 
compatible with WTO principles of open and non-discriminatory trade. But there are some 
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areas such as agricultural, services, and certain manufacturing industries, where more 
liberalisation is needed. These last few barriers to free trade will have to come down, if 
Taiwan wants to win quick admission. This is especially true, because Taiwan is applying for 
entry as a developed economy. 
As a contracting party to be, Taiwan should abide by the following rules: contracting parties 
should observe mutually the MFN treatment, make policy transparent, expand the par- 
ticipation of developing countries, open markets, consult and negotiate. The WTO will 
require that some existing restraints and controls be abolished or eased according to its codes 
of conduct. Therefore, it is quite critical for Taiwan to plan in advance in order to reduce the 
impact accompanied by the large scale open market. 
Besides making the necessary adjustments, the government should carefully study many 
rules promulgated by the WTO to help protect the interests of domestic industries and help 
them compete more effectively with major trading countries. The government should also 
help local business in cases of unfair trade practices by imposing countervailing and anti- 
dumping tariffs, and by providing assistance such as import restrictions and educational 
training for local business coping with foreign competition brought on by the reduced tariffs. 
Industries deserving assistance should be provided with a reasonable environment for 
development or be protected by a relatively longer cushioning period. 
However, such government assistance should only be temporary, and a final solution to the 
impact of WTO membership will require structural changes in both the industrial and 
agricultural sectors. After decades of rapid econon-dc development, Taiwan's economy is now 
at a cross-roads. To continue developing, it must carry out a fundamental structural 
transformation. Despite the pain and dislocation it will cause, WTO membership will 
accelerate the island's progress toward the goal. Aggressive anti-protectionism is the best 
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way for Taiwan to acquire the political capital that it needs to accede to the WTO. And trade 
liberalisation would be the only and the best way for Taiwan to defend itself against other 
countries' protectionist measures and proposing a timetable would help convey its 
willingness to liberalise its trade. 
Research Agenda for the Future 
Although the research undertaken in this thesis focuses on a number of discrete issues they 
are inter-linked in a number of important ways. We have attempted, as far as is possible 
within time and space constraints, to unify the themes discussed in this thesis within a holistic 
structure. We hope that focusing on particular themes, examined through a series of inter 
connected essays, helps develop an understanding of those particular features of national 
security that we have highlighted. However, there remains a rich agenda for future research. 
Some key areas for further study are indicated. 
1. With respect to Taiwan's defence spending, a critical problem the ROC government will 
continue to face is of balancing the need to sustain a strong defence posture with the essential 
requirement of trying to maintain a healthy economy. The continuing challenge to policy- 
makers to balance economic growth with an effective defence effort is as difficult to meet at 
the present time as it has been in the past. Indeed in some important respects the 
contemporary challenge is even more difficult to resolve. This can be shown by looking at 
the projected defence spending and the plans for defence capabilities over the next few years. 
Thus, can Taiwan continue to sustain the current pattern of defence spending? Both domestic 
and international changes are likely to hinder the continuation of current defence spending. 
The recent democratic transition has altered parameters underlying the political economy of 
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public spending in Taiwan. The liberalisation of politics has fostered the proliferation of 
interest groups, and they have begun to exert formidable political influence through various 
channels. The government is losing political leverages to insulate the defence sector from 
these new competing social pressures. Thus we need to pay constant attention to Taiwan's 
future defence spending policies and the political impact upon it. 
2. Another intriguing and important issue is the role of the military in Taiwan's political 
development and in Taiwan's society. The military and security apparatus have long been 
regarded as an obstacle and constraint to Taiwan's democratisation. Though Taiwan has 
undergone a transition from authoritarian to democratic rule, and President Lee Teng-hui has 
been striving to depoliticise the military and establish civilian control, some issues still need 
further exploration. Will President Lee be able to exercise control over the military and 
command its full support? What impacts will (did) the regime changes have on the role of 
the military in politics? Will democracy motivate and enable elected officials to diminish 
significantly the political influence of the armed forces? Will the military elites be able to 
maintain their political clout in the democratic era and undermine the independence and 
authority of the civilian government? 
3. Although democracy in Taiwan seems to have a promising future, the issue of 
independence versus unification is increasing tension between the government and the 
opposition, threatening political stability. These differences also complicate relations with 
the PRC, heightening the threat of a military take-over by Peking. Thus, will the ongoing 
power struggle between the mainstream and non-mainstream factions of the KMT, combined 
with the escalation of electoral competition among the KMT, the DPP, and the NP, further 
deepen the existing crisis in the ethnic conflict between Taiwanese and the mainlanders? 
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4. There is also the need to examine the security relations between the US and Taiwan. With 
the end of the Cold War, the US is likely to play a lesser role in world politics than it has in 
the preceding decades. The era of Pax America is over; a new, multipolar international order 
is emerging. This is bound to impact upon Taiwan's security in that the United States is the 
only country at present with both the military power and the political will to assist Taiwan 
should the PRC attempt to reunify China by force. Thus some questions need to be further 
explored. Is the United States still committed to the defence of Taiwan? What might the US 
attitudes be toward the resolution of the so-called Taiwan issue? And what policy on 
Taiwan's security is in the best interest of the United States? 
5. In addition, more research and consideration should be given to the impact of the changing 
nature of cross-Strait relations on the future of Taiwan's security and defence policies. There 
is the need to further assess defence requirements in the light of the changing structure of 
cross-Strait politics. In particular the question which must be asked is whether there is still 
such a PRC threat which necessitates the kind of defence posture Taiwan has sustained for 
the previous decades? Will there exist the following possibilities: the establishment of a 
cross-Strait military buffer zone (the demilitarisation of off-shore islands); the signing of a 
non-aggression agreement and military exchanges, and the establishment of official 
communications and dialogues? 
Communications between Peking and Taipei probably would make the continuing state of 
civil war less explosive and more tolerable for both parties. A dialogue could reassure Peking 
that Taiwan's leaders were not about to set up an independent state and reassure Taiwan that 
Peking did not intend to seek an early resolution of the problem by military force. It could 
reinforce the tacit understandings that for many years have minimised the risk of military 
clashes in the Taiwan Strait. Although a dialogue could be used to make threats as well as to 
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